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Abstract 
Ghana’s oil discovery in 2007 heightened expectations for socio-economic 
development, but it also raised concerns. The “resource curse” refers to the seeming 
paradox that countries richly endowed with  natural resources tend to suffer from 
weak economic growth and low levels of democracy (Rosser 2006). The political 
science literature and international policy discourse has taken an increased focus on 
the role of institutions in explaining and curbing the resource curse. Following 
Ghana’s oil find, commentators focused on the urgency of strengthening institutional 
mechanisms and ensuring accountability in the petroleum sector. Good regulatory 
frameworks and regulatory institutions stood out as particularly important in this 
regard. Despite the importance of the issue, the resource curse literature lacks a focus 
on the conditions under which institutions are formed and changed. This thesis 
attempts to help fill this void by conducting a case study of processes and 
corresponding outcomes in an institutional reform. By employing qualitative data 
collected during my field work, I have studied regulatory reform processes in Ghana’s 
petroleum sector, leading up to the establishment of the Petroleum Commission in 
2011. The primary focus of the thesis is on analyzing (i) the Petroleum Commission’s 
institutional independence, (ii) mechanisms keeping the Petroleum Commission 
accountable and (iii) the Petroleum Commission’s role of holding operators in the 
petroleum industry accountable. Furthermore, by utilizing a conceptual “policy 
transfer” framework I analyze how domestic and external actors and structures have 
influenced the abovementioned outcomes. In particular, I study the influence of the 
World Bank and the Norwegian “Oil for Development” program. My findings 
indicate that the Petroleum Commission enjoys a high level of institutional 
independence, but also that subsequent legislation may allow for ministerial 
intervention in areas of the Commission’s authority, thus reducing its independence. 
Domestic structures and political actors appear to have had a greater impact on the 
Commission’s independence than external donors. The analysis concludes that there 
are good mechanisms in place to ensure the Commission’s accountability towards 
relevant government institutions, and that the Commission plays an important role in 
holding the oil companies accountable. In this regard, the Oil for Development 
program provides a positive influence.  
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1 Introduction 
There is an apparent consensus in the scholarly debate that “institutions matter” for 
development. Authors such as Douglas North (1990; 1992) and Acemoglu et. al 
(2001; 2005; 2013) share the perception that sound institutions are the key to 
countries’ socio-economic development. This view is also reflected in the literature 
on the so-called “resource curse”. The latter concept refers to the seeming paradox 
that countries richly endowed with natural resources tend to have low economic 
growth, authoritarian governments and low scores on development indicators. This 
empirical relationship is particularly strong for oil producing countries. According to 
Karl “most oil-exporting countries […] suffer from economic deterioration and 
political decay” (1997, xv). Further, several academics agree that countries are not 
cursed by their resources, but rather by their institutions (Ross 1999; Mehlum, Moene, 
and Torvik 2006a; Stevens and Dietsche 2008; Kolstad, Wiig, and Williams 2009). 
Poor countries seem especially prone to the resource curse due to weak institutions 
associated with rent seeking and corruption (Rosser 2006). Sound institutions are 
thought to prevent negative effects of petroleum exploration partly because they can 
provide democratic accountability mechanisms.  
The perception that institutions matter for development is also prevalent in the policy 
discourse and among aid practitioners. Previously, influential donors such as the 
World Bank and IMF demanded recipient countries to carry out economic reforms in 
exchange for financial aid. However, since the 1990s their aid disbursement 
conditions have become increasingly directed towards institutional reform. 
International financial institutions have departed from their purely economic 
liberalistic perspective on development, to focusing on aims of “good governance” 
(Stokke 2013a). This change is also reflected in aid policies of bilateral donors, 
including the Norwegian government (Stokke 2013b). In line with the good 
governance development trajectory, Norwegian aid policies are influenced by the 
view that sound institutions can curb negative effects of the resource curse. Petroleum 
related aid programs have come to constitute a significant share of the world’s 
development assistance (Kolstad, Wiig, and Williams 2009). The Norwegian aid 
program “Oil for development” is an important player in this field. The Norwegian 
Agency for Development Cooperation (Norad) states that “among the potential policy 
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responses to prevent natural resource revenues from becoming a curse for the 
economy, development of accountable institutions stands out as especially important” 
(Norad 2011a, 8). Norway is seen as a country that has avoided the resource curse 
partly due to sound political and economic institutions (Larsen 2004). OfD is aimed at 
transferring knowledge and expertise to developing countries, based on Norway’s 
historical experience with petroleum governance.  
Despite the increasing awareness among scholars and practitioners on the importance 
of institutions, there is a lack of focus on how institutions are developed and the 
conditions under which they change. In the words of Achemoglu et. al (2005): “At 
some level it is obvious that institutions matter”. But what is meant by sound 
institutions and what do they matter for? Schelder (1999a) directed an early critique at 
the study of institutions. He claims that the “new institutionalism” in political science 
has given rich accounts of the consequences and effects of institutional arrangements. 
However, “by comparison, they have apparently neglected the study of institutional 
creation and change” (Schedler 1999a, 336). A decade later, Steven and Dietsche pose 
a similar critique with reference to the resource curse literature. They argue that the 
current emphasis on “institutions” as a potential solution to the resource curse, has 
largely ignored the conditions under which institutions are formed and changed 
(Stevens and Dietsche 2008). While the effects of institutions on factors such as 
economic growth are thoroughly studied (Douglass C. North 1989; Rodrik 2008), the 
issue of institutional change appears to be a highly important, but underexplored, 
field.  
Acknowledging the salience of “institutions” among academics and practitioners, as 
well as the above criticism, this thesis aims to shed light on institutional creation and 
development. The thesis explores processes and corresponding outcomes in a 
developing country’s institutional reform. More specifically the study focuses on 
institutional reform in the petroleum sector, as the importance of institutions seems 
particularly prevalent in this policy area. I conduct a qualitative case study of a 
regulatory reform in Ghana’s petroleum sector, namely the establishment of the 
Ghanaian Petroleum Commission.  
Before proceeding, it should be made clear what is meant by institutions in the first 
place. An informed debate deserves a return to Douglas North’s classic distinction 
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between institutions and organizations. North claims that “Institutions are the rules of 
the game in society or, more formally, are the humanly devised constraints that shape 
human interaction” (Douglas C. North 1990, 3). Institutions are formal (or informal) 
laws and regulations. Organizations are the “players of the game”. North explicitly 
mentions regulatory agencies as examples of organizations (ibid, 5). The Petroleum 
Commission can thus be seen as an organization, while the laws and regulations it is 
supposed to enforce are considered “institutions”. Al-Kasim et al. (2008, 8) claim that 
“[Regulatory frameworks] sets the scene for the industry’s activities.” The very 
institution of “regulation” determines opportunities for the sector to function 
efficiently, and whether it will be beneficial for society at large (ibid., 8). This thesis 
will pay attention to both the institutional and organizational features of Ghana’s 
regulatory reform, by looking at the organizational structure as well as the impact of 
relevant laws and regulations. The terms organization and institution are however 
used somewhat interchangeably, in line with colloquial usage of the terms.  
There are a number of possible entries to the study of institutions or organizations. As 
I will return to when the presenting the research questions below, I have chosen to 
look at two central aspects of the organizational structure: independence and 
accountability. The thesis also aims to explore processes influencing these outcomes 
of reform. How is the reform affected by actors and processes internal and external to 
the domestic political system? More specifically, how might donors affect 
institutional reform which is highly contingent on domestic political processes? I 
argue it is vital to include the role of external actors in the analysis, given the 
prominence of aid directed towards petroleum governance. In particular, the 
Norwegian government is providing assistance to the Ghanaian government to build 
up their Petroleum Commission through the Oil for Development program. This is a 
clear example of Oil for Development’s efforts to build up accountable institutions in 
recipient countries. To theoretically capture both endogenous and exogenous 
influences on reform, I utilize the “policy transfer framework” developed by Dolowitz 
and March (2000). The framework is suited to the empirical case at hand since it 
offers concepts to analyze the role of both domestic and external actors as well as 
incorporating the possible influence of donor conditionality1 on reform. Also, the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 The concept “aid conditionality” is defined as discussed in chapter 2.  
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framework captures how the transfer of institutional practices from one political 
context to another may influence outcomes of institutional reform. This is important 
to include given Oil for Development’s attempt to transfer aspects of the Norwegian 
experience of petroleum governance to Ghana.  
It should be noted that the explanatory and evaluative ambitions of the thesis are 
somewhat modest and the reader should not mistake the study for a full-fledged 
evaluation. As stated, I investigate only two outcomes of the institutional reform in 
addition to exploring actors and processes influencing these outcomes. However, I do 
not aim to detect causal explanations on the outcomes of reform. The policy transfer 
framework’s value is first and foremost heuristic; it offers a conceptual toolkit to 
investigate how exogenous and endogenous actors and structures affect the genesis 
and development of institutional reform. A comprehensive evaluation might for 
example be aimed at measuring precise effects of the Norwegian development 
cooperation. This would require more sophisticated data, and is beyond the scope of 
this study. That being said, the possible entries to the study of institutional reform are 
many. In the following I argue why it is relevant to study the aspects of institutional 
independence and accountability. 
1.1 Research questions  
The preceding section established the two main aims of this thesis: Firstly it will 
investigate outcomes of the Ghanaian regulatory reform related to qualities of 
“institutional independence” and “accountability”. Secondly, the thesis explores how 
endogenous and exogenous processes and actors influence these two outcomes. The 
two overarching aims are reflected in four research questions formulated below.  
For a regulator to be able to perform its task effectively, a certain degree of 
independence from government is required (Basilio 2006, 162). As mentioned, 
effective regulation is important for preventing the resource curse and detrimental for 
making the extractive resource beneficial for society at large (Al-Kasim, Søreide, and 
Williams 2008). However, Minogue and Cariño (2006) show that there might be 
reasons to expect impediments towards institutional independence when pursuing 
regulatory reforms in developing countries. A central target in the Oil for 
Development program is that “relevant [cooperating] institutions are able to 
implement and enforce […] policy and legal frameworks.” Based on the above, the 
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fulfilment of this target presupposes some degree of institutional independence.2 In 
sum these arguments imply that the Petroleum Commission’s institutional 
independence is important for it to fulfil its mandate. I therefore investigate the 
following research question: 
Research question 1 (RQ 1): To what extent does the Ghanaian Petroleum 
Commission enjoy institutional independence?  
Furthermore, “accountability” is frequently put forth as the main remedy against the 
resource curse from an institutional perspective (see for example Mehlum, Moene, 
and Torvik 2006b). What is meant by accountability is hardly obvious, and clarity in 
this matter will be sought in chapter 3. Heller and Heuty argue that an oil sector 
regulator often “operates as a fiefdom that overflows its ill-defined role and occupies 
a more and more powerful role in sector management with little accountability” 
(2010, 54). Accountability has become a fashionable, widely used term in the policy 
and academic discourses alike, frequently associated with a good governance 
development agenda. This is reflected in the Oil for Development program as well, 
with its marked focus on supporting the development of accountable institutions in 
recipient countries. Given the salience of this concept, the second research question 
addresses the accountability of the Petroleum Commission:  
Research question 2 (RQ 2): To what extent is the Ghanaian Petroleum 
Commission held accountable? 
The accountability of the Petroleum Commission as a sector regulator is one 
important quality. Nonetheless, keeping the oil companies accountable to the 
population is of equal or perhaps increased importance (Heller and Heuty 2010, 
51). A regulator’s prime purpose is precisely to keep industry accountable for 
their activities to avoid laissez-faire conditions. Recalling Douglas North’s 
distinction, we should ask whether the Petroleum Commission actually does 
constrain the activities of “the players of the game” (the industry) through 
enforcing laws and regulations?       
Research question 3 (RQ 3): To what extent does the Ghanaian Petroleum 
Commission keep operators in the petroleum industry accountable? 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 Fulfilment of this target will arguably depend on a range of other institutional features, but the scope 
of the thesis necessitates some limitation. 
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Again, the thesis has an explanatory section in addition to the evaluative part. With 
respect to the latter, I present and test some theoretically motivated expectations about 
what might explain any significant impediments towards independence and 
accountability (cf. RQs 1-3). In this regard it is relevant to consider the fact that the 
reform process is partly influenced by “policy transfer” from an external context. As 
mentioned, I therefore make use of the “policy transfer framework” developed by 
Dolowitz and Marsh (1996; 2000) to identify variables and mechanisms that can 
explain the reform process. I discuss three transfer variables, namely: Is the transfer 
process voluntary or coerced? Who are the key actors involved in the policy transfer 
process? From where are lessons drawn? Based on this, my fourth and final research 
question is: 
Research question 4 (RQ 4): To what extent does the policy transfer framework 
explain outcomes in the establishment of the Ghanaian Petroleum 
Commission? 
1.2 Methodology 
To gain insight into the petroleum regulatory reform processes in Ghana I have 
chosen a case study approach, in which I have utilized two main methods: semi-
structured interviews and document studies. A large share of the empirical data was 
collected during five weeks of fieldwork in Ghana, January-February 2014. Prior to 
this I conducted background interviews with officials from Norad, and resource curse 
experts at Christian Michelsen Institute, to seek empirical and theoretical insight 
respectively. In Ghana I conducted 15 interviews with respondents from relevant 
public administration and civil society organizations, donors and scholars. In addition 
to providing valuable information on matters related to my research questions, 
respondents gave me otherwise not available written reports concerning the reform 
processes. Further, a comprehensive document study was carried out in the archives at 
the Royal Norwegian Embassy in Accra. Other documents studied include relevant 
laws and regulations, evaluations, official reports and a vast academic literature on the 
topic. The case study approach has proved fruitful, as my aim has not been to make 
large-scale generalizations but to investigate one empirical case in depth. 
Nevertheless, such an approach has certain caveats when it comes to scientific 
validity and reliability. I return to these issues in chapter 4 where the thesis’ 
methodology is elaborated in more detail.   
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1.3 Outline of thesis 
The broader themes that motivate this thesis are discussed in chapter 2, to provide the 
reader with necessary background information on the topic. Here I further elaborate 
on the movement towards aims of good governance and institution building in aid 
policy and development discourse. I also describe Norway’s role as bilateral donor 
and its Oil for Development program in particular. Moreover, I review theories of the 
resource curse and discuss how regulatory reforms may contribute to curbing this 
curse. Chapter 3 gives a thorough operationalization of the key concepts of the thesis: 
institutional independence and accountability. This exercise allows the abstract 
research questions to be assessed empirically. The policy transfer framework is also 
presented in chapter 3. As mentioned, will I discuss the thesis’ methodology in 
chapter 4. Chapters 5 and 6 present the empirical information that came forth in the 
interviews and document studies. Chapter 7 draws on all the preceding chapters to 
offer an analysis aimed at answering the four research questions formulated in the 
introduction. In chapter 8 I summarize the overall findings of the study and propose 
suggestions for further research on the topic.  
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2 Background  
The regulatory reform in Ghana’s petroleum sector has been taking place with a 
marked influence of external donors. The Norwegian Oil for Development program 
and the World Bank are two significant actors in this respect. It has been argued that 
while the 1980s were marked by a neo-liberal development paradigm aimed at 
economic policy reform, we have since the 1990s been facing a development agenda 
dominated by goals of “good governance” and administrative reform. This chapter 
places the relationship between development assistance and institutional reform into a 
broader historical context.  
2.1 Two generations of aid conditionality and policy reform   
Marcel Mauss asserted, early on in his seminal work The Gift (1954), that there is no 
such thing as a free gift. What ultimately differentiates the gift exchange from the 
commodity exchange is that the gift creates more stable and lasting relations between 
the giver and the recipient. In a more or less explicit way, the receiver will be 
indebted to the giver. Gifts in the form of developmental assistance share a lot of the 
same qualities as “regular” gifts (Nustad 2003). The concept of “aid conditionality” 
refers to donors’ practice of making official development assistance conditional on 
political and economic reform in recipient countries (Stokke 2013a, 1). Aid 
conditionality is hardly a new phenomenon. However, a marked difference in its 
usage appeared as donors became more explicit in giving specific, reform-oriented 
conditions on disbursements of aid since the late 1970s (Stokke 2013b, 162). Collier 
(1997) distinguishes between five objectives of conditionality: Selectivity entails that 
aid is conditional on maintenance of a good policy environment in the recipient 
country.3 Paternalism implies that aid is conditional on being spent on particular 
activities. The recipient government may wish to use conditionality as restraint, to 
avoid domestic political pressures pushing for policy reversal. A recipient country 
may commit to donor conditionalities for the purpose of signaling to investors that 
donors have given approval to the future policies of the country. Finally, 
conditionality is most often used as inducement, which means that donors offer 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 This is also called “ex post conditionality”, where future aid disbursement are contingent on past 
performance (Stokke 2013b, 163). 
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support if the recipient authorities agree to introduce a set of policies (Collier 1997).4 
Critics argue that aid conditionality seldom has achieved objectives of policy change. 
Because the recipient countries do not own policies, programs induced by 
conditionalities are not sufficiently implemented (Johnson 2005).   
Stokke (2013a, 7) differentiates between two generations of aid conditionality. The 
first generation began in the late 1970s. It was largely influenced by a prevailing faith 
in laissez-faire economics, and marked by the international financial institutions’ 
(IFIs) efforts to promote economic liberalization in developing countries. This 
happened in conjunction with the severe economic crises that several developing 
countries were experiencing around this time. Governments turned to the IFIs, 
primarily the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF), for financial 
support. Initially, IFIs dispersed cheap loans widely to alleviate the crisis. As the 
crisis worsened and global financial sources started drying up, IFIs established 
conditions for new loans or lower interest rates. Aid was made conditional on the 
implementation of economic policy reform, aimed at liberalizing domestic economies 
through Structural Adjustment Programs (SAPs). Donors would now enter the 
political arena of the recipient government at higher levels than had previously been 
the case. By the early 1980s virtually every African country received large amounts of 
aid conditional on economic reform (Devarajan, Dollar, and Holmgren 2001). And 
“with few other sources of finance, individual debt-ridden Third World countries had 
little choice but to accept the conditions” (Stokke 2013a, 9). 
The policy reforms promoted by the IFIs came to be known as “The Washington 
Consensus”, a term coined by John Williamson who summarized ten common 
principles in the reforms that were promoted towards developing countries in the 
1970s and 1980s.5 The reform principles were: Fiscal discipline (reduction of budget 
deficits), investment rather than consumption in public expenditure, tax reform, 
financial liberalization, unified exchange rates (currency devaluation), trade 
liberalization, removing barriers on foreign direct investment, privatization of state 
enterprises, deregulation of competitive markets and securement of private property 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 This is also called “ex ante conditionality”, where recipient governments have to commit to 
improvement in certain policy areas to obtain aid (Stokke 2013b, 163).  
5 Williamson focused on reforms in Latin-American countries, yet analysts have shown that they apply 
to other developing countries as well.  
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rights (Williamson 2005, 35–43; Walle 2001, 138–139). The salience of different 
reform elements varied greatly between African countries, and so did the success of 
the reforms implemented. It is not possible to give justice to the comprehensive 
debate concerning the effects and virtue of the SAPs. Though, Van de Walle (2001) 
and several analysts with him argue that the structural adjustment process further 
undermined state institutions and their capacity in African countries. Regardless, the 
illustration shows the immense power external actors possess in influencing domestic 
policy reform. The Washington consensus has by many been termed a paradigm (see 
for example Gore 2000). Rodrik commented that “What is remarkable about the 
current fashions in economic development policy […] is the extent of convergence 
that had developed on the broad outlines of what constitutes an appropriate economic 
strategy. […] Faith in the desirability and efficacy of these policies unites the vast 
majority of professional economists in the developed world who are concerned with 
issues of development” (Rodrik 1996, 9).6 To the extent that we saw a development 
paradigm in the 1980s, this was replaced by a new unitization of development thought 
emerging by the end of the Cold War.7 
By the late 1980s a new emphasis was placed on “good governance” by the leading 
western powers and the IFIs (Stokke 2013b, 164). The emergence of the good 
governance agenda coincides with what Stokke calls the second generation of 
conditionality (Stokke 2013a, 9; Stokke 2013b, 162). While efforts in the first 
generation of conditionality were directed towards economic policy reform, donors 
were now increasingly making development assistance conditional on political and 
administrative reform. This seeming new paradigm within the development discourse 
has by some been described as a “post-Washington consensus” (Santiso 2001, 14). 
There was a realization among the IFIs that the SAPs had not delivered as expected. 
Previous development efforts had failed due to a lack of focus on governance issues. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6 Also cited in Van de Walle (2001, 138) 
7 Paradigm is a catchword that should be used with caution. For Thomas Kuhn a scientific paradigm is 
"universally recognized scientific achievements that, for a time, provide model problems and solutions 
for a community of practitioners” (Kuhn 1962). Kuhn’s term paradigm has been widely used in the 
social sciences, referring to policies and political lines of thought rather than scientific principles (see 
for example Hood 1995; Gow and Dufour 2000).  
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Economic policy reform had to be accompanied by reform of political and 
administrative systems (Stokke 2013a, 9). 
The term good governance was first used by the World Bank in 1989. There are 
multiple understandings of the concept of good governance (Santiso 2001, 4). The 
good governance development agenda is therefore broad, with a range of policy 
proposals and implications. It includes democratization (in a wide sense), as well as 
institutional and bureaucratic efficiency and accountability (Abrahamsen 2000a, x). 
Recipients would have to commit to improvements on these arenas to obtain aid. 
Abrahamsen (2000b) points critique at the good governance agenda of the West for 
only involving superficial institutional reforms in developing countries.  
2.2 Norway in the donor society 
In the post war years Norway was a recipient of aid through the Marshall Plan. 
Norway started to provide development assistance itself in 1952 (Leira et al. 2007, 
18). Until the mid-1970s, Norwegian (and Nordic) aid was mainly dispersed 
multilaterally through international organizations such as the United Nations (UN) 
and the World Bank. However, aid gradually became more bilaterally oriented. The 
Norwegian Agency for Development Cooperation (Norad) is the main implementing 
agency for development policies. Since the 1970s, Norwegian aid policy has to a large 
extent included elements of the good governance agenda described above. Institution 
building and competence building in public management were early features of 
Norwegian aid objectives and implementation practices. The stated motives for 
Norwegian aid policy have been altruistic and based on solidarity and a moral 
obligation to help the social and economic development of countries in the global 
South. Norway formulated its first principles for development assistance through their 
aid policy White Paper of 1962. It stated that aid should be provided on a general 
humanitarian basis and was not to be based on political and economic particularistic 
interests (Mushi 2013, 229). Aid should be recipient oriented and used for utilitarian 
motivation, not for interference in the policy of recipients. Stokke calls this stance 
contradictory. The norm of non-interference at the policy level contradicts 
conditionality and it complicates the achievement of the objectives set by the donor 
(Stokke 2013b, 166). The ability to achieve aims of social justice by adherence to 
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principles of non-interference “in a world of neo-patrimonial8 states [run] by self-
seeking elites”, is a seeming paradox (Stokke 2013b, 168).  
The changing climate of international aid policy, from the first to the second 
generation of conditionality, especially in the World Bank, influenced the formulation 
of Norwegian aid policy. At the beginning of the 1990s, the non-interference principle 
was weakened (Stokke 2013b, 194). While the recipient orientation continued to be 
strong, coercive aid conditionality became more explicit. Norad communicated to its 
aid recipients that a failure to deliver results could lead to a closure of the aid 
relationship (Stokke 2013b, 195). The main focus of Norwegian aid policy has 
however been directed towards positive conditionality, by increasing aid to recipient 
countries based on good performance (Stokke 2013b, 164). 
The Norwegian government has traditionally emphasized that a precondition for 
effective aid is that the recipient country must fully share the aims of the cooperation 
(Stokke 2013b, 186–7). From the 1990s, Norad has focused on the use of “jointly 
agreed and binding development contracts”9, a legally binding contract, in which the 
process leading toward the contract is perceived to matter as much as the contract 
itself (Stokke 2013b, 186). The contract should be based on a joint perception of 
mutual benefits between the respective parties. The donor commits itself to a long-
term cooperation with the recipient country, in exchange for commitments to for 
example economic or political reforms on behalf of the recipient (Stokke 2013b, 187). 
In addition to being a large donor country relative to its size, Norway has been 
heavily involved in peacebuilding processes. Well-known examples are the Oslo 
Peace Accords and the Sri Lankan peace negotiations. These factors contributed to 
shaping an image of Norway as a “goodness regime” (Tvedt 2005). The “Nordic 
model” has been presented as an honourable exception from common practice in 
international politics. This has contributed to an identity shaping at home, but also to 
presenting an image of a model that can be copied by other countries (Leira et al. 
2007, 10). The latter applies in particular to Norway’s image as a successful 
petroleum nation.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8 The concept “neo-patrimonialism” is defined and discussed in chapter 3.  
9 A concept introduced by Thorvald Stoltenberg in 1989; then Norway’s Minister of Foreign Affairs. 
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2.3 The Oil for Development program  
Norway has achieved a high level of economic growth and welfare distribution 
despite its oil wealth (cf. the paradoxical nature of the resource curse, defined in 
chapter 1 and further discussed below). Through the Oil for Development Program 
(OfD), Norway strives to share their experiences in petroleum management developed 
over 40 years, with oil producing developing countries. The aspect of the Norwegian 
oil experience of key importance to this study is Norway’s separation of three 
functions related to the governance of the petroleum sector: Policy-making, 
commercial operation and the regulation of industry. Responsibility for policy making 
rested with the Ministry of Energy and Petroleum. The commercial functions of 
exploration and production were placed with the national oil company, Statoil. Lastly, 
The Norwegian Petroleum Directorate (NPD) was established in 1972 to serve as an 
independent regulator of the industry. In response to its oil discovery, Ghana has 
sought the same tri-partite division of institutions. The implementation of a body 
similar to NPD in Ghana is the empirical focal point of this thesis. 
Norway has provided assistance in petroleum management to developing countries 
since the early 1980s. One of the respondents I interviewed at the Ghanaian 
Petroleum Commission had visited Norway in 1983, as part of a training program in 
petroleum management.10 The OfD initiative was launched in 2005, and formally 
established in 2007, to consolidate Norwegian petroleum based development 
assistance (Norad 2007, 4). This decision was aimed at ensuring a more holistic 
approach in Norway’s petroleum aid. While assistance previously was limited to 
resource management, it would now include environmental and financial management 
as well. OfD assistance is divided into three “pillars” covering these three areas.  
OfD is Norway’s most frequently demanded aid program internationally (Norwegian 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2013, 56). In 2013, OfD provided assistance to 18 
countries.11 Norad emphasizes that all cooperation through OfD shall be demand 
driven (Norad 2007, 5) and “tailor-made to domestic conditions and demands” (Norad 
2011a, 11). OfD has been referred to as “the flagship program” of Norway’s 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10 Interview, PC official 1. He received the training in the capacity of being an official of Ghana 
National Petroleum Corporation (GNPC). 
11 http://www.norad.no/no/tema/%C3%B8konomisk-utvikling-og-offentlig-forvaltning/olje-for-
utvikling/olje-for-utvikling 
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development cooperation, as it addresses a strategic sector at high policy levels. OfD 
allows Norway to play a more visible role in several countries and contributes to the 
development of international networks of partners (Scanteam 2013, xvii). OfD is a 
clear example of the focus on good governance in Norwegian development assistance. 
OfD’s objectives were briefly discussed in chapter 1, and deserve a brief elaboration 
here. OfD defines as their primary goal to ensure “Economically, environmentally and 
socially responsible management of petroleum resources which safeguards the needs 
of future generations” (Norad 2011a, 8). In addition, they state that “Principles of 
good governance such as transparency, accountability, anti-corruption and gender 
equality are cross-cutting in all assistance provided” (Norad 2012). These main goals 
are further specified through three targets. The first target is to “develop sound policy 
and legal frameworks”. The second target is that “relevant institutions are able to 
implement and enforce the policy and legal frameworks” (Norad 2011a, 8). The third 
target in the OfD program is that “relevant institutions are held accountable to the 
citizens of the country” (Norad 2011a, 8, my emphasis). The research questions 
formulated in chapter 1 were partly motivated by OfD’s marked focus on good 
governance and accountability. More specifically it was argued that target two 
presupposes some degree of institutional independence on behalf on a regulatory 
agency (cf. RQ 1), while target three is reflected in RQ 2 concerning the 
accountability of the Ghanaian Petroleum Commission.  
The means to achieve OfD’s targets is competence building and institutional 
development of government bodies, through so-called “technical assistance” (Norad 
2011a, 9). Technical assistance refers to contributions to development through 
education and training. 12  OfD is headed by a ministerial steering committee, 
representing the four ministries proving assistance through OfD: The Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs, Finance, Petroleum and Energy and Environment. The steering 
committee formulates strategic direction and guidelines, while the OfD secretariat is 
responsible for coordination and implementation of the initiative. The secretariat is 
placed within Norad (Norad 2007, 5). OfD funds are distributed through the 
Norwegian partner institutions, as well as international consultancy companies, the 
World Bank and the IMF (Norad 2011a, 18). Norwegian partner institutions include 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12 http://www.oecd.org/site/dacsmpd11/glossary.htm 
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the four ministries mentioned above, as well as subordinate Norwegian governmental 
directorates and agencies. A large share of the OfD assistance is organized through 
institutional cooperation programs between relevant institutions in Norway and the 
recipient country. Petrad13 is also an important partner, providing training courses in 
Norway. In the context of this thesis, the relevant Norwegian institutions are the 
Ministry of Petroleum and Energy and The Norwegian Petroleum Directorate. The 
nature of their cooperation with Ghanaian counterparts will be further described in 
chapter 6. As made clear, OfD’s main focus is to prevent natural resources becoming 
a curse for the economy, through among other means establishing accountable 
institutions. To better understand the rationale behind this policy, I briefly describe 
theoretical perspectives on the resource curse and how they relate to institutions.    
2.4 The resource curse and institutions 
Large deposits of natural resources have become associated with weak economic 
growth, low levels of democracy and even the outbreak of civil war (Rosser 2006). 
The developments in Angola, Nigeria, Algeria and Sudan provide examples of this 
(Karl 1997). Sachs and Warner were the first to coin the term resource curse, which 
refers to the negative effects on economic growth (Sachs and Warner 1995). The 
economic rent, or windfall profit, that stems from large natural resources is commonly 
perceived to be dangerous (Ryggvik 2013, 5). In addition to precious stones, metals 
and minerals, petroleum is the resource most commonly associated with the resource 
curse. According to Amundsen (2013), three different, but interrelated, perspectives 
are prominent in explaining the resource curse: Economic, political science and 
political economy perspectives. 
A prominent explanation within the economic perspective is that growth declines 
because the increase in revenues from natural resources leads to exchange rate re-
evaluations. This will make domestic manufacturing and agricultural sectors less 
competitive on the international market which leads to a crowding out of such sectors 
(Sachs and Stiglitz 2007). This might lead to de-industrialization, unemployment and 
deflation and thus weak or negative growth. This is referred to as the so-called “Dutch 
Disease” model (Di John 2008). The model’s name draws inspiration from the effects 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13 Petrad is a Norwegian foundation set up to support capacity development in the petroleum sector 
(Scanteam, 105). 
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felt on the Dutch economy after the discovery of natural gas in the North Sea in 1959. 
The Dutch currency appreciated which made domestic exports more expensive 
relative to imports. As a result the manufacturing sector became significantly less 
productive and de-industrialization and economic downturn occurred (Corden 1984). 
Explanations from the field of political economy tend to focus on the “rentier-state” 
model, often based on theories of rent-seeking and corruption (Di John 2008). In an 
oil rich state, the windfall profit can reduce the government’s need to tax the 
population. This may increase the autonomy and powers of the state, by the reverse 
logic of “no taxation without representation”. In the rentier-state, popular pressures 
for accountability and democratization are reduced. This can include direct opposition 
or prevention of the formation of social groups independent of the state (Kolstad, 
Søreide, and Williams 2008).  
In the political science literature there is an increasing focus on the role of institutions 
in explaining the resource curse. Natural resources don’t necessarily lead to negative 
socio-economic development. There are several examples of countries that are 
considered “resource blessed”, including Norway, Chile, Brazil and Australia. 
Mehlum et. al (2006b) have tested the relationship between economic growth and 
natural resources. They claim that institutional differences between resource rich 
countries is an important explanation for different outcomes in growth (Mehlum, 
Moene, and Torvik 2006b). Whether the resource rents are spent on stimulating the 
productive economy and national development, or is geared towards elite 
consumption and capital flight, is in essence a question of institutional quality 
(Mehlum, Moene, and Torvik 2006a). According to Amundsen (2014, 2) there are 
essentially two theoretical positions on the relationship between resource abundance, 
institutions and development. One position claims that government institutions that 
are weak (or lacking) will affect the economy in a negative way. The negative effects 
will be enhanced in the event of an oil boom since high rents become appropriable by 
the ruling elite (Amundsen 2014). The other position is focused on the negative 
effects a sudden boost of government income might have on governmental institutions 
themselves. Resource wealth might create forces that hinder the development of 
“good” political institutions. It can also lead to institutional decay, if politicians 
obstruct or dismantle political institutions to reap the benefits of the rents. Democratic 
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institutionalization is thus important with respect to the resource curse. The risk of 
being cursed by petroleum resources seems higher if the discovery of the resource is 
made before democratic institutions are established and consolidated. In the case of 
Ghana, Heller and Heuty warns that: “Now that the oil from Jubilee has begun to 
flow, the task of building accountable institutions, rules and procedures gets more 
difficult with each passing day that legislation is not enacted.” (2010). Countries 
without institutions that promote accountability and state competence will suffer from 
a resource curse, as such institutions ameliorate the perverse political incentives of oil 
booms (Robinson, Torvik, and Verdier 2006). In line with this perspective, Amundsen 
(2013a) argues that the institutionalization of special agencies of restraint and control 
is one important solution for avoiding the resource curse. Independent regulatory 
agencies are common in the petroleum sector and considered as part of a best practice 
model of petroleum governance (Banful 2010). Regulation is seen as important in 
petroleum governance to ensure that the resource rent14 benefits the citizens of the oil 
nation, rather than profit seeking companies or political elites. Below follows a 
review of what is meant by regulation and regulatory agencies. 
2.5 Regulatory reform 
Political regulation stands as an alternative to leaving the operation of an industry or 
sector solely to market mechanisms (Baldwin 2012, 56). Regulation has been defined 
as “the intentional use of authority to affect behavior of a different party according to 
set standards, involving instruments of information-gathering and behavior 
modification” (Baldwin, Cave, and Lodge 2012, 12). Over the past three decades, 
several services that were previously supplied by the state15 have been shifted to 
private ownership and provision. As a consequence, the private sector requires some 
regulation to ensure that it functions in the interest of the wider public (Aryeetey 
2004, 295). This has led to enhanced state regulation of private industry, by some 
referred to as the rise of the “regulatory state” (Majone 1997). Regulation may be 
aimed at securing market competition, product quality, health and safety of work 
environments, among other qualities (Cook et al. 2004, 3). Regulation is particularly 
important in the petroleum sector. Regulation determines opportunities for the sector 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14 The term rent referring to the definition posed by David Ricardo. It is synonymous with oil rent, 
ground rent or economic rent. 
15 Such as telecommunications, water and electricity.  
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to function effectively, and whether it will benefit society at large. The well-
functioning of an oil industry depends on a good regulatory framework as well as the 
capacity of regulatory institutions (Al-Kasim, Søreide, and Williams 2008, 8).  
Regulatory functions can in principle be placed within, or insulated from, the central 
government. Placing regulatory activity within the central government has 
advantages, as it enables coordination between regulation and other government 
policies. However, when regulatory authority is centralized in a ministry, political 
alteration may affect regulatory policies (Levi-Faur 2011, 206). It is commonly 
argued that regulatory activities should be independent from central government, to 
avoid political bias and short term horizons of ministers; there is a perception that 
some things are best left out of politics. This creates an incentive to limit the 
ministerial authority over certain parts of public administration (Christensen 2006, 
114). A common approach is therefore to place regulatory responsibility within 
independent agencies. As guardians of the public interest, regulators should in 
principle have both technical capacity and independence (Minogue and Cariño 2006, 
9). As argued in the preceding chapter, it is therefore important to analyze the 
institutional independence of the Petroleum Commission. The establishment of the 
Petroleum Commission in Ghana is an example of OfDs efforts to develop 
accountable institutions “to prevent natural resource revenues from becoming a curse 
for the economy” (Norad 2011a, 8). While the Norwegian regulatory authority is 
named a directorate and the Ghanaian regulatory authority is named a commission, 
they both fall into the category of regulatory agencies (Pollit et al. 2001). 
A public (regulatory) agency can take many shapes but is generally an administrative 
body which enjoys relative independence from the executive branch of government, 
while still being part of the executive portfolio. It is an organization vertically 
specialized outside ministerial departments, staffed by public servants, carrying out 
public tasks at the national level, often with a more or less single purpose (Egeberg 
and Trondal 2009).16 Regulatory agencies are used in several sectors, for example the 
utilities, telecommunications and infrastructural sectors.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
16 In addition to regulation, agencies may be responsible for managerial tasks, policy advice or service 
provision (Christensen, Lie, and Lægreid 2008). 
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There was a rise in the establishment of regulatory agencies around the world from 
the 1960s-1970s and onwards. This has been associated with a process of so-called 
“agencification”. 17  The creation of quasi-autonomous public bodies has been a 
prominent organizational trend in OECD countries during the so-called New Public 
Management era (Verhoest et al. 2010). However, agencification and de-
agencification has been an enduring theme in public administration and is not 
something entirely novel (Egeberg and Trondal 2009). The independent regulatory 
agency is an old organizational form. An early known example is the US Inter-State 
Commerce Commission from 1887 whose function was to regulate the pricing of 
railroads. The apparent acceleration in the creation of (regulatory) agencies is often 
perceived to be connected with OECD’s ability to influence member countries 
through recommendations. OECD is often considered to be an important agent of 
“policy transfer” (for example in Stone 2004). Similarly, in Ghana, increased 
regulation has occurred partly as a consequence of demands made by donors 
(Aryeetey 2004, 295).  
There are disagreements as to whether the organizational form of independent 
regulatory agencies ensures accountability in decisions or if it weakens the 
parliamentary chain of control. Baldwin suggests that accountability is limited in this 
model (Baldwin 2012). Autonomy produces a loss of public accountability and 
political control (Verhoest et al. 2004, 2). I will return to the relationship between 
independence and accountability in the next chapter. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
17 By some scholars termed “autonomisation” (Verhoest et al. 2004, 1) 
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3 Theoretical Framework 
Research question 1 address to what extent the Ghanaian Petroleum Commission 
enjoys institutional independence. While research question 2 asks to what extent the 
accountability of the Commission is ensured, research question 3 concerns whether 
the Commission ensures accountability of the operators in the upstream petroleum 
industry. The evaluative part of the analysis necessitates operationalization of the key 
concepts institutional independence and accountability. This will be an important 
focus of this chapter. Likewise, the explanatory part of the analysis (cf. RQ 4) 
necessitates identifying variables hypothesized to influence the outcomes of interest. 
This will be the focus of section 3.4, where an explanatory framework based on the 
policy transfer literature is developed.  
3.1 Institutional independence  
There is broad consensus in the literature on regulation that a regulatory agency 
cannot have absolute independence, since political executives eventually have the 
final political responsibility for the agency’s activities (Christensen and Lægreid 
2006, 12). But also, that a regulatory agency needs some degree of independence 
from superior bodies in government (cf. section 2.5). The agency should be formally 
separated from and managed at arms-length by its ministry (Pollitt 2009). In reality 
regulatory agencies have varying degrees of independence in policy decision-making, 
personnel matters, financial and managerial matters (Levi-Faur 2011). Organizations 
are commonly considered to be open systems that will never be fully independent nor 
dependent on their environment (Kickert 1993). Therefore, the independence of an 
organization will always be relative and should be considered to be positioned in a 
continuum between two extremes of full dependence and full independence (Levi-
Faur 2011). Different countries have varying traditions for degrees of regulatory 
independence. John Stern makes a classification of utility regulators, where he argues 
that the US model is “the epitome of independent regulation”, closely followed by the 
UK model. Least autonomous are the regulatory agencies in the post-Communist 
central and eastern European countries (Stern 2001, 103). The independence of a 
regulatory agency means relative insulation from both industry and political pressures 
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(Minogue and Cariño 2008). Independence from the regulated industry is important to 
avoid regulatory capture (Bó 2006).18 
In the petroleum industry, the presence of an independent regulator is seen as 
important in order to avoid conflicts between commercial, political and regulatory 
interests (Oxfam America 2009). Amundsen (2013) claims that countries become 
cursed from oil when their institutions are not strong enough to withstand pressures 
from certain group’s access to the wealth. Regulatory independence stands out as 
particularly important in this respect. An operational concept of institutional 
independence is necessary to empirically assess its prevalence with regard to the 
Petroleum Commission.  
Operationalization of institutional independence 
There is no consensus on how to operationalize institutional or regulatory 
independence (Levi-Faur 2011, 202) and the concept is used differently in various 
studies about regulatory agencies (Verhoest et al. 2010, 18). The first academic works 
on formal regulatory independence were focused on Central Banks. Gilardi and others 
drew inspiration from these works to develop measures of the formal independence of 
regulatory agencies in general. The operationalization below (see table 3.1) is inspired 
by Gilardi’s operationalization, but is somewhat simplified in accordance with similar 
studies on institutional independence (see for example Sezen 2007; Amundsen 
2013b). I will focus on the dimensions of legal, financial and human resources (HR) 
management independence, as well as procedures for the nomination of leaders and 
commissioners.  
Firstly, it is important to consider whether there are judicial rules for the agency’s 
independence from other institutions. This concerns the category of legal 
independence. Ensuring legal independence involves creating a separate legal entity 
with a restriction on ministerial responsibility for agency matters. Where agencies do 
not have a legal personality, the decision-making powers delegated to them can be 
taken back by government rather quickly as a parliamentary vote is not necessary 
(Verhoest et al. 2004, 106). The agency should have a status and mandate guaranteed 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
18 Due to the scope of this thesis I will not discuss and analyze the Petroleum Commission with regard 
to regulatory capture, though this would make for an interesting future study.   
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by the constitution or specific legal acts. Further, for Christensen (2006) this includes 
authorization by law for the chief executive to make decisions in his own capacity. 
This is important to curb “ministerial interventions in his decisions as well as his 
consultation with the minister or the minister’s advisers on decisions that, according 
to the law, are delegated to him” (ibid.). The ability of policy principals to overrule 
agency decisions is an impediment to effective regulation (Minogue and Cariño 2006, 
5). 
Financial independence concerns the extent to which the agency is dependent on 
government funding or own revenues, and the extent to which the agency is 
responsible for its own losses (Verhoest et al. 2004, 106). From the perspective of 
principal-agent theory, financial management autonomy is important for the 
regulatory agency’s ability to manage its finances optimally according to their 
objectives. At least four sub-dimensions are important in this regard. The first two 
dimensions are interrelated. Firstly, independence is considered low if the agency is 
funded exclusively from the central government. Conversely, independence is high 
where central government funding represents a small share of the overall budget. The 
second sub-dimension deals with whether the agency is mandated to earn its own 
income. Independence is considered high where regulatory agencies have the ability 
to gain revenue through levying fees on the regulated firms. This increases their 
independence because it reduces budgetary dependence on the government. Perla 
Legaspi (2006) has however shown, in her case study of local regulatory authorities in 
the Philippines, how levying regulatory charges can lead to corruption and regulatory 
capture. Governments have traditionally restricted the ability of agencies to generate 
income through such a regulatory charge, and have also restricted their capacity to 
define the charge themselves. Allowing them to do so is however argued to increase 
their independence as they can better adjust the tariff to their cost structure. This 
allows for the management to maximize its budget for optimal output (Verhoest et al. 
2010, 22). From a rational choice perspective it could also be used to optimize 
“organizational slack” as proposed by Niskanen (1971), a discussion we will not enter 
into here. 
The third sub-dimension of financial independence concerns the ability to take up 
loans. There are three basic ways an agency can finance its investments: By using 
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their current capital, by saving capital for future investments, or by taking up loans in 
the capital market. According to Verhoerst et al. (2010), governments have 
traditionally been skeptical towards giving agencies the independence to take up 
loans. If the agency fails to service its loan, the government’s debt ratio may worsen, 
which could raise the interest rate for government loans in general. Furthermore, the 
loan burden, which will last for several years, must be funded either through the state 
budget, or by the agency’s “users”. Being able to take up loans increases an agency’s 
financial independence, which is particularly important where the agency has capital-
intensive activities (Verhoest et al. 2010, 22), which is typical for petroleum 
regulators. The final sub-dimension of financial independence concerns whether the 
agency has to cover its own deficits.  
Matters relating to appointments of agency head and governing board falls under 
what Christensen (2006, 115) terms structural autonomy. Agency independence is 
considered high where the agency head is appointed and evaluated by the agency 
board (Verhoest et al. 2004, 108) and the board is appointed for fixed terms by non-
governmental actors (Christensen 2006, 116). Conversely, independence is low where 
the central government appoints agency head and governing board, and the board 
members can be resigned at any time (ibid.). Non-governmental appointments of 
agency head and board is considered important in many instances, in order to avoid 
the risk of partisan or patrimonial nominations, which can seriously impede on agency 
independence (Amundsen 2013b, 10). This risk might be higher in countries with a 
record of neo-patrimonial practices. 19  A low score on this aspect of structural 
independence is also widespread in “legal-bureaucratic” contexts; Stern asserts that 
UK regulation appears to be less divorced from the policy process, for example since 
the government can choose the single person regulatory office head (Stern 2001, 103). 
In his discussion of electoral commissions, Amundsen (2013b, 10) claims that if 
executive appointment of agency head and board is the case, the appointment of 
respected public figures, known for non-alignment with politics, may nevertheless 
advance agency independence. 
The fourth and final conceptual category considers human resources management 
independence. Human resources (HR) are often the most important factor of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
19 The concept “neo-patrimonialism“ is defined and discussed in section 3.4. 
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production for regulatory agencies, and the allocation of decision-making powers 
along this dimension has been a highly contested issue. Verhoest et. al (2010, 19) 
include three aspects of HR management: autonomy regarding salaries and the 
promotion and evaluation of personnel. Decisional autonomy on these issues may be 
important since it provides managers flexibility in staff numbers and thus better 
budgetary control, among other things. For the purpose of “getting the right man on 
the job” it should be important to have autonomy to set criteria for recruitment and 
also to evaluate staff to get the right incentives for doing a good job (Verhoest et al. 
2010, 20).  
Table 3.1 below summarizes the four categories of institutional independence, with a 
total of nine dimensions, according to how the concept is made operational from the 
above review.  
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Table 3.1 Operationalization of institutional independence 
3.2 Accountability  
According to Heller and Heuty (2010, 51), the need for accountability is the most 
important challenge in Ghana’s process of reinvigorating its petroleum sector 
institutions. It is of critical importance to ensure mechanisms that hold both oil 
companies and the Ghanaian government accountable to the population (Heller and 
Heuty 2010, 51). Deficiencies in accountability are often more critical in new rather 
than established democracies (Schedler, Diamond, and Plattner 1999, 2), and often 
particularly problematic in oil rich countries (Kolstad, Wiig, and Williams 2008). An 
 Low High 
Le
ga
l 
(1) The agency is part of the 
central government with no 
separate legal status; (2) the 
relevant laws give little decision-
making power to the agency 
head; (3) decisions are taken by 
or in consultation with the 
minister. 
(1) The agency is a separate legal entity 
by public law and is established by a 
parliamentary act; (2) the relevant laws 
place the decision-making power with 
the agency head; (3) relevant laws 
minimize the scope for ministerial 
interventions.  
Fi
na
nc
ia
l 
(4) The agency’s funding stems 
exclusively from the central 
government; (5) the agency does 
not earn income through levying 
fees on regulated industry; (6) 
the agency cannot take up loans; 
(7) the agency does not have to 
cover its own deficits. 
(4) A minor part of funding might stem 
from central government; (5) the 
agency is primarily funded by other 
sources than central government, e.g. by 
levying fees on regulated industry; (6) 
the agency can take up loans; (7) the 
agency must cover most of its deficits 
itself, e.g. by imposing budget 
constraints. 
A
pp
oi
nt
m
en
ts
 
(8) Central government appoints 
agency head and governing 
board; (9) board members can be 
resigned at any time. 
(8) Agency head is appointed and 
evaluated by the governing board; (9) 
the board is appointed by actors outside 
central government and its members are 
secured fixed terms. 
H
R
 m
an
ag
em
en
t (10) Decisions regarding 
recruitment; salaries; promotions 
and evaluation of personnel are 
made by the central government. 
 
(10) Decisions regarding recruitment; 
salaries; promotions and evaluation of 
personnel are made by the agency. 
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oft repeated aim of the OfD program is to promote accountable government 
institutions, as a means to avoid the resource curse. However, accountability is “an 
underexplored concept whose meaning remains evasive, whose boundaries are fuzzy, 
and whose internal structure is confusing” (Schedler 1999b, 13). Accountability 
focuses on the need for checks and oversight, surveillance and institutional constrain 
on the use of power. Without being constrained by an institutional infrastructure of 
accountability, rulers are free to act as they please (ibid.).  
As discussed earlier, the autonomy of a regulatory agency is perceived as important in 
order to withstand industry and political pressures. The independence of a regulatory 
agency can however create unwanted effects unless balanced by proper requirements 
for accountability (Baldwin 2012). Commentators warn that agencies may become 
dangerously independent of the political process, whereby they will lack 
accountability (Levi-Faur 2011, 370). How will the agency be held accountable, if 
largely insulated from other actors in politics and public management? There appears 
to be an inherent trade-off between the autonomy and accountability of such agencies. 
Nevertheless, Baldwin (2012, 113) warns against too much accountability: “The 
abilities of regulators to develop and apply their expertise, to operate efficiently in 
pursuit of their mandate, and to function in a transparent and accessible manner, may 
all be prejudiced by ill-judged moves to increase accountability”.20 Transparency is 
another important quality of public management sought through the OfD program. 
Transparency is of reduced importance if democratic accountability is missing. There 
is little use in having information about the performance of public officials if their 
abuses cannot be punished. Transparency may therefore be considered a precondition 
for accountability and will be operationalized as part of the latter concept. To 
approach an operationalization of the concept accountability, it is useful to distinguish 
three sets of accountability questions: who is accountable, to whom and for what 
(Scott 2000, 41)?  
Accountable for what?  
Bovens (2007) views political accountability as resting on a set of principal-agent 
relationships. For example, voters delegate sovereignty to elected representatives who 
then delegate their authority to the cabinet and civil service. The concept of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
20 What Bovens et. al (2008) refer to as “accountability overload”. 
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accountability establishes a dialogic relationship between “accounting agents” and 
actors being held accountable. In a wide sense of the term, political accountability 
concerns the accountability of public officials in general, i.e. everyone employed by 
the state, from politicians to street-level bureaucrats. Political accountability (in the 
wide sense) can be further subdivided according to categories of what different state 
actors ought to be held accountable for. I choose to follow Schedler’s (1999b, 22) 
classification. He suggests seven sub-categories of political accountability. Firstly, 
political accountability (in the narrow sense) concerns the appropriateness of policies 
and policymaking processes as well as the personal qualities of political actors. 
Administrative accountability assesses the procedures and effectiveness of 
bureaucratic behavior (ibid.). This type of accountability is concerned with 
monitoring processes, or procedures, whereby inputs are transformed to outputs or 
outcomes (Byrkjeflot, Christensen, and Lægreid 2013, 4). Professional accountability 
reviews compliance with codes of conduct or ethical standards of professionalism. 
Financial accountability means evaluating the use of public money by state officials, 
based on norms of efficiency and austerity. Legal accountability entails monitoring 
whether laws are followed. Constitutional accountability reviews whether legislative 
acts correspond with constitutional rules. Lastly, moral accountability means 
evaluating political acts on the basis of normative standards, but not necessarily 
related to laws and regulations (Schedler 1999b, 22).  
Accountable to whom?  
Public officials are thus accountable for a variety of acts and domains. The dialogic 
nature of the accountability concept necessitates an identification of the “agents of 
accountability” who are meant to check and restrain the power of public actors. 
O’Donnell’s heuristic distinction between vertical and horizontal accountability is a 
useful conceptual tool to identify different agents of accountability. O’Donnell’s 
distinction plays on a spatial metaphor of power: The vertical dimension refers to a 
classic pyramidal power hierarchy. Elevation in the hierarchy means power, whilst a 
low placement indicates powerlessness. Accountability can flow either top-down or 
bottom-up along this vertical dimension. Top-down, vertical accountability is 
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typically associated with administrative accountability 21  (Schedler 1999b, 23). 
Administrative accountability can refer to the principal-agent relationship between 
higher ranking officials controlling lower ranking officials within an (public sector) 
institution. It can also refer to the principal-agent relationship between public 
agencies and other representative bodies of government (O’Loughlin 1990), in our 
context, the relationship between the relevant sector ministry and regulatory agency.  
Electoral accountability is the most important mechanism in the bottom-up, vertical 
dimension (Schedler 1999b, 23). The fundamental institution of vertical 
accountability is free and fair elections, as that is the people’s means to reward or 
punish politicians based on their performance. Civil society organizations and the 
media are also important institutions of vertical accountability.  
Horizontal accountability refers to formal relationships within the state itself. 
Government must be accountable to the electorate, but also be subject to restraint and 
oversight from other public bodies. Horizontal accountability concerns the capacity of 
state institutions to check abuses by other public agencies and branches of 
government (Schedler, Diamond, and Plattner 1999). The classic expressions of 
horizontal accountability are the checks and balances between the executive, 
parliament and the judiciary. The purpose of this tripartite division of power22 is for 
these institutions to constrain, check and monitor each other to prevent any power 
abuse. Over the past century, the functional differentiation of the state has increased, 
and so has the number of “agents of accountability” (Diamond, Plattner, and Schedler 
1999, 3). Examples of newer agents of horizontal accountability are auditor generals, 
ombudsmen, central banks and electoral commissions (Amundsen 2013c). In our 
context, the relevant agents of horizontal accountability are the Parliament, Auditor 
General and Judiciary. Metaphorically, the horizontality dimension implies that this is 
a relationship between agents of relatively equal power, though this will rarely be the 
case. For an accounting party to be taken seriously it should be more powerful than 
the accountable party in its areas of competence. This concerns the enforcement 
dimension of the accountability which is the focus of the following section.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
21 What Schedler names bureaucratic accountability. The “forms of accountability” are overlapping and 
the terminology varies in the literature. Administrative accountability is for example closely connected 
to legal accountability. 
22 As promoted by Montesquieu. 
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Accountability as answerability and enforcement  
Accountability consists of two main aspects: answerability and enforcement (Schedler 
1999b, 14–15). Answerability refers to public officials’ obligation to provide 
information about their conduct, while enforcement denotes the capacity of agents of 
accountability to impose sanctions on power holders when they have violated their 
duties (ibid.). The term accountability is hence closely related to steering and control 
(Verhoest et al. 2010, 25; Scott 2000, 39).23 Majone asserts that “independence from 
direct political control does not mean independence from political accountability” 
(Majone 1999, 11).  
Answerability constitutes the informational aspect of accountability. It concerns the 
ability of accounting agents to oblige power to be exercised in transparent ways, 
through questioning what has and what will be done in a specific area. “Holding 
somebody accountable implies the opportunity to ask uncomfortable questions” 
(Schedler 1999b, 14). Answerability also entails forcing power holders to defend their 
acts, through giving reasons and forming judgments. “Being accountable to somebody 
implies the obligation to respond to nasty questions” (ibid.). This informational aspect 
of accountability is closely linked to transparency, which in a political context simply 
means “access to information” (Kolstad, Wiig, and Williams 2008, 1–2). 
Transparency is seen as an important quality for reducing corruption and other 
resource curse related problems. It is an important prerequisite for establishing proper 
institutional and regulatory structures (ibid.). Strengthening transparency is therefore 
an important goal in the OfD program. Transparency is important for creating 
conditions in which abuses can be challenged, which is linked to the second aspect of 
accountability: enforcement. 
Enforcement of accountability means punishing bad conduct and rewarding good 
behavior. This aspect reflects a view that political accountability should be more than 
merely a discursive activity. Appropriate enforcement mechanisms are important 
incentives to induce proper behavior. Schedler states that:  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
23 Schedler states that: “This two-dimensional structure of meaning makes the concept a broad an 
inclusive one that, within its wide and loose boundaries, embraces (or at least overlaps with) lots of 
other terms – surveillance, monitoring, oversight, control, checks, restraint, public exposure, 
punishment – that we may employ to describe efforts to ensure that the exercise of power in a rule-
guided enterprise” (Schedler 1999b, 14).  
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Exercises of accountability that expose misdeed but do not impose material 
consequences will usually appear as weak, toothless, “diminished” forms of 
accountability. They will be regarded as window dressing rather than real 
restraints on power (Schedler 1999b, 16).  
There is a large pool of possible sanctions. Mere exposure is in itself a powerful tool 
of accountability as it can destroy reputations. Removal from office is a common 
sanction for misconduct. Illegal behavior should be followed by legal sanctions 
(Schedler 1999b, 16–17).  
Operationalization of accountability 
I draw on the main insights from the above discussion to develop an 
operationalization of accountability applicable to the study of regulatory agencies. 
The main dimensions of accountability are well articulated in the following quote: “A 
is accountable to B when A is obliged to inform B about A’s past or future actions 
and decisions, to justify them, and to suffer punishment in the case of eventual 
misconduct” (Schedler 1999b, 17). Making RQ 2 and 3 operational necessitates 
identifying who constitutes “A” (the accountable party) and “B” (the accounting 
agent) in the respective research questions. With respect to RQ 2, the Petroleum 
Commission is seen as an “A” actor. Relevant accounting agents for a body like the 
Petroleum Commission are its sector ministry, relevant parliamentary committee(s) 
and the Auditor General. Regarding RQ 3, the Petroleum Commission can be 
considered a “B” actor in relation to the oil companies who it is supposed to regulate 
and monitor. Accordingly, the dimensions of enforcement and answerability must be 
taken into account. Whether the Petroleum Commission is held accountable, will be 
investigated through an empirical inquiry into whether the three relevant accounting 
actors ensure answerability and enforcement. Similarly, I will analyze whether the 
Petroleum Commission ensures answerability and enforcement towards the industry. 
The operationalization for each research question is summarized in tables 3.2 and 3.3 
below. 	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Table 3.2 Operationalization of the Petroleum Commissions’ accountability vis-
à-vis relevant government bodies 
 Low High 
A
ns
w
er
ab
ili
ty
 
(1) The sector ministry does not oblige 
the agency to explain and inform about 
the processes whereby inputs are 
transformed to outputs (vertical, 
administrative accountability); 
(1) The sector ministry obliges the 
agency to explain and inform about the 
processes whereby inputs are 
transformed to outputs (vertical, 
administrative accountability); 
(2) Relevant parliamentary committee(s) 
does not oblige the agency to explain and 
inform about the processes whereby 
inputs are transformed to outputs 
(horizontal, administrative 
accountability); 
(2) Relevant parliamentary committee(s) 
obliges the agency to explain and inform 
about the processes whereby inputs are 
transformed to outputs (horizontal, 
administrative accountability); 
(3) The Auditor General does not oblige 
the agency to explain and inform about 
their financial conduct (horizontal, 
financial accountability) and their 
performance (horizontal, administrative 
accountability) 
(3) The Auditor General obliges the 
agency to explain and inform about their 
financial conduct (horizontal, financial 
accountability) and their performance 
(horizontal, administrative 
accountability) 
En
fo
rc
em
en
t 
(4) The sector ministry/relevant 
parliamentary committee/auditor general 
does not impose sanctions on the agency 
when they have violated their duties 
(4) The sector ministry/relevant 
parliamentary committee/auditor general 
imposes sanctions on the agency when 
they have violated their duties 
 
Table 3.3 Operationalization of the Petroleum Commissions’ role in keeping 
industry accountable 
 Low High 
A
ns
w
er
ab
ili
ty
 
(5) The agency does not oblige the oil 
companies to explain and inform about 
their conduct; 
 
(5) The agency obliges the oil companies 
to explain and inform about their 
conduct; 
 
En
fo
rc
em
en
t 
(6) The agency does not have the means 
impose sanctions on the oil companies 
when they have violated their duties 
(6) The agency has the means to impose 
sanctions on the oil companies when they 
have violated their duties 
	  
	   32 
3.3 A two-fold approach to the study of institutional change 
The above operationalization provides categories which will be applied to the 
empirical material to analyze the institutional independence and accountability of the 
Ghanaian Petroleum Commission in chapter 7. However, it is essential to keep in 
mind that there may only be a loose coupling between formal institutions and actual 
practice. Good institutional analysis must pay attention to both formal and informal 
rules. Actors respond to both, and informal incentives might triumph over the formal 
ones (Helmke and Levitsky 2012). Brunsson asserts that “It is relatively easy – 
basically with a couple of strokes of the pen on an organizational chart – to adapt the 
formal organization to changes in norms or new laws of fashions” (Brunsson 1993, 9). 
However, “[…] institutional reforms will not be worth the legislative paper they are 
written on unless supported by real changes in political attitudes, managerial practices 
and organizational competencies” (Minogue and Cariño 2006, my emphasis). With 
regard to institutional autonomy, it is thus important to the make the distinction 
between agencies that are truly independent and those that are independent on paper 
but strongly influenced by the government and ruling party (Amundsen 2013b). 
Institutions that are formally dependent may act independently, while institutions that 
are independent may be “intimidated, colonized, or neutralized in practice” (Mozaffar 
and Schedler 2002, 15). Likewise, mechanisms for accountability may be ensured 
formally, while lacking in practice. “Scores” on the dimensions of the operational 
concepts may thus be different with regard to formal and observed change. The above 
arguments call for a twofold approach to the study of institutional independence and 
accountability. Based on this, I conceptualize a matrix of institutional reform with two 
dimensions representing degrees of real and formal change:  
Table 3.4 Possible outcomes of institutional reform 
 
Formal change 
High Low 
R
ea
l c
ha
ng
e High 1 4 
Low 2 3 	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The simplified division between high and low change, gives four possible outcomes: 
Formal change can be accompanied by real change (outcome 1). Formal change can 
occur, while real change is lacking (outcome 2). Outcome 3 signifies that both formal 
and real change is low. The fourth possible outcome is low formal change 
accompanied by high real change. This matrix will be applied when the concepts of 
independence and accountability are analyzed in chapter 7.  
3.4 Explanatory framework  
In order to explain outcomes (cf. RQ 4), it is important to consider the fact that the 
regulatory reform is influenced by what several scholars have termed “policy 
transfer” from abroad. The vast literatures on policy diffusion (Walker 1969), lesson-
drawing (Rose 1991), policy convergence (Bennett 1991) and policy transfer 
(Dolowitz and Marsh 1996) are all concerned with how: 
Knowledge about policies, administrative arrangements, institutions and 
ideas in one political setting (past or present) is used in the development of 
policies, administrative arrangements, institutions and ideas in another 
political setting (Dolowitz and Marsh 2000, 5). 
The concept is thus not merely concerned with “policy” in the common understanding 
of the term, where policy may be seen as a government statement of intended actions, 
in the form of laws, regulations and rulings (Birkland 2011, 8). Since the term also 
refers to the transfer of institutions and administrative arrangements it becomes 
relevant for the analysis at hand. Keeping in mind the role of the OfD program (cf. 
chapters 1 and 2), it should be clear that transfers of lessons from other contexts are 
likely to have influenced the petroleum regulatory reform in Ghana. Characteristics of 
the transfer process itself can be hypothesized to influence resulting institutional 
structures and practices (Dolowitz and Marsh 2000). It can have implications for 
whether policy transfer is likely to occur at all, as well as for whether implementation 
of reform will be “successful”. Dolowitz and Marsh have developed a conceptual 
“policy transfer framework” (1996; 2000), in which they have systematized insights 
from much of the above mentioned literature. The framework serves as a helpful 
heuristic to analyze empirical findings. It will be used to expand an understanding of 
(1) why the Petroleum Commission’s independence may be deemed sufficient, or 
possibly undermined, and (2) why certain accountability mechanisms are in place or 
lacking. The policy transfer framework is organized around a number of questions 
related to various aspects of the transfer process, all assumed to affect outcomes in 
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different ways. I have chosen to focus on the following three central questions, and 
treat them as explanatory variables for analysis: Is the transfer process voluntary or 
coerced? Who are the key actors involved in the policy transfer process? From where 
are lessons drawn (Dolowitz and Marsh 2000, 8)?24  
Though conceptually helpful, the frameworks’ claims of causation between variables 
are somewhat underdeveloped. Evans and Davies (1999, 3) recognizes this, stating 
that “[…] in order to make stronger knowledge claims [the policy transfer framework] 
must engage in theoretical and methodological pluralism and integration.” Following 
that thought, I will supplement the policy transfer framework with theories of 
institutional change.25 The concepts in the policy transfer framework are used to 
frame and pose theoretically motivated hypothesizes about the empirical material. The 
hypotheses are formulated towards the end of each of the below sections. 
Voluntary and coerced transfer  
The two first variables in the policy transfer framework address whether the transfer 
is voluntary or coerced and which actors who are involved in transfer. These two 
variables are interlinked, since the actors involved may affect whether transfer is 
voluntary or coerced. I thus discuss these two variables in conjunction. A policy 
transfer process can be conceptualized along a continuum ranging from the most 
voluntary forms of policy transfer, to direct imposition of what is being transferred 
from one domain to another. There are six stages of the continuum,26 as illustrated in 
figure 3.1. Coercive policy transfer occurs when a government or a supranational 
institution pushes or forces another government to adopt a certain program (Dolowitz 
and Marsh 1996, 344). Transfer processes will often involve both coercive and 
voluntary elements, which might be difficult to distinguish between (Dolowitz and 
Marsh 2000, 14). For the sake of simplicity, I discuss the binary distinction between 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
24 The remaining questions are: What is transferred? What are the degrees of transfer? What restricts or 
facilitates the transfer process? How is the process of policy transfer related to “success” or policy 
“failure”? (Dolowitz and Marsh 2000, 8). 
25 Evans and Davies also argue that “policy transfer is a model of policy change” (Evans and Davies 
1999, 367). James and Lodge agree that different schools of institutionalism offer insights into, for 
example, the voluntary-coercion dimension of policy transfer (James and Lodge 2003, 186). 
26 Ranging from maximum voluntariness (and i.e. minimum coercion) to the opposite: Lesson-drawing 
marked by perfect rationality, lesson-drawing marked by bounded rationality, voluntary transfer driven 
by a perception of perceived necessity, obligated transfer, conditionality and coercive transfer in the 
form of direct imposition. 
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voluntary transfer (in the shape of “lesson drawing”) and coercive transfer through 
donor conditionality. Due to the fact that donors appear to have an important role in 
the reform under study, I place main emphasis on the theoretical impact of coercive 
transfer. The discussion culminates in an empirical expectation of which impact a 
coerced transfer process is likely to have on institutional independence and 
accountability. 
Figure 3.1 A policy transfer continuum 
 
Source: Dolowitz and Marsh 2000, 13 
Lesson-drawing is a concept coined by Richard Rose (1991, 7), defined as “an action-
oriented conclusion about a program or programs in operation elsewhere.” Rose states 
that even though all countries have unique political systems and histories, problems 
that are unique for one country are abnormal. Confronted with common problems, 
governments are likely to draw lessons from each other. The lesson drawing part of 
the continuum implies that transfer is chosen as a rational response to a perceived 
problem. Transfer occurs as a “result of free choices of political actors” (Dolowitz 
and Marsh 1996, 344). This view of the policy process assumes a rational-choice 
perspective, where actors behave instrumentally to maximize the attainment of their 
preferences. Politics is seen a process of social learning where institutional creation 
results from voluntary agreement between the relevant actors (Hall and Taylor 1996). 
Dissatisfaction with the status quo, a gap between aspirations and achievement, drives 
actors to voluntarily search for existing solutions in time and space. The concept of 
lesson-drawing captures the importance of experience in policy making, and the fact 
that public officials are reluctant to implement solutions that have not been tried 
elsewhere. Lessons can be positive or negative, teaching policymakers what to do or 
not to do. For Rose, the critical analytical question is: “Under what circumstances and 
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to what extent would a program now in effect elsewhere also work here?” (1991, 4). 
Rose claims that “lesson-drawing tends to be voluntaristic” (1991, 9). However, there 
is also a push-effect in lesson-drawing when a country, or a group of countries, have 
disproportionately large power relative to the other (Majone 1991). Dolowitz and 
Marsh distinguish between lesson drawing marked by perfect rationality and bounded 
rationality (stage two of the continuum). Bounded rationality, a term coined by 
Herbert Simon (1957), recognizes the limits of human cognitive capacity and 
resources to process information. This distinction is not of vital importance here.27 
The more voluntary a transfer process is, the more likely it is that there will be a 
political will for implementation and a genuine ownership over the reform efforts. 
Reform is assumed to be the result of deliberate goal-directed choices between 
alternative organizational forms (Brunsson 1993, 67).  
Dolowitz and Marsh place donor conditionality towards the coercive end of the 
transfer continuum. They claim that “when aid agencies are making loans it is likely 
to lead to coercive policy transfer” (2000, 16). The use of conditionalities can 
represent an explicit form of coercion, where donors demand that certain reforms are 
implemented. Policy conditionality is one important means by which aid can 
influence the decision to reform (Tsikata 2001, 82). Regulatory reforms in the water, 
electricity and telecommunication sectors in Ghana, have happened partly by 
consequence of demands from donors (Aryeetey 2004, 295). Different forms of aid 
conditionality have generally impacted the development path of a number of nations, 
as described in chapter 2. Aid has predominantly been used as an incentive for, but at 
the same time been very ineffective in creating, sustained policy change (Collier 
1999a, 325; Bräutigam and Knack 2005). In aid dependent countries, donor 
conditionalities tend to undermine policy learning. Where donors set policy, 
ministries become passive. Officials have negative incentives to disagree with donors 
since this will delay the disbursement of resources (Rakner and van de Walle 2001). 
Collier asserts that genuine change is more likely where policies are determined by 
domestic political processes over which donors have little influence. Santiso points 
out that “External support to policy change has all too often failed to offset a lack of 
local commitment and ownership of reform. The use of financial leverage is not a 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
27 For a critique of equating perfect and bounded rationality with voluntary transfer, see James and 
Lodge (2003, 185). 
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substitute for weak domestic institutions or feeble political will” (2001, 9). Donors’ 
use of conditionality as an incentive towards policy change involves purchasing 
change, which explicitly places ownership of policy with the donors (Collier 1999a, 
323; Johnson 2005; Bräutigam and Knack 2005). This is exemplified by the fact that 
the World Bank for years referred to Ghana as “its” success (until the government 
started reversing their policies) (Bräutigam and Knack 2005). The former vice 
president of the World Bank has expressed: “For the World Bank, it will need to 
differentiate carefully between countries where reforms are serious and stand a 
reasonable prospect of success and those in which window dressing is used as a 
means of seeking additional funding” (sited in Santiso 2001, 10). 
Actors involved in reform  
The second variable in the policy transfer framework deals with actors involved in 
policy transfer. To make this variable relevant for the study of institutional reform, I 
draw on Schedlers’ framework for analysis of actors involved in institutional reform 
(Schedler 1999a). Dolowitz and Marsh identify nine broad categories of political 
actors engaged in the process of policy transfer.28 Schedler presents a similar list, 
agreeing that: “agencies […]29 are not the product of lone institutional designers. 
Quite the contrary, constructing them tends to involve a plethora of actors: 
governments, state officials, legislators, judges, journalists, citizens, interest groups, 
public interest organizations, international financial organizations, and so forth” 
(Schedler 1999a, 336). Agents involved in transfer will often organize forums for the 
exchange of ideas between the “recipient” and knowledge elites within the relevant 
policy area. This will frequently include members of relevant epistemic communities 
(see Adler and Haas 1992) who share similar beliefs and common policy concerns. 
Such arenas can facilitate the development of consensual knowledge in a transfer 
process (Evans and Davies 1999, 379). 
As an analytical starting point, Schedler talks of a binary structure of conflict where 
“conservatives” and “agents of change” constitute two sets of antagonistic actors 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
28 Elected officials, political parties, civil servants, pressure groups, policy entrepreneurs, transnational 
corporations, think tanks, supra-national governmental and non-governmental institutions and 
consultants. 
29 Schedler uses the framework to analyze the genesis of “institutions of horizontal accountability” (cf. 
section 3.3), but the framework may advantageously be used to analyze institutional reform in other 
areas of politics as well (Diamond, Plattner, and Schedler 1999, 9). 
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influencing institutional reform. The boundaries between the two groups are not clear 
cut, and membership in one or the other group is not fixed. Reconstructing 
dichotomous conflicts between reformers and their opponents is common in empirical 
analyses of institutional reform (ibid.).30 The binary distinction is further subdivided 
into “four modes” of institutional change: Reform can be triggered from outside, 
above, within or below. Since Schedler includes both domestic and “outside” actors, 
his framework becomes relevant for the study of policy transfer. In our context, 
relevant actors from outside are epistemic communities of experts, other governments 
and donors (discussed above). The four modes of change rarely work in isolation. The 
trigger for reform may come from one side, as somebody “has to kick the status quo 
from its point of equilibrium” (Schedler 1999a, 346). 
In democratic systems all institutional creation must pass through government and 
parliament.31 In that sense, institutional reform cannot come anywhere else than 
from above (Schedler 1999a, 338). Top officials and legislators are veto players 
who have the final say when it comes to the establishment, formal structure and 
resource endowment of new institutions (Schedler 1999a, 338). Due to their role as 
veto players, actors “from above” are the most powerful both in both preventing 
and promoting reform.  
Schedler asserts that: “Political institutions do not fall from heaven; they have to be 
conquered against the express will of those who defend the status quo (more often 
than not, because they benefit from it while they expect to lose in alternative futures)” 
(Schedler 1999a, 337). The quote refers to a common assumption in theories of 
institutional change: power-holders who are enjoying the status quo will be reluctant 
to reform, especially if reform negatively affects their vested interests. In the short 
run, institutional change generates winners and losers (Douglass C North 1992). 
Losers will commonly attempt to block policy change, making change difficult and 
largely incremental (Devarajan, Dollar, and Holmgren 2001, 10). This can be 
explained from the perspective of historical institutionalism – an umbrella term for a 
range of similar theories about institutional change. The punctuated equilibrium 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
30 For example in the literature on democratic transitions, studies of the political economy of economic 
reform, judicial reform, electoral reform, state reform, civil service reform the combat against 
corruption and clientelism and the establishment of common property rights (Schedler 1999a, 336). 
31  In two party-systems national legislatures are often dominated by the ruling government, making 
this them largely the same actors. 
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model is influential within this tradition, with its idea of path dependency (Mahoney 
2013). From this perspective, internal reproductive mechanisms of institutions, such 
as increasing returns to scale, causes institutional change to be largely incremental. 
Positive feedback mechanisms maintain structures over time towards robustness and 
stability. Institutions are thus reproduced in long periods of continuity, interrupted 
only by critical junctures of radical change (March and Olsen 2008). Power-holders’ 
tendency to prefer the status quo represents an important reproductive mechanism in 
institutions. According to North, the interests of actors in existing institutions produce 
path dependence as “[…] the mental modes of the entrepreneurs […] bias the actors 
in favor of policies conceived to be in the interests of existing organizations” (North 
1992, 12). Reform induced by aid can therefore temporarily disturb the political 
equilibrium, but is unlikely to shift it permanently (Collier 1999a, 326). Critical 
junctures are points in time when path dependent institutional stability is punctuated 
by brief phases of institutional flux (Capoccia and Kelemen 2007, 341). These are 
short periods where structural influences on political action are significantly relaxed. 
During critical junctures the range of choices available to political actors are 
expanded considerably. Choices and decisions that occur during critical junctures may 
have lasting impact on the direction of a self-reinforcing, path-dependent institutional 
development (Capoccia and Kelemen 2007, 343). Junctures are “critical” because 
they place institutional arrangements or trajectories which may be difficult to alter 
(Pierson 2004, 135). 
What implication do these insights have for the study of institutional independence 
and accountability? Institutional reform frequently entails changing existing power 
structures. The creation of autonomous institutions will, more often than not, involve 
taking away power from existing institutions. The reform under study in this thesis, 
involves the establishment of a new institution, which at the same time affects the 
structure of (at least) two existing institutions: The Ministry of Energy and Petroleum 
and GNPC. The reform involves directing some of the responsibility that was 
previously mandated to these institutions, to the new Petroleum Commission. As 
discussed, such changes may trigger reactionary behavior from actors enjoying this 
power from the outset. History provides several examples of this, including the 
development of constitutional courts in East Central Europe and Central Banks in 
Russia, whereby both had their independence thwarted and had to proclaim it in open 
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confrontations with governments unwilling to offer sufficient autonomy (Schedler 
1999a). 
Based on the above, I shape the following argument: Assume that donors32 are the 
prime movers of change, by demanding that an institution is established through 
attaching conditionality to disbursements of aid. In the terminology of Dolowitz and 
Marsh, this represents coercive policy transfer. In such an instance, lack of local 
commitment and ownership among higher government officials is likely. We may 
however assume that reform is adopted and implemented, since government officials 
have negative incentives to disagree with donors, as this may delay or block the 
disbursement of funds. Nevertheless, reproductive mechanisms within existing 
institutions may work counter to change. The recipient country may wish to satisfy 
donors, while attempting to retain existing structures. The government will establish 
an institution that satisfies the first dimension of independence: creating a separate 
legal entity (cf. section 3.1). The government will however strive at keeping 
decisional powers within the central government, giving low independence along 
dimensions 2 and 3. The central government may wish to influence the agency by 
keeping powers of appointment of agency head and board, thus creating low 
independence along dimensions 8 and 9. Central government may also wish to 
influence staffing of the agency, leading to low independence along dimension 10 as 
well. In section 3.3 it was argued that (administrative) accountability is closely 
connected to steering and control (Schedler 1999b, 14; Verhoest et al. 2010, 25). 
Following the same line of thought, administrative accountability between the 
superior ministry and established agency can be expected to be strong in order to 
maintain a great degree of control. High accountability along dimension 1 can thus be 
expected. Based on this line of argumentation I formulate the following hypothesis:  
Hypothesis 1: If donors are the prime mover of reform (through applying 
conditionality), high autonomy along dimension 1, high accountability along 
dimension 1, and low independence along dimension 2, 3, 8, 9 and 10 will be the 
result.  
Thus far it has been assumed that donors are the primary proponents of reform (actors 
of change), while government may “halt” reform towards low degrees of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
32  This may be the Norwegian government through the OfD program, or other donors. 
	   41 
independence, and corresponding high degrees of administrative accountability. 
Rational choice institutionalists assume that popular demands are the driving force of 
institutional reform. In democratic systems, actors from below can influence a reform 
process through advocacy. Reform is frequently induced "from below”, by the 
electorate and “civil society”.33 In many societies, civil society organizations function 
as watchdogs, pressuring government to improve on accountability and “good 
governance”. Such demands regularly include pressuring government to follow 
international best practice of governance. The presence of an independent regulator in 
the petroleum industry is frequently referred to as “best practice” (Banful 2010). 
Since government is assumed to have self-interest in reelection, they will be more 
receptive to demands from “below”, than from “outside”. In societies where vertical 
electoral accountability is strong, power-holders’ interest in reelection may curb their 
short-term interest of retaining the status quo (Schedler 1999a, 340).  
Killick et. al claim that “the objectives and interests of donor agencies and of recipient 
governments can rarely be expected to coincide” (Killick 2005, 98). However, the 
interests of donors and civil society may coincide. Schedler asserts that the success of 
change-promoting actors depends on the support they receive from other actors. Their 
success depends on forming coalitions for change (Schedler 1999a, 347). Donors 
frequently fund civil society organizations (CSOs) in countries they operate in to 
pursue common agendas (Hearn 2001).  
I shape an empirical expectation of reform outcomes, based on the main assumption 
of the previous argument: Donors aim to induce institutional reform in a recipient 
country. I further assume that CSOs share the preferences of the donors (either 
because they are funded by donors and/or because both agents promote good 
governance as part of their agenda). It is assumed that CSOs are truly independent of 
government, and not coopted by them (thus sharing governments’ preferences). Due 
to government officials’ interest in reelection, they will be more receptive to the 
demands from their domestic civil society, thus including several of their demands in 
the institutional design of reform. The coinciding preferences of donors and civil 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
33 Definitions of civil society vary greatly but is generally perceived as actors separated from the state 
and the private sector (Rooy 2013). Here civil society will refer to voluntary associations, think tanks 
and the media (Schedler 1999a, 340). 
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society have a greater chance of gaining prevalence if they form a coalition for 
change. We assume civil society promotes a high degree of independence for the 
regulatory agency, to insulate it from political bias and short term political interests.  
Hypothesis 2: If donors and CSOs coalesce in promoting regulatory reform, there 
will be a greater chance of independence and accountability along all dimensions 
of the concepts.  
From where are lessons drawn?  
The third transfer variable considers the spatial dimension of policy transfer. Policy 
makers may seek lessons from three levels of governance: The international, the 
national and the local (Dolowitz and Marsh 2000, 12). Transfer might take place at 
and between any of these levels (Evans and Davies 1999, 368). Here we will focus on 
whether lessons about institutional features are drawn primarily from within the 
nation or from the cross-national level (see Dolowitz and Marsh 2000, 9). The fact 
that domestic structural features inevitably will influence outcomes cannot be 
circumvented. Domestic structures and traditions produce path dependence, limiting 
the range of options available in a transfer process, and thus reducing the possible 
impact of the transfer process on final outcomes. Structural constraints may include 
constitutional or other legal requirements regarding institutional arrangements. The 
following paragraph discusses how informal structures may influence relevant 
outcomes of reform.  
A common entry point for analyzing the African state is the concept of the neo-
patrimonial state, initially coined by Eisenstadt (1973).34 The neo-patrimonial state 
stands in contrast to the Weberian ideal type of the legal-rational state. Expressions of 
the neo-patrimonial state are by no means restricted to Africa, as most states can be 
said to exist in a continuum between the ideal types of the neo-patrimonial and the 
Weberian state (Braathen, Bøås, and Sæther 2000). Weber claims that modernity gave 
rise to the modern state and its bureaucracy, where legitimacy emerges from the rule 
of a rational-legal authority. The modern state has supreme authority over its territory 
and monopoly on the use of legitimate force. Patrimonialism is a term introduced by 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
34 The term has become associated with the works of Jean-Francois Médard and Christopher Clapham, 
among others. 
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Weber in his writings on traditional authority, where the patriarchy within the smaller 
family unit is extended to broader societal relations (Weber 1978).  
In Africa, neo-patrimonial norms often permit unregulated presidential control over 
state institutions with a degree of executive dominance that far exceeds a president’s 
constitutional authority (Helmke and Levitsky 2012, 86). The Neo-patrimonial state 
exists in a tension between a legal-rational bureaucratic framework on the one side, 
and a personalistic framework on the other. The public sector unites inherited 
traditional values with the logic of the modern state. Employment in the public sector 
is commonly seen as an important source of personal enrichment (Bøås and Dokken 
2002). Instead of having the impersonal and abstract character of legal-rational 
domination, political power becomes personal power (Bøås 2001, 701). Political 
power structures are regularly maintained through vertical clientelistic relationships, 
where political patrons maintain the political or economic support of their agents 
through providing patronage.  
Gyimah-Boadi and Prempeh characterize Ghana as having patronage-based politics, 
and argue that “a multitude of public-sector opportunities – jobs, consultancies, 
directorships, civil-service posts, and construction contracts – are reallocated entirely 
on the basis of party loyalty after a party turnover in government” (2012, 101). Civil 
service reforms often involve efforts to curb patrimonial rule. Brinkerhoff et. al (2002, 
33) claim that “civil service reform is important to depoliticize and professionalize the 
bureaucracy, but this always encounters resistance.” Aryeety (2002, 23) argues that 
regulatory agencies in Ghana only enjoy partial independence. Ministers can give a 
great deal of direction on the discharge of their functions and their boards and agency 
heads are mainly appointed by the president (ibid.).  
Hence, there are reasons to expect impediments towards certain aspects of 
institutional independence if lessons are drawn primarily from within the nation. It 
has been argued that neo-patrimonial structures often permit great presidential control 
over state institutions. To the extent that such structures are salient in Ghana, we may 
expect significant scope for ministerial interventions in relevant laws, thus reducing 
independence along dimension 3. Conversely we may expect ministerial 
administrative accountability to be strong, since that allows for a greater deal of 
executive control over the agency (dimension 1 of accountability). Independence with 
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regards to appointment of board members and agency head may also be expected to 
be low in neo-patrimonial systems, where power structures are upheld by vertical 
clientelistic relationships. Political principals may provide their agents opportunities 
for public sector employment, either through appointments to boards or by 
influencing the staffing of an agency as a means of patronage. The latter may 
motivate central government to maintain decisional power in HR management. Any 
salience of neo-patrimonial power structures may thus lead to low independence 
along the dimensions concerning appointments of agency head and board (dimension 
8 and 9) as well as for HR management (dimension 10). Based on this I shape a third 
and final empirical expectation to be tested in the analysis: 
Hypothesis 3: If lessons about the organizational structure are drawn primarily 
from the domestic level, high accountability along dimension 1 and low 
independence along dimension 3, 8, 9 and 10 will be the result.  
Before presenting relevant empirical information in chapters 5 and 6, I elaborate on 
strengths and weaknesses of my data collection methods in the next chapter. 
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4 Methodology  
As initially established, this thesis has adopted a qualitative case study approach. As I 
discuss below, the study is not aimed at drawing general conclusions about a larger 
set of cases. The case study method is therefore fit for purpose, allowing for holistic 
analysis with “thick descriptions” (Geertz 1973; Gerring 2007, 49). The main 
methods for data collection were semi-structured interviews and document studies. In 
this chapter I describe in closer detail how these methods have been utilized during 
the course of the study.  
4.1 The case study method and potential for generalization  
A case refers to a phenomenon delimited in space and time (Gerring 2007, 19). The 
case under study is “Ghana’s petroleum regulatory reform during the period 2007 to 
2013.” As chapter 5 will show, the case begins when petroleum regulatory reform 
appeared as a policy issue in 2007 and ends shortly prior to the data collection period. 
It should be noted that the temporal scope of a case, is often longer than the period 
about which data is collected (Gomm, Hammersley, and Foster 2000, 109). Spatial 
boundaries of a case are often more obvious than temporal boundaries (Gerring 2007, 
19). Ghana’s reform is still ongoing as central legislations are not yet passed and 
institutional practices not fully settled. This has implications for suggestions for 
further research on the topic, as will be discussed in chapters 7 and 8. Further, calling 
something a case implies that the phenomenon relates to a broader set of cases 
(Gerring 2007, 13). George and Bennett define a case as an “an instance of a class of 
events” (2005, 17). The reform under study can be seen as an instance of “petroleum 
regulatory reform in sub-Saharan Africa.” Though case studies regularly aim to shed 
light on a larger set of cases, their potential for such generalization is often weak since 
the unit under focus is not necessarily representative of a population of similar 
phenomena (Gerring 2007, 21). The case study method is therefore commonly 
critiqued for its weak external validity, that is its lack of representativeness between 
sample and population (Gerring 2007, 43). Generalization is however a matter of 
degree. Though not perfectly representative of a broader phenomenon, findings from 
a case study may have transferability to other similar cases (Gomm, Hammersley, and 
Foster 2000). Lincoln and Guba (2000) argue that case studies offer working 
hypotheses that can be used to understand other cases where there is transferability 
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between “source” and “target” cases. The concept of transferability implies that 
readers determine whether findings are applicable to other cases, rather than the 
researcher making explicit generalizations to a population (Gomm, Hammersley, and 
Foster 2000, 98–100). Single case studies allow for the generation of hypotheses that 
can be tested elsewhere (Gerring 2007, 41).  
4.2 Rationale behind choice of case  
In order to make findings transferable to similar instances, my choice of case was 
motivated by what Gerring calls “typical case selection”, where the case is chosen 
based on similarity to the larger class of cases (Gerring 2007, 91). The thematic 
motivation for the study was an interest in good governance reforms. More 
specifically: the influence of aid on intuitional reform in developing countries. The 
Norwegian Oil for Development program came forth as an empirical example of a 
promoter of good governance in institutions through aid. OfD is the most frequently 
demanded Norwegian aid program and appears to be the best-funded petroleum aid 
program globally (Scanteam 2013, xix). An empirical focus on the OfD program 
therefore appeared to have practical value in addition to thematic fit. In addition, 
choosing a reform influenced by a Norwegian aid program, would hopefully give 
findings increased relevance to the immediate audience of readers. These factors 
provided pragmatic justifications for narrowing the scope of possible cases to OfD’s 
18 cooperating countries (cf. section 2.3). A further criterion for the choice of case 
was to select a country where institutional reform was in focus. A recent evaluation of 
the OfD program concluded that “The overall finding is that OfD has generally not 
given governance problems sufficient attention, with Ghana being the most positive 
exception of the cases looked at“ (Scanteam 2013, xix). OfD support to Ghana has 
among other things focused on developing legal frameworks to establish relevant 
institutions. In the evaluation, OfDs support on drafting of the Petroleum Commission 
was put forth as an important basis for establishing institutions with proper regulatory 
functions. Ghana was thus chosen because the focus on institutional reform appeared 
to be stronger here than in other OfD cooperating countries. If the larger class of cases 
was “OfD cooperation countries” this would be a regarded as a deviant case selection 
(Gerring 2007, 89). However, the choice of case was made to ensure that findings 
from the case study could shed some light on the similar cases of institutional 
regulatory reform. Minogue and Cariño (2006) have edited a compilation of case 
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studies about regulatory governance in developing countries. Nevertheless, the issue 
of regulatory reforms in developing countries appears to be a somewhat 
underexplored field in the political science literature. This thesis aims at contributing 
to this scholarly literature. The study’s ambitions of generalization are however 
modest. The study shares resemblance with the “intrinsic case study”, where a 
particular phenomenon is investigated partly for its own sake. This is common in 
evaluative case studies, where focus is directed to whether a policy or program 
implemented in a particular place achieved its goals or produced desirable effects 
(Gomm, Hammersley, and Foster 2000, 99). Following this thought, research 
questions 1-3 were termed evaluative research questions, as they aim at assessing 
certain outcomes in the particular reform. 
The study has taken a single-case study approach. Research question 4 asked to what 
extent the policy transfer framework could explain outcomes in the reform. In this 
regard, a multiple or comparative case study could have been useful to properly assess 
the value of the theoretical framework. Such a design would allow for more variation 
across the selected cases, thus make stronger claims of verification or falsification of 
the proposed hypotheses. Cross-case studies may have larger potential to make 
general claims about the value of a theoretical framework. If the main aim was to test 
and scrutinize a general validity of the theoretical framework, a multi case approach 
would definitely be more useful. However, the explanatory part of this study takes 
more of an exploratory approach. The policy transfer framework has a heuristic value 
by providing insight into the specific reform process.  
Finally, since the focus of this thesis is on a sole institution, a qualitative approach is 
chosen before a quantitative one. Both qualitative and quantitative methods can be 
used to determine regulatory independence and accountability, and the latter is 
convenient when comparing the independence of several agencies (see Gilardi 2002; 
2005). In the following I describe the qualitative data collection methods used. I pay 
particular attention to strengths and weaknesses regarding scientific validity and 
reliability of the research design. 
4.3 Fieldwork   
According to King, Keohane and Verba, the most important rule for all data collection 
is to report how the data were created and how they were processed (1994, 51). A 
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great share of my data was collected during a fieldwork in Accra, Ghana, January 1th 
until February 7th 2014. The research project had been approved by the Norwegian 
Social Science Data Services (NSD) prior to the field work.35 The project was also 
financially supported by the foundation Fritt Ord. During my stay in Accra, I 
conducted 15 interviews with a total of 17 respondents. I emphasized to the 
respondents that their participation in the project was voluntary, that they could 
choose to be referred to anonymously and that the recorded interviews would be 
treated with confidentiality and deleted after the end of the project. Some respondents 
preferred anonymity, and are therefore not identified by name. A comprehensive list 
over respondents is presented in appendix 1. The sample of respondents consisted of 
six Ghanaian government officials, three Norwegian government officials related to 
OfD, four persons from Ghanaian civil society organizations, two World Bank 
officials, one scholar and one journalist. The categorization of respondents is based on 
their current occupations. However, some respondents were relevant particularly 
because of their former capacities. For instance was the scholar interviewed, Kwaku 
Appiah-Adu, previously a presidential advisor on oil and gas matters.  
In some social science research, interviewees are selected through random sampling 
where each unit of the population has a known probability of being selected. This is 
essential if the aim of the study is to make causal interferences about the larger group 
of respondents (Tansey 2007, 768). As discussed above, this thesis has modest 
ambitions of generalization, and aims rather at gaining insight into the particular 
phenomenon under study. Therefore, respondents were chosen based on their 
knowledge and experience with processes related to the regulatory reform. The 
respondents were selected from a non-probability sampling approach, based on the 
snowballing, or chain-referral, sampling method. This procedure is common when the 
population of interest is not fully visible from the onset (Tansey 2007, 770). By this 
method, I identified an initial set of relevant contact persons, and requested they 
suggest other respondents of relevance to the topic. Roughly speaking, total sample of 
respondents has resulted from three such chain-referring processes. In the initial 
phases of framing the study, I established contact with Norad. Officials there provided 
me with valuable background information about the OfD program in Ghana. Norad 
referred me to the Norwegian Petroleum Directorate. They provided me with contact 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
35 Approved December 2013.  
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information for a person at the Petroleum Commission in Ghana, who turned out to be 
an important “gatekeeper” for gaining access to respondents there. After an informal 
e-mail correspondence with that contact person, a formal letter with an official request 
for conducting interviews signed by my supervisor was sent to the Petroleum 
Commission. The letter emphasized that the research was independent of the 
Norwegian government, and that the government would not be given access to the 
data collected, only the resulting thesis itself. This was emphasized to all respondents, 
to avoid them perceiving me as representing any interested party. The interviewer’s 
characteristics and attitudes may affect the answer of respondents. “The social 
desirability effect” implies that respondents answers are related to their perception the 
social desirability of those answers (Bryman 2004, 220). A Norwegian researcher 
asking questions about a Norwegian aid program may lead respondents to consciously 
or unconsciously portray an overly positive image. This effect can hardly be 
excluded, but I attempted to dampen it. When possible, respondents received an 
introductory letter or a letter of reference prior to the interview, where I emphasized 
the independence of the study. The letter is attached as appendix 2.  
After arrival in Accra I met with my contact person at the Petroleum Commission to 
further discuss the scope of the study, and for him to recommend the appropriate 
persons for the interviews. Upon his request, I also sent my interview guide for 
respondents at the Petroleum Commission. Based on this, the contact person 
identified four respondents in the Petroleum Commission whom I interviewed. The 
second chain referring sampling process resulted from the contact established with the 
Norwegian Embassy in Accra. Firstly, they welcomed my request to gain access to 
archive documents about the Oil for Development program, allowing for a 
comprehensive document study. Secondly, they facilitated interviews for me. I 
conducted one interview with the person currently responsible for the OfD program at 
the embassy. I was also able to interview two Norwegian officials from the OfD 
secretariat during their official visits to Accra. The third chain-referral sampling 
procedure, started with a correspondence with the Kofi Annan International 
Peacekeeping Training Centre (KAIPEC).36 Upon my request to get in contact with 
academics working on petroleum governance in Accra, they compiled a 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
36 An international center for training and research about African peace and security, located in Accra. I 
owe gratitude to Karin Dokken at the University of Oslo who suggested I contact KAIPEC.  
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comprehensive list of relevant persons from civil society and public sector 
organizations. Based on this list, I contacted several relevant persons per e-mail and 
phone which directed me to important respondents.  
4.4 Reliability and validity of data  
That being said about the sampling procedure, I move on to discuss issues regarding 
reliability and validity of the data. While validity refers to how appropriate the chosen 
measuring instrument is for tapping the underlying phenomenon of interest, reliability 
refers to how consistent results would be with the repeated use of the same measuring 
instrument (Berry 2002). Although analytically distinguishable, reliability and 
validity are related because validity presumes reliability. In the words of Bryman: “If 
your measure is not reliable, it cannot be valid. […] If the measure fluctuates, it may 
be measuring different things on different occasions” (2004, 75). I begin by 
discussing the reliability of my findings, before discussing their validity.  
In my view, there are four possible threats to the reliability of my results: the 
composition and size of the sample of respondents, the flexibility of the questions 
asked and the operationalization of the theoretical concepts. A danger with the 
snowballing method is that respondents regularly will suggest persons similar to 
themselves, creating sampling bias. The sample may contain an overrepresentation of 
interviewees with similar characteristics (Tansey 2007, 770). You risk getting a rather 
homogenous group of respondents. This threatens the reliability of results, since other 
information could arise from a differently composed sample. Since my sampling 
procedure was guided by three different and parallel snowballing processes, the group 
of respondents became rather heterogeneous, reducing the potential skewedness of the 
sample.  
The fact that the sample of respondents is relatively small may represent a second 
threat to the reliability of the results. Other information could come forth from a 
larger sample. Thus, reliability could probably have been advanced by including 
respondents beyond the 17 interviewees. It would have been relevant to speak to more 
persons from both the Ghanaian and Norwegian side. Reliability could for example 
have been improved by conducting interviews with officials from the Ghanaian 
national oil company GNPC and the Norwegian Petroleum Directorate. 
Unfortunately, practical- and time constraints made this difficult to achieve.  
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A third threat to the reliability of the study concerns the questions asked. The topics 
for conversation were largely similar across the interviews. But since the respondents 
had different involvements in relevant processes, I sought somewhat different 
information from the various types of respondents. In addition, respondents would in 
some instances point my attention towards issues of relevance to the research 
questions that I was not aware of. Therefore, some questions were added throughout 
the interview process. Since I did not use an identical, consolidated interview guide 
for all interviews,37 it would be difficult for another researcher to replicate the study 
and achieve the exact same results. This illustrates how the valuable flexibility of 
semi-structured interviews may compromise on reliability.  
I have attempted reduce these three threats towards reliability by using multiple 
sources of data. When possible, I have checked the information obtained through 
interviews against reliable written sources. The archive studies at the Norwegian 
Embassy in Accra were helpful in this regard. As abovementioned, Scanteam has 
conducted a comprehensive evaluation of the OfD program (Scanteam 2013). This 
evaluation is currently being followed up by the same consultants. I have spoken with 
consultants from Scanteam on two occasions, discussing my findings regarding the 
Petroleum Commission and the reform processes as such. No significant 
discrepancies were revealed, which confirms a certain level of reliability. However, 
since Scanteam’s approach to studying the Petroleum Commission varies from mine, 
these consultations cannot be regarded as verifying my findings. However, such 
cross-checking ensures satisfactory reliability of data to a greater extent than if 
interviews were used as the sole source of information. The flexibility of a qualitative 
research design will inevitably compromise somewhat on reliability.  
The fourth caveat of reliability concerns the operationalization of the theoretical 
concepts in the study. In the previous chapter I emphasized that there is no consensus 
on how to operationalize the concept institutional independence. Verhoest et. al. claim 
that “the choices of conceptualizations, analysis and measures of autonomy are not 
neutral but rather influence the research outcomes“ (Verhoest et al. 2004). If a 
different researcher were to conduct a similar study, applying different 
operationalizations of the theoretical concepts, his or her results would probably be 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
37 See interview guide in appendix 3. 
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different from mine. However, reliability was here interpreted as “how consistent 
results would be with the repeated use of the same measuring instrument” (Berry 
2002). Operationalizations are a vital part of that measuring instrument. Since the 
concepts were operationalized in a transparent manner, another researched would in 
principle be able to use the same operationalizations and achieve the same results (if 
one disregards the other three threats towards reliability). Therefore, 
operationalization is less of reliability problem with this study as such, but a problem 
associated with the bulk of research on institutional independence.  
The reliability issues also have implications for the validity of the results. Scientific 
validity is a broad concept with a range of dimensions. Above it was argued that the 
external validity of the study is limited, since the results cannot easily be generalized 
to a larger population of cases. Construct validity refers to whether the empirically 
operationalized concepts measure the underlying theoretical concepts of a study 
(Bryman 2004, 72). Verhoest et. al.’s critique from the previous paragraph applies 
here as well. The preceding chapter was largely focused on developing a sound 
operationalization of the concepts institutional independence and accountability, 
reflecting a wide range of literature on the field. The construct validity between the 
underlying theoretical concept and the empirical expression is thus argued to be rather 
sound. However, such operationalizations are never neutral, and their construct 
validity is part of a larger methodological debate beyond the scope of this thesis. 
Closely related to construct validity is measurement validity. The latter refers to 
whether a measure of a concept really measures the underlying concept (Bryman 
2004, 72). The way the operationalized concepts were conveyed to respondents 
through questions may represent a threat to the validity of the study. Respondents 
could have understood questions and concepts differently, jeopardizing the 
measurement validity. Again, this is a common trade-off with the qualitative 
interview method. 
4.5 Document studies  
In closing, I elaborate on the documents studied. The main source for assessing 
formal institutional independence and accountability is the Petroleum Commission 
Act, which describes the institution’s mandate and structure. Other relevant laws 
affecting the mandate of the Petroleum Commission are the Local Content Law and 
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the Petroleum Exploration and Production Bill. These three legal documents have 
been coded and analyzed based on the theoretical operationalizations in chapter 3. 
The Petroleum Exploration and Production Bill is not a public document. By luck I 
was able to obtain a physical copy while one of my Ghanaian respondents was 
attending a meeting in Oslo, in late March. Since this document was attained rather 
late in the study, time constraints have made me unable to analyze it in its entirety.38 I 
therefore emphasize that additional findings could appear if a proper analysis of this 
document had been included in the study.  
Further, a comprehensive document study was carried out at the Norwegian Embassy 
in Accra, where I was provided access to folders containing written materials about 
the OfD program. The folders mainly included e-mail correspondences and meeting 
minutes. Since I was not permitted to photocopy or photograph any of the material, I 
spent numerous hours copying text by writing. This exercise was carried out rather 
early during the field work. This was advantageous for gaining a great deal of 
oversight in the Norwegian-Ghanaian cooperation. Nevertheless, this may also have 
created a bias in framing my understanding of the processes from a one sided 
perspective. Again, the multiplicity of sources utilized has hopefully offset such 
methodological caveats. Other documents that have proved helpful in gaining insight 
into the overall reform process, including the influence by external actors, are the 
mentioned Scanteam evaluation, various analyses by Ghanaian civil society 
organizations, World Bank reports, Norad’s annual reports on the OfD program and a 
Memorandum of Understanding regarding Ghana and Norway’s cooperation within 
the petroleum sector.  
In the next two chapters I present empirical information about Ghana’s regulatory 
reform processes. This will lay the foundation for an analysis aimed at answering the 
thesis’ four research questions in chapter 7.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
38 The legal document is near 100 pagers long.  
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5 Petroleum Governance and Aid in 
Ghana  
Ghana is a lower middle-income country located along the Gulf of Guinea in West 
Africa. Ghana neighbors Cote d’Ivoire to the west, Burkina Faso to the north and 
Togo to the east. The Gold Coast, as the country was formerly called, was the first 
country in sub-Saharan Africa to gain independence from European colonialism in 
1957 (Dzorgbo 2001, 143). While British colonial rule was relatively subtle and 
indirect, it left a significant historical legacy. The British imposed bureaucratic-legal 
public administration, while also preserving traditional political institutions such as 
the chieftaincy39 (Dzorgbo 2001). Britain’s civil service was used as a model to shape 
the public administration of The Gold Coast, which came to “resemble the British 
variant of classical Weberian public bureaucracy” (Price 1975, 43). The country has 
had a turbulent political history with nine different governments and four military 
coups between 1957 and 1983 (Dzorgbo 2001). The Provisional National Defense 
Council (PNDL) headed by Jerry Rawlings ruled the country under a military 
dictatorship from 198140 until democratic elections were held in 1992. Authoritarian 
and neo-patrimonial structures were strengthened in the early years of Rawlings rule 
(Dzorgbo 2001, 281). Coming to power with a slogan of fighting a “holy war” against 
international imperialism, Rawlings ironically became one of the firmest 
implementers of the World Bank and IMFs Structural Adjustment Program (Dzorgbo 
2001, 272). The World Bank has been an important development partner for Ghana, 
and considered as its “star pupil” (Hutchful 1995).  
The 1992 constitution41 laid the ground for a democratic presidential system with a 
maximum tenure of two presidential periods. The constitution ensures the right to 
vote, the right to form and join political parties42, freedom of assembly and freedom 
and independence of media. This pro-democratic move has been accredited to 
domestic pressures as well as World Bank/IMF political conditionalities (Dzorgbo 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
39 The continued rule of regional chiefs.  
40 Rawlings had seized power through military revolt in already 1979. Power was handed back to 
civilian politicians later the same year, but taken back by PNDC in 1981. 
41 The current constitution of Ghana. 
42 Political parties had thus far been banned.  
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2001, 299). Since 1992, elections have been held every four years. From 1996 these 
have been fully competitive multi-party elections. The incumbent president has 
stepped down twice because of electoral defeat, implying that Ghana has passed 
Huntington’s “two-turnover test”, indicating that a democracy is consolidated when 
the executive has renounced power peacefully at least twice as a result of electoral 
defeat (Huntington 1993, 267). Over the past two decades Ghana had developed a 
stable and competitive two-party system (Gyimah-Boadi and Kwasi Prempeh 2012, 
95).  
Article 269 of the 1992 constitution requires regulation of the utilization of natural 
resources (Aryeetey 2004) and establishes a number of commissions “which shall be 
responsible for the regulation and management of the utilization of the natural 
resources concerned and the co-ordination of the policies in relation to them” 
(Government of Ghana 1992). The constitution specifically names a Minerals 
Commission, a Forestry Commission and a Fisheries Commission, “and other 
Commission as Parliament may determine” (Government of Ghana 1992). Donors 
have played an important role in creating regulatory agencies in Ghana through using 
aid conditionalities (Aryeetey 2002, 43). 
5.1 Legislative framework for the petroleum sector: 1980s 
Petroleum exploration in Ghana started as early as 1896 and has continued to the 
present (Donyinah 2013, 17). Legal frameworks for the management of a petroleum 
industry were set up in the 1980s under the PNDC government (Banful 2010). Three 
laws were of particular importance: The Ghana National Petroleum Corporation Law 
of 1983, which established The Ghana National Petroleum Corporation (GNPC) as a 
national oil company mandated to undertake petroleum exploration and production on 
behalf of the government (Donyinah 2013, 17). The Petroleum Exploration and 
Production Law of 1984 provided the framework for management and regulation of 
the oil and gas sector. The Petroleum Income Tax Law (PNDCL 188) was established 
in 1987 to deal with fiscal and taxation issues (Banful 2013, 146).  
In June 2007, oil was discovered in commercial quantities offshore the Western 
region of Ghana.43 The field was named The Jubilee Field as the discovery was made 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
43 The discovery was made by the companies Kosmos Energy, Tullow Oil, Anadarko and E.O. Group 
(Donyinah 2013, 18). 
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in the year of Ghana’s fifty years anniversary of independence. The petroleum 
discovery raised great expectations among inhabitants in Ghana’s Wester region, 
hoping the revenues would be addressed towards development needs (Osei-Tutu 
2012). The quantity of oil is modest by global standards. IMF has estimated an 
average revenue of approximately $ 1 billion a year, the same amount Ghana receives 
in annual development assistance (Gyimah-Boadi and Kwasi Prempeh 2012, 94–95). 
5.2 Government response to oil discovery: 2007-2008 
In October 2007, shortly following the oil discovery, GNPC applied for assistance 
from OfD (Norad 2011a; Scanteam 2013, 31). The request was supported through 
dialogue between then Ghanaian President John Kufuor and the Norwegian Minister 
of International Development, Erik Solheim. The appeal was also followed up by a 
call from former secretary general Kofi Annan44 to Mr. Solheim. In the phone call 
Annan says:  
Your experience is so important, I hope you can advise the government, work 
with them and steer things in the right way. I think transparency is going to be 
key, and also the training of the staff and setting in place the right regulatory 
mechanisms, is going to be very essential. 45  
Solheim responds that “Norway is very eager to share our experiences with such a 
promising country as Ghana.” Following this initiation of cooperation, the Ghanaian 
government convened a national forum in Accra, in February-March 2008. The 
president had formed an Oil and Gas Technical Committee, to facilitate a policy 
response to the recent petroleum discovery (Dypedokk 2011, 72).46 The Technical 
Committee initiated and organized the national forum, under assistance from Norway, 
the World Bank and other development partners. The World Bank was the main 
financial sponsor. The forum was aimed at gathering lessons about successes and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
44 Himself a Ghanaian national. 
45 The phone call is made available on podcast: 
http://media.regjeringen.no/ud/lyd/rett_paa_traaden/KofiAnnan.mp3   
46 The committee consisted of six sub-groups respectively concerned with issues of security (i), 
environment (ii), the legal regime (iii), fiscal regime (iv), the downstream and natural gas utilization (v) 
and private sector and local participation (vi). The GNPC and the Attorney generals departments were 
represented in all six teams. The teams otherwise mainly consisted of representatives from The 
Ministry of Energy and Petroleum, the Attorney Generals Department, the Ministry of Finance and 
Economic Planning, the Internal Revenue Agency, the Navy and the office of the President (interview, 
Appiah-Adu 22nd January 2014). 
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failures of other countries in petroleum governance,47 and to gather stakeholder’s 
views on the content of a national oil and gas policy and strategy. In an interview, the 
leader of the Technical Committee explained that: “We decided: Let’s make noise. 
Let’s let the people know that indeed we’ve discovered oil. And let’s let people know 
that their voices and their views and opinions are important”.48 Various stakeholders 
within Ghana,49 development partners and international petroleum and public sector 
experts from oil producing countries such as Kazakhstan, Norway, Timor-Leste, 
Canada, Nigeria and Trinidad and Tobago participated at the forum. Experts from 
Trinidad and Tobago were invited because they were thought to have good local 
content legislations, while experts from Nigeria thought about the weaknesses of their 
system.50  
During the national forum, Ghana’s Ministry of Energy and Norway’s Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU)51 regarding their 
cooperation within the petroleum sector (Norad 2008, 55). This made Ghana a core 
country in the OfD program (Norad 2011a). The MoU states that the focus of the 
cooperation programme “shall be capacity building within Ghanaian state institutions 
relating to the exploration for and exploitation of oil and gas resources, revenue 
management and environmental protection, among others.” It was decided that the 
cooperation would be focused on technical assistance as a means for capacity building 
in institutions. Central aims were a revision of the Petroleum Law of 1983 and 
development of regulations to the law. It is stated that “the parties will cooperate to 
ensure full transparency and accountability on the part of all institutions and persons 
involved in the Cooperation Programme” (ibid.). It was specified that Norway will 
make input into the policy making process in Ghana “when specifically asked” (ibid.). 
Norway should also assist Ghana’s adoption of the Extractive Industry Transparency 
Initiative (EITI) and other anti-corruption measures. In regard to the drafting of the 
MoU, the leader of the Technical Committee expressed an appreciation of that 
committee’s ability to influence the content of the MoU: “Norway actually told us: go 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
47 Interview, World Bank official 2 (4th February 2014).  
48 Interview, Appiah-Adu (22nd January 2014). 
49 Opinion leaders, traditional rulers, politicians, academics, legislators, the government and 
development partners (interview, Appiah-Adu 22nd January 2014). 
50 Interview, World Bank official 2 (4th February 2014).  
51 A MoU is not an internationally legally binding document, but a statement of intent.  
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and study the MoU. Whatever you are not happy with. Let us now, let us hear what 
you are not happy about, and we'll see what we can do about it. And thus we saw a 
partner who was willing to bend backwards to work with us”.52  
Based on the needs assessment at the national forum, the traditionally important 
donors in Ghana gathered for a donor conference.53 Discussions concerned how to 
coordinate petroleum related aid towards the Ghanaian government. There was a 
mapping of who wanted to contribute with different kinds of assistance (Dypedokk 
2011, 80).  
Following the national forum and the signing of the MoU, representatives from the 
Oil and Gas Technical Committee visited Norway on several occasions to undertake 
training for the drafting of a petroleum policy. Lectures were held at Petrad and 
Statoil, and field trips were organized to various parts of the petroleum industry in 
Norway.54 During 2008, Norway assisted Ghana in the development of a petroleum 
policy and a master plan for developing of the sector. Norway also provided technical 
assistance in evaluating field development plans and a so-called unitization agreement 
for the Jubilee Field (Norad 2011a, 36).55  
In response to why Norway was chosen as the main development partner the above 
mentioned leader of the Technical Oil and Gas committee, Appiah-Adu pointed to the 
fact that individuals in Ghana previously had positive experiences with training within 
petroleum management in Norway.56 A GNPC official in the Technical Committee 
had strongly recommended choosing Norway as the preferred partner, based on 
personal experiences with training in Norway. The perception that Norway had a 
good, or “the best”, international reputation in managing oil resources was also 
pointed to. Another factor emphasized was the flexibility and lack of conditions on 
behalf of the Norway as a donor. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
52 Interview, Appiah-Adu (22nd January 2014). 
53 The UK, Germany, the World Bank, IMF, USAID as well as Canada and Japan were present 
(Dypedokk 2011, 80). 
54 Interviews, Appiah-Adu (22nd January 2014) and World Bank official 2 (4th February 2014).  
55 Assistance was also provided on reviewing the Jubilee Environmental and Social Impact 
Assessment. The research vessel Dr. Fridtjof Nansen carried out Marine environmental surveys by in 
2009. Assistance was given for the application to the UN on extension of the continental shelf beyond 
200 nautical miles (Norad 2011a, 54). 
56 The Norwegian government has provided assistance and training in petroleum management since the 
1980s (cf. section 2.3).  
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At the end of the day we had the World Bank knocking on our door, with it’s 
other, you know, interested parties such as […] GIZ from Germany, DFID from 
the UK as all of that. The Japanese and so on and so forth. But the Norwegians 
were more proactive, more forthcoming, easier to deal with, not much of, you 
know, strings and conditions attached, etc.57  
Appiah-Adu further emphasized that: 
That was what gave us the comfort to go with Norway […] it was […] a 
sentiment that ran through the Technical Committee, the Ministerial Committee, 
to the president, the highest level. […] And there is something about 
Scandinavians. In the world, […] when you look at transparency, you look at no 
agenda, no strings attached and all that.58 
The government thus chose a “two stream approach” (ibid.) with Norway as the main 
donor and the others “on the sideline”.  
In January 2009, there was a change in government from the New Patriotic Party 
(NPP) to the National Democratic Congress (NDC). In response to why Norway was 
chosen a main development partner, an advisor within the Ministry of Energy (MoE) 
of the new (and current) government pointed to similar factors as Appiah-Adu. This 
exemplified by the following statement: “The beauty of the Norwegian […] 
cooperation is that we are in the driving seat. For the other ones, they want to take 
control and we are not very comfortable with that”.59 Other donors had suggested 
incorporating conditions about for example liberalization of the energy sector into 
their Multi-Donor budget support (MDBS)60 to the government.61 The MoE advisor 
emphasized that the government is first and foremost accountable to the Ghanaian 
public for public policy, not to the donors. The government was also convinced that 
Norway did not need anything from Ghana and they were therefore not concerned 
about double agendas.62 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
57 Interview, Appiah-Adu (22nd January 2014). 
58 Interview, Appiah-Adu (22nd January 2014). 
59 Interview, representative from MoEP (6th Februrary 2014).  
60 Multi-Donor Budget Support (MDBS) is a joint support mechanism to the Government of Ghana 
from eleven Development Partners: the African Development Bank, Canada, Denmark, the European 
Union, France, Germany, Japan, the Netherlands, Switzerland, UK and the World Bank. The 
contributed financial resources are directly channeled into the Government's treasury to complement 
Ghana's domestically generated revenues. (Ministry of Finance, Republic of Ghana 
http://www.mofep.gov.gh/?q=divisions/mdbs).  
61 Interview, representative from MoEP (6th Februrary 2014). 
62 Interview, Appiah-Adu (22nd January 2014). 
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5.3 Consolidation of civil society advocacy  
According to Heller and Heuty, the debate around oil in Ghana has been vigorous, 
attracting the attention of all elements of Ghanaian society (2010, 54). The national 
forum was criticized by representatives from a number of civil society organizations 
(CSOs), because CSO participation was restricted to three representatives (Gary 2009; 
Dypedokk 2011, 72). 63  A leading civil society organization, Integrated Social 
Development Centre (Isodec) criticized Norway for not engaging civil society the in 
initial phase when they were giving advice to the Ghanaian government. In an 
interview Steve Manteaw from Isodec64 expressed concern for the lack of insight they 
were given to which advice Norwegian officials were giving “their” government:  
The reason that [lack of insight] is dangerous is that […] you will be 
undermining the social contract, because government must first and foremost 
hold themselves accountable to their citizens. […] And so if they talk to our 
government and they don’t talk to us, when we are the ones who elected the 
government, then they are undermining our democratic processes in this 
country.65 
As a response to their weak representation at the national forum, some CSO 
representatives collaborated with the German government development agency GIZ66 
to advocate for a larger civil society representation at the national forum, without 
success. Thus, GIZ, Revenue Watch Institute and other donors funded a civil society 
preparatory meeting ahead of the conference in order to gather views representative of 
a larger civil society. Oil and gas experts from African oil producing countries and 
beyond were invited to lecture about experiences with petroleum governance. The 
preparatory conference became known as the Mankessim Consensus. 67  Later, 
representatives from Isodec travelled to Stavanger in Norway to study oil and gas 
governance. The study trips were funded by OfD through Publish What You Pay 
Norway, The Norwegian Confederation of Trade Unions (LO) and Norwegian Church 
Aid. 68  This mobilization and building up of expertise laid the ground for the 
formation of a coordinated Ghana Civil Society Platform on Oil and Gas in March 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
63 These were representing Isodec, Third World Network-Africa and Ghana Trades Union Congress. 
The ISODEC representative was mandated to facilitate discussions without the opportunity to express 
his own views (interview, Manteaw 17th January 2014).   
64 And the current chair of Ghana Civil Society Platform on Oil and Gas.  
65 Interview, Manteaw (17th January 2014).   
66 GIZ stands for Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit. 
67 Interview, Manteaw (17th January 2014).   
68 Interview, Manteaw (17th January 2014).   
	   61 
2010, chaired by Isodec and partly funded by the World Bank. The platform consists 
of 120 organizations, individuals and professional bodies (Zandvliet 2014). Gyimah-
Boadi and Prempeh claim that “the advent of oil has galvanized Ghana’s normally 
splintered civil society into collective action” (2012, 97). Below, I return to the 
platform’s specific efforts to influence regulatory reform in the petroleum sector.  
5.4 Formalizing the OfD cooperation: 2009-2010 
Though the Norwegian government had provided significant assistance to Ghana 
during 2008, the cooperation has not yet been formalized through legally binding 
agreements. The change of government in January 2009, let to a halt in the 
cooperation between Norway and Ghana. E-mail correspondences between 
Norwegian government officials around this time69 testify that the new Minister of 
Energy, Joe Oteng-Adej, had completely written off the OfD cooperation. In various 
e-mail correspondences, this decision is accredited to a lack of trust in deals 
negotiated under the previous government. The cooperation was however reconfirmed 
around September 2009. In the minutes of a meeting between the deputy minister of 
Energy and a Norwegian embassy official (3.11.2009), the former reportedly claimed 
that “the Norwegian model is the best to draw experiences from and is a model the 
current government is extremely comfortable with”. In the same meeting, the deputy 
minister also initiated a discussion about the establishment of a Norwegian embassy 
in Accra. In a meeting between Norwegian officials and GNPC (4.11.2009), GNPC 
officials express their apologies for their lack of communicative response during the 
past months and explaining that this was due to ”adjustments to the change in national 
leadership.” In the minutes from a meeting between a Norwegian embassy official 
and a World Bank official (5.11.2009), the latter expresses that the Ghanaian 
government appears to be more comfortable with Norway than with other 
development partners. The fact that Norway again was the government’s primary 
preferred partner is supported by numerous meeting minutes and e-mail 
correspondences between Norwegian and Ghanaian government officials throughout 
the period 2009-2010.  
During 2010, Norway provided comprehensive technical assistance to GNPC, the 
Ministry of Energy (MoE) and the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). GNPC 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
69 Documents I gained access to at the archives at the Norwegian Embassy in Accra.  
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and MoE received training in international practices of resource management 
(Scanteam 2013, 32). Extensive assistance was given to the MoE in drafting The 
Petroleum Commission Bill and The Petroleum Exploration and Production Bill 
(Norad 2011b). There was no Norwegian embassy in Accra at the time of entering the 
cooperation. A Norwegian embassy was however established in 2011. Prior to this the 
follow-up was mainly done from The Norwegian in Abuja, Nigeria.  
On December 10th 2010, 5-year cooperation agreements were signed between the 
Norwegian Ministry of Petroleum and Energy (MoPE) and the Ghanaian MoE,70 and 
between the Norwegian Ministry of the Environment (MoE) and the Ghanaian 
Ministry of Environment, Science and Technology (MEST) (Scanteam 2013, 35). 
Later in December 2010 the first oil started flowing from the Jubilee Field. The 
cooperating agreements were based on a program document that states what the 
partners aim to achieve through the cooperation, as well as a budget. The Norwegian 
counterparts will give feedback on the program document and suggestions for 
alterations, but the guiding principle is that the document is developed and owned by 
the recipient.71 An OfD official responsible for government contact, Arne Olsen, 
explained that the reason it took three years to establish legal agreements was the 
need to “get to know Ghana” and “to give Ghana an opportunity to find out what they 
actually wanted”.72  
OfD has entered into a partnership with the World Bank whereby the two have made 
a division of which type of assistance they provide. The Bank mainly finances capital 
items, while Norway provides human resources, training of staff and consultancy 
work.73  
The 5-year agreements between Ghana and Norway end December 2014. The 
Ghanaian MoEP has applied for a second period of cooperation through OfD.74 The 
Chief Executive of PC has also informally requested to have long-term consultants 
from Norway to provide day-to-day training for the staff at the PC.75 Whether OfD 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
70 Later renamed the Ministry of Energy and Petroleum 
71 Interview, Olsen (13th January 2014). 
72 Interview, Olsen (13th January 2014). 
73 Interview, Olsen (13th January 2014). 
74 Interview, representative from MoEP (6th February 2014).  
75 Interview, Solheim (4th February 2014).  
	   63 
welcomes the request for a second phase of cooperation will be based on a review of 
the level of goal attainment achieved in the previous phase, and an identification of 
future needs for assistance. This assessment is carried out as a joint review where 
both Norwegian and Ghanaian counterparts determine its terms of reference and 
approve the final report.76 When finalized, the report is presented before the OfD 
steering committee (cf. section 2.3) who takes a final decision on whether the 
cooperation will be continued. The following table shows annual spending in the 
OfD program in Ghana:  
Table 5.1 Spending figures, OfD in Ghana77 
Year NOK 
2008 N/A 
2009 8,300,000 
2010 15,600,000 
2011 36,000,000 
2012 24,791,000 
2013 N/A 	  
 Source: Norad, 2010, 2011, 2012. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
76 Interview, Solheim (4th February 2014). 
77 The table show total expenditures in the OfD program in Ghana, not exclusively directed towards the 
Petroleum Commission.  
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6 Regulatory Reform 
In June 2011 the Petroleum Commission Act was passed in Parliament. Norwegian 
legal practitioners had assisted in drafting the bill. The Act established The Petroleum 
Commission (PC) as the independent regulator of the upstream segment of Ghana’s 
petroleum industry. The act states that the PC shall regulate and manage exploitation 
of petroleum resources and coordinate policies in relation to them. The regulatory 
function was previously mandated to the Ministry of Energy by The Petroleum 
Exploration and Production Act of 1984. The regulatory function had however been 
delegated and practiced by GNPC, as the ministry lacked the capacity. The PC’s first 
board was appointed November 2011 (Daily Graphic 2011). Evidence suggests that 
the PC has encountered some start-up challenges, and time is still needed for the 
institution to be fully functional. In the following section I will describe the process 
leading up to the establishment of the PC, while section 6.2 gives an account of the 
PC’s functions and structure. 
6.1 Actors influencing reform  
The process leading up to the establishment of the PC was subject to some 
controversy and debate, broadly characterized by two schools of thought.78 The 
reform meant taking away regulatory responsibility from GNPC, which had been the 
locus for government expertise in the petroleum sector.79 In the view of many, 
GNPC’s consolidated structure created a conflict between commercial and regulatory 
interests (Gary 2009). At the national forum in February 2008, there had been a near 
consensus among the international petroleum experts that regulatory and commercial 
functions within petroleum management should be separated (Gary 2009, 38). Experts 
pointed to negative experiences of countries such as Angola, where consolidated 
NOCs had become an “unaccountable state within the state” (Gary 2009, 38). Donors 
such as the World Bank and GIZ advocated the stance that GNPC should not be 
playing commercial and regulatory roles simultaneously, to avoid conflicts of interest 
(Gary 2009, 39). GNPC expressed reluctance towards the idea of a decoupling at the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
78 Interview, Manteaw (17th January 2014). 
79 At one point their staff amounted to 700 employees, but is now reduced to around 100.  A GNPC 
official stated in an interview with Oxfam that GNPC “wears a lot of hats” and does a lot of things we 
are not supposed to do” (Gary 2009, 38). 
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national forum. GNPC director of operations, Thomas Manu, argued that the roles 
should rather remain consolidated (Gary 2009, 38).  
There seems to have been a hesitation towards this separation of roles among higher 
government officials.80 People who were close to president Mills, including the 
presidential advisor on petroleum, Tsatsu Tchikata, argued for a consolidated model 
pointing to Angola’s NOC Sonangol. 81  It was claimed that GNPC should be 
responsible for regulation, as they had the experience and the expertise.82  
During summer 2010, the cabinet approved a new Petroleum Exploration and 
Production Bill intended to replace the one from 1984 (cf. section 5.1). The bill stated 
“The Minister responsible for petroleum shall regulate petroleum operations” 
(Government of Ghana 2010). The bill was withdrawn from Parliament in November 
2010 (Heller and Heuty 2010, 51). Heller and Heuty commented that “the 
[Exploration and Production] Bill failed to reflect the vibrant debate taking place both 
internationally and within Ghana on oil-sector governance” (2010, 50) and that “the 
bill provided for excessive levels of discretion on part of the Ministry of Energy and 
GNPC” (2010, 51). The bill had been written without any Norwegian influence.83 
According to a Norwegian OfD official the bill was refuted partly due to low legal 
quality. 84  Another important reason were arguments saying that the bill was 
inconsistent with article 269 of the constitution, demanding the establishment of 
separate institutions (commissions) for the regulation of natural resources (cf. the 
introductory section of this chapter) (Heller and Heuty 2010, 51).  
Norway was subsequently asked to assist in creating a new Petroleum Exploration 
and Production Bill. 85  During the legislative review process that followed, 
government allowed for citizen’s participation through public forums and 
consultations. The Civil Society Platform on Oil and Gas organized stakeholder 
consultations, sponsored by The World Bank, where views on regulation were 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
80 Interviews, World Bank official 2 (4th February 2014) and Manteaw (17th January 2014). 
81 Interview, Manteaw (17th January 2014).   
82 Interview, World Bank official 2 (4th February 2014).  
83 An OfD official expressed that this was “strange” since the cooperation was already established. But 
the drafting had been going on when there was not much contact between Norway and Ghana.   
84 Interview, Olsen (13th January 2014). 
85 Interview, Olsen (13th January 2014). 
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gathered.86 Consequently, the platform submitted numerous analyses and papers to 
the government promoting a separation of regulatory and commercial roles.87 The 
Civil Society Platform on Oil and Gas argued that there were governance risks 
associated with ministerial regulation of the industry, due to a high possibility of 
politicization of the industry, corruption, rent seeking behavior and regulatory capture 
(Ghana Civil Society Platform on Oil and Gas 2011, 8). A World Bank official 
explained “whatever comes out of [such CSO stakeholders consultations] feed into 
what we do.” The World Bank is focused on empowering civil society organizations 
in order to hold government accountable. Among other things they support legislative 
research, so CSOs can understand the legal frameworks and enter into policy dialogue 
with government.88 The World Bank official claimed there is a realization in the 
World Bank that they are seen as an external body, which is dependent on engaging 
with civil society groups to gain acceptance from the government.89  
On 20th December 2010 the World Bank approved a US$38 million credit to the 
Government of Ghana for implementing an Oil and Gas Capacity Building Project, a 
so called “technical assistance loan” (Santley 2013). Among the main objectives of 
the program are to “improve public management and regulatory capacity while 
enhancing transparency” (Santley 2011). In a project document it is stated: “The 
potential conflict of interest and lack of transparency arising from the multiplicity of 
GNPC’s roles present a challenge for the sector.” Part of the funds had a 
“disbursement condition on satisfactory establishment of a future petroleum 
regulatory body” (The World Bank 2010). In a press release the Work Bank stated: 
Specifically the Project will provide institutional support to the Ministry of 
Energy and the soon-to-be-established petroleum regulatory body to enable 
them play their oversight, coordination, policy planning and implementation as 
well as monitoring and evaluation roles effectively (World Bank 2010). 
The project is implemented by a Project Coordination Unit at the Ministry of Energy 
and Petroleum (The World Bank 2010) and the credit is supposed to be disbursed 
over a period lasting until June 2015. Roughly speaking, the World Bank provides 
two types of financial support to Ghana: project support, such as the Oil and Gas 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
86 Interview, World Bank official 2 (4th February 2014). 
87 Interview, Manteaw (17th January 2014).   
88 Interview, World Bank official 2 (4th February 2014). 
89 Interview, World Bank official 2 (4th February 2014).  
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Capacity Building Project, and budget support (an annual credit). For certain parts of 
the budget support to be released in a certain year, the recipient government needs to 
fulfil certain “trigger actions”. One of the trigger actions demanded for budget support 
disbursement in 2012, was that “The Government, through the Ministry of Energy, 
submits to Cabinet for decision a policy proposal establishing a petroleum regulatory 
authority” (World Bank 2011). The World Bank official explained “[…] there was a 
conflict. So the bank thought that […] the two needs to be decoupled and separated. 
So that was the reason for pushing for it”.90 The same official explained that the 
background for incorporating this condition was that “everybody was pushing for that 
decoupling”, civil society groups and all stakeholders were talking about it, but “the 
government is doing nothing”.91  
The first Petroleum Commission Bill was presented before Parliament in December 
2010 (Heller and Heuty 2010, 52). In the bill, GNPC was to serve on the governing 
board of Commission.92 The Civil Society Platform on Oil and Gas persuaded 
Parliament to reject the provision that GNPC should sit on board, arguing that this 
constituted a conflict of interest (Gyimah-Boadi and Kwasi Prempeh 2012, 99).  
The new Petroleum Commission Bill was developed in few weeks’ time early 2011, 
and approved in Parliament in June. An OfD official involved in the drafting process 
explained: “Commissions is something Ghana already knows about. So it was 
relatively easy to get it though. It wasn’t like: now we’re going to see how Norway 
did it”.93 The same official explained that Norwegian officials had conveyed to the 
Ghanaian counterparts that the reason things has worked well in Norway was that the 
most important roles in petroleum management had been separated between the 
national oil company, policy maker and regulator. He further emphasized that the idea 
of a Petroleum Commission was essentially Ghanaian.94 
For the sake of further illustrating how the World Bank has influenced policy and 
legislation in Ghana’s petroleum sector, it is worth mentioning that conditions for 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
90 Interview, World Bank official 2 (4th February 2014).  
91 Interview, World Bank official 2 (4th February 2014).  
92 Interviews Amin (20th January 2014) and Manteaw (17th January 2014).   
93 Interview, Olsen (13th January 2014). 
94 Interview, Olsen (13th January 2014). 
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receiving government budget support (agreed upon in 2010) included the “submission 
of a Petroleum Revenue Management Bill to the Cabinet based on broad consultations 
with stakeholders”, and submission to Cabinet for decision a revised Extractive 
Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI) institutional framework to include the oil 
and gas sectors” (World Bank 2011). These conditions were developed in cooperation 
with the Civil Society Platform on Oil and Gas (Ghana Civil Society Platform on Oil 
and Gas 2011, 35). All these conditions were met by government. Steve Manteaw 
from Isodec, explained that CSOs in Ghana have traditionally been critical towards 
World Bank conditionalities, and this was the first time the World Bank and CSOs 
had attained such cooperation in Ghana.95 In 2013, Ghana’s budget support from the 
World Bank was not disbursed due the government’s lack of fulfilment of trigger 
actions.96    
6.2 The Petroleum Commission and the Petroleum Directorate 
Apart from aiding the legislation of the Petroleum Commission Act, OfD aims to 
provide assistance to enhance the capacity of the institution. Prior to the establishment 
of the PC, a training program was organized in Norway where experiences were 
shared on how typical petroleum regulatory functions had been carried out in Norway 
(Scanteam 2013, 33). The main instrument to fulfil the goals in OfD’s resource pillar 
(cf. section 2.3) is institutional cooperation with relevant Norwegian government 
institutions: The Norwegian Ministry of Petroleum and Energy and the Norwegian 
Petroleum Directorate. In addition, the Stavanger-based foundation Petrad serves an 
advisory and administrative role (Scanteam 2013, 29). Part of the 5-year institutional 
agreement between Ghana and Norway’s respective ministries of energy and 
petroleum (see section 5.4), is an institutional cooperation between the Norwegian 
Petroleum Directorate and Ghana’s PC. The institutional cooperation involves that the 
NPD provide consultants for training and assistance for drafting the legal instruments 
for regulation. The NPD has provided training courses in Ghana and assistance on 
drafting supplementary regulation for the specific areas under the PC’s regulatory 
responsibility.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
95 Interview, Manteaw (17th January 2014).   
96 Interview, World Bank official 2 (4th February 2014). 
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In the start-up phase the PC was lacking funds. Much time was spent acquiring and 
settling in a permanent office building. The Worlds Bank has supported the PC’s 
operational costs, mostly for rent expenses for temporary office space, as well as 
office equipment and furniture through the Oil and Gas capacity Building Project 
(The World Bank 2013, 4). Appointing staff and establishing routines has been time 
consuming. The World Bank funds were used for initial training to help build 
capacity of staff in 201297.  
6.3 Functions and structure of the Petroleum Commission  
The Petroleum Commission Act established the PC as a separate legal body. The Act 
emphasizes that no other institutions should perform functions related to regulation 
and management of the resource: 
Subject to other provisions of this Act, a Government agency or authority shall 
not exercise any function in relation to the regulation and management of the 
utilization of petroleum resources and co-ordination of policies in relation to 
that function (Petroleum Commission Act 2011, section 24, part 3).  
Regulatory role   
A main part of the PC’s mandate is to ensure that contractors, subcontractors and 
others involved in petroleum activities comply with applicable laws and regulations 
(Petroleum Commission Act 2011, section 3, part c). The specific regulations are to 
be defined through subsidiary legislation of “legislative instruments” (LIs), which are 
the common instruments for regulation among regulatory agencies in Ghana 
(Aryeetey 2004, 298). The LIs specify which rules the companies must follow, and 
corresponding penalties for noncompliance. In July 2013 the first LI for the PC was 
passed in Parliament: The Local Content Law. “Local content” refers to the level of 
Ghanaian employment in the petroleum industry. The local content legislation was 
largely influenced by Trinidad and Tobago’s model of local content.98 Further LIs are 
in the process of being developed for areas under the PC’s regulatory mandate.  
The cooperation arrangement with the NPD has largely been focused on the drafting 
of these subsidiary legislations for regulation. Apart from the already mentioned local 
content regulations, the main areas of regulation are: fiscal metering, health, safety, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
97 Interview, World Bank official 2 (4th February 2014). 
98 Interview, Amin (20th January 2014).  
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security and environment (HSSE), as well as regulations on petroleum data and 
drilling. Four corresponding teams have been established at the PC, to work on the 
drafting laws for these areas of regulation. Each team has corresponding Norwegian 
partners guiding the group in drafting the regulations”. 99 A PC official expressed that 
“There has been an awareness that Norway has one of the world’s best practices. […] 
The laws we are passing for the PC are strictly formed after the Norwegian model”. 
100 Another PC official expressed that “this was where we had a lot of Norwegian 
influence, in regards to these particular regulations”.101 The NPD has organized 
numerous workshops on petroleum regulations in Accra, as well as providing 
continuous reviews of draft regulations. When the teams have completed their law 
drafts, they are processed by the MoEP, the Attorney General and finally presented to 
Parliament for approval.102  
A PC official explained that the PC already has preliminary monitoring and 
evaluation systems in place for most areas of regulation. Operators have a 
requirement to report quarterly on their performance to the PC. These reports are 
audited by the PC. If they discover non-compliance with applicable regulations, they 
demand the operators to remedy the violation. The PC also conducts expected and 
uninspected inspections at facilities. In 2013 one such inspection revealed non-
compliance with safety standards. The companies were given three weeks to rectify 
the violation. Two companies were unable to do this, whereby the PC had their 
operations temporarily halted.103 
The above mentioned Local Content Law is aimed at ensuring local industry 
participation in petroleum activities. It demands that “A contractor, subcontractor, 
licensee, the Corporation [GNPC] or other allied entity carrying out a petroleum 
activity shall ensure that local content is a component of the petroleum activities […]” 
(Local Content Law 2013, section 3). The law defines specific rules for local industry 
participation in Ghana’s petroleum sector, including a demand for minimum 5 % 
equity participation of an indigenous Ghanaian company (other than GNPC) to be 
qualified to enter into a petroleum agreement or license (Local Content Law 2013, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
99 Interview, PC official 2 (31st January, 2014). 
100 Interview, government official (2nd February 2014) (paraphrased). 
101 Interview, PC official 2 (31st January, 2014). 
102 Interview, PC official 2 (31st January, 2014). 
103 Interview, PC official 3 (6th February 2014). 
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section 4, part 2). In the proceeding sub-section of the law it is stated that “despite 
subregulation (2)” the minister may vary this requirement if a Ghanaian company is 
unable to satisfy requirements. In that case the minister shall determine “the persons 
qualified” (Local Content Law 2013, section 4, part 3–2). According, previous 
coordinator of the Civil Society Platform on Oil and Gas and current director of 
African Centre for Energy Policy (ACEP), Mohammad Amin, two contracts were 
approved after the passing of the Local Content Law, where one had 2, 5 % Ghanaian 
equity, while the other had none.104  
The Local Content Law establishes requirements that the oil companies provide 
reports to the PC, and the PC is mandated to monitor and inspect the oil companies. 
Operators have to submit a local content plan for the PC’s approval before they can 
undertake any activity. The law provides for penalties in form of monetary fines or 
imprisonment, depending on the severity of offense. In an interview a PC official 
expressed: “The local content law gives us teeth to bite”.105 According to the 
Petroleum Commission Act, a person who is aggrieved by the decision of the PC may 
file a complaint to the ministry, whereby the minister will take a decision on it.106 If 
the person is dissatisfied with the ministers’ decision, the person can apply to the 
Court for a review of that decision (Petroleum Commission Act 2011, section 20, part 
1–3).  
The PC must publish an annual public report on petroleum resources and activities in 
Ghana. The Petroleum Commission Act gives a detailed account of which 
information the annual report should contain (2011, section 3k).  
Advisory role  
An important function of the PC is to advise the ministry on “national policies related 
to petroleum activities” (Petroleum Commission Act 2011, section 3, part b) and 
“matters related to petroleum activities including […] field development plans 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
104 Interview, Amin (20th January 2014).  
105 Interview, government official (2nd February 2014) (paraphrased). 
106 Mohammad Amin was highly critical to this provision in the Petroleum Commission Act. He 
claimed it was widely discussed and debated when the law was to be passed (interview, Amin 20th 
January 2014). 
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[…]”(Petroleum Commission Act 2011, part 3, section j). 107  The Petroleum 
Commission Act states that “six months after the commencement of this Act, the 
Ghana National Petroleum Corporation shall cease to exercise any advisory function” 
in relation to the above mentioned areas within the PC’s responsibility (2011, section 
24, part 2, my emphasis). Nonetheless, GNPC is still exercising an advisory role. This 
may be exemplified by the process leading to the approval of the field development 
plan for the TEN development project, a cluster of three oil fields developed as an 
integrated project, located 25 kilometers from the Jubilee Field.108 The partners 
licensed to develop the project submitted their Plan of Development (PoD)109 to the 
Ministry of Energy and Petroleum in November 2012. It was approved by 
government in May 2013. During that time span, both the GNPC and the PC were 
evaluating the PoD, and the main bulk of advice was provided by GNPC.110 GNPC 
has seconded a number of advisors to the PC, who did thorough evaluations of the 
PoD based on negative lessons from the Jubilee Field development. The evaluators 
raised objections on a number of issues. The PoD was approved “subject to the 
comments of the PC”.111 The perceptions of respondents from the PC and others were 
that important advice was not taken into account (though some aspects were changed 
according to the advice).112 Further, the advice provided by GNPC and the PC was 
not differentiated, but rather “piled together”.113 The respondent I interviewed from 
the MoEP explained that advice from GNPC was welcome because they are partners 
in the field: “We are partners, GNPC represents us. So, with all the engineering works 
and all those things, GNPC is part of it. They advise the government, that this is the 
best way to go.”114 Several respondents expressed that the PC’s advisory role was 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
107 As well as “(ii) plans for the development of petroleum transportation, processing and treatment 
facilities and (iii) decommissioning plans for petroleum fields and petroleum infrastructure” 
(Petroleum Commission Act 2011, section 3j).  
108 It is called “TEN” because it is a collective development of three hydrocarbon accumulations: 
Tweneboa, Enyenra and Ntomme.  
109 Synonymous with “field development plan”.  
110 Interviews, Amin (20th January 2014), PC official 1 (29th January 2014) and PC official 2 (31st 
January 2014).  
111 Interviews, government official (3rd February 2014) and PC official 3 (6th February 2014). 
112 Interviews, PC official 1 (29th January 2014), government official (3rd February 2014), PC official 3 
(6th February 2014), representative from MoEP (6th February 2014) and Amin (20th January 2014). 
113 Interviews, PC official 1 (29th January 2014) and representative from MoEP (6th February 2014). 
114 Interview representative from MoEP (6th February 2014).  
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weak because they are still developing their capacity,115 while others claimed they are 
more or less ready and that the dual advice creates duplication and a waste of 
effort.116 The PC has requested that the Norwegian Petroleum Directorate focuses on 
PoD evaluations in their next set of courses.117 With reference to the lack of 
consideration for the PC’s technical advice, ACEP director Mohammad Amin 
claimed that “these are some of the ways that the Petroleum Commission is being 
made a laughing stock of its own”.118 
Finances  
The PC is supposed to be financed by funds provided by Parliament, by funds the 
Commission earns by levying fees on the regulated industry and by donations 
(Petroleum Commission Act 2011, section 14, part 1 a–c). The latter is the basis for 
the PC’s internally generated fund. The PC’s funds shall be deposited into a bank 
account “for the purpose opened by the Commission with the approval of the 
Controller and Accountant-General” (Petroleum Commission Act 2011, section 14, 
part 2). The expenses of the PC shall be covered by the three mentioned sources of 
funding (2011, section 16).  
When it comes to acquisition of property, the Act states that “the costs shall be borne 
by the Commission” (2011, section 1, part 2). The Act does not mention whether the 
PC can take up loans. However, the PC took up a commercial bank loan to acquire its 
current office building. The Civil Society Platform on Oil and Gas expressed concerns 
that the PC will be financially dependent on government (Ghana Civil Society 
Platform on Oil and Gas 2011, 8). However, the main challenge respondents pointed 
to with regard to the implementation of the Petroleum Commission Act, was the 
institution’s lack of funding from central government.119 Several respondents claimed 
that the PC would have had a quicker start, a bigger role in contracting processes and 
would have come further in developing their various regulations, if they had sufficient 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
115 Interviews, Olsen (13th January 2014), representative from MoEP (6th February 2014) and PC 
official 2 (31st January 2014).  
116 Interview, PC official 1 (29th January 2014). 
117 Interview, PC official 1 (29th January 2014). 
118 Interview, Amin (20th January 2014). 
119 In the seven interviews this topic came up, 6 respondents emphasized that this was a major 
challenge for the proper implementation of PC (namely PC official 1, 2, 3, government official, Amin 
and World Bank official 2). The respondent from MoEP disagreed, and claimed it was an issue of 
economic mismanagement. 
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funding to from the start. PC officials expressed that the lack of funds have delayed 
several of their activities.120 In 2012 they were for example not able to audit 
companies registered as operating in the oil and gas industries, as they are mandated 
to do by the Petroleum Commission Act (2011, section 3e). The PC is dependent on 
hiring consultants for drafting the various regulations, something they have not been 
able to afford.121 When the PC was set up it was promised a startup capital from the 
government that did not materialize.122 Further, evidence suggests that the PC was not 
given any budgetary allocation in the national budget for 2012 (Odoi-Larbi 2013). 
Regulatory agencies in Ghana have generally had difficulties meeting their financial 
requirements and “suffer enormous logistical difficulties as a result of the limited 
funding that they receive from government” (Aryeetey 2002, 45). Due to high interest 
rates the down-payment on the mortgage is a big financial challenge for the PC.123 
Expenses for capacity building activities have been covered by the Oil for 
Development program and the World Bank Oil and Gas Capacity Building Project. 
The refurbishing of the current office building was financed by the World Bank loan, 
provided through the Oil and Gas Capacity Building Project 
The PC aims to wean themselves of government support.124 The PC has started 
charging some fees already for administrative services such as registration of 
companies operating in the petroleum sector.125 When the PC’s remaining legislative 
instruments are passed, they will provide for imposition of regulatory charges on the 
companies. Companies will have to pay fees to the PC for a number of activities, for 
example to obtain permits to drill wells. 
Agency head and governing body  
The PC is governed by a board, to which the president appoints members. In 
appointing board members to the PC, the president shall “have regard to the person’s 
integrity, knowledge, expertise and experience in matters relevant to the functions of 
the Board.” The board should consist of a chairperson, the Chief Executive of the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
120 Interviews, PC official 1 (29th January 2014), PC official 2 (31st January 2014) and PC official 3 (6th 
February 2014).  
121 Interview, PC official 3 (6th February 2014). 
122 Interviews, PC official 1 (29th January 2014) and PC official 3 (6th February 2014). 
123 Interview, PC official 3 (6th February 2014). 
124 Interviews, PC official 1 (29th January 2014) and PC official 2 (31st January 2014). 
125 Interview, PC official 3 (6th February 2014). 
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Commission, a representative of the Institution of Geo-scientists 126  and a 
representative of the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and three other 
persons127 (Petroleum Commission Act 2011, part 4, section 1–4). The president 
appoints the Chief Executive officer of the PC, who “shall be a person of high moral 
character and integrity with the relevant qualifications and experience related to the 
functions of the Commission” (2011, section 11, part 1–3). The PC’s first board was 
appointed in November 2011, where former Deputy Energy Minister, Dr. Kwaneba 
Donkor, was made Chief Executive (Daily Graphic 2011). In addition, the president 
can revoke the appointment of any member (2011, part 5, section 5). 
The practice of presidential appointments to boards of public entities is enshrined in 
the constitution of Ghana (1992, article 70). Gyimah-Boadi and Prempeh argue that 
this practice leaves the Commission’s independence in doubt (2012, 100). The Civil 
Society Platform on Oil and Gas has expressed concerns that presidential 
appointments to the board of the PC will lead to political party patronage (Ghana 
Civil Society Platform on Oil and Gas 2011, 8). There was a general perception 
among respondents that presidential appointment to boards of commissions and other 
public entities in Ghana are generally based on political patronage as opposed to 
technocratic merit. This is exemplified by the following quote: 
Almost invariably what we have seen in the past is that once a new government 
is formed, the new government would like to bring its people. I mean, it's a way 
of saying thank you to people who have helped you […] get power […] we put 
you on the board so you are collecting allowances, you get your money.128  
Respondents viewed this as less of a problem with regard to the PC, both because of 
the institutional representation that is ensured by the act, as well as an impression that 
the board members recruited do have expertise relevant to the PC’s areas of 
competence.129 The chairman of the board for example, has long-term experience 
within the oil and gas sector.130 The current Chief Executive, Theo Ahwireng, was 
appointed late 2012. He has a long lasting background from GNPC, and was by a PC 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
126 Nominated by the institute.  
127 “at least one of whom is a woman” (Petroleum Commission Act 2011, section 4, part 1e). 
128 Interview, PC official 1 (29th January 2014).  
129 Interviews, PC official 1 (29th January 2014), PC official 2 (31st January 2014), government official 
(3nd February 2014) and PC official 3 (6th February 2014).    
130 Interview, PC official 3 (6th February 2014).  
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respondent perceived to have “no political connections in any way”.131 The president 
has also chosen to appoint the executive director of the civil society organization 
Isodec, as well as a person from the opposition party, to the PC board.132 
HR policy  
When it comes to the appointment and management of regular human resources, the 
act only mentions that the president can appoint staff “that are necessary for the 
proper and effective performance” of the PC (Petroleum Commission Act 2011, 
section 13, part 1). Respondents from the PC said that the recruitment of staff so far, 
had been outsourced to a human resources (HR) consultancy.133 All positions were 
advertised in newspapers with clear criteria of the qualifications needed. In line with 
the policy of the HR consultancy, position adverts did not say which institution the 
recruitment was for, merely that is for an organization “in the oil and gas sector”134. 
Going forward, the PC intends to maintain this HR policy, for the purpose of having a 
fair and transparent process and attaining staff based on merit. The respondents 
expressed that this policy counters political influence in HR matters, exemplified by 
this quote: 
There is a tendency for a lot of influence. […] If you want to do the recruitment 
directly here, there will be a lot of pressure on us. […] from… maybe 
politicians here and there, and the people in the high places. […]. They will call 
you, and they will have this person... they will bring the CV to you. […]. So to 
avoid that problem, once you give it to the standard recruitment agency, it 
becomes fair and you can get very quality people.135 
According to the Petroleum Commission Act, the board may establish committees to 
perform various functions (2011, section 8, part 1). Members of the board and 
members of a committee of the board “shall be paid the allowances approved by the 
Minister in consultation with the Minister responsible for Finance.” (2011, section 9). 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
131 Interview, PC official 3 (6th February 2014). 
132 Interviews, Olsen (13th January 2014), Manteaw (17th January 2014), representative from MoEP (6th 
February 2014) and PC official 3 (6th February 2014). 
133Interviews, PC official 1 (29th January) and government official (3nd February 2014).  
134 Interview, PC official 3, (6th February 2014). 
135 Interview, PC official 3, (6th February 2014). 
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Decisional authority and reporting  
The Chief Executive has the overall responsibility for the implementation of the 
decisions of the board and for the daily administration of the PC (Petroleum 
Commission Act 2011, section 12, part 1). The minister may however give directions 
to the board on matters of policy whereby the board shall comply (Petroleum 
Commission Act 2011, section 10, part 1). It is specified that “directions given by the 
Minister shall not adversely affect or interfere with the performance of the functions 
and exercise of the power of the Commission under this Act.” (Petroleum 
Commission Act 2011, section 10, part 2). 
The accounts of the PC are to be audited by the Auditor General. The PC is required 
to keep accounting books which must be submitted to the Auditor General annually. 
The auditor general sends a copy of its audited report to the Minister of Energy and 
Petroleum (Petroleum Commission Act 2011, section 17, part 1–3). Ghana Auditing 
Service does not conduct performance audit. Respondents from the PC confirmed that 
Ghana Auditing Service has audited PC’s accounts for 2012 and 2013.136  
The PC must submit an annual report to the Ministry of Energy and Petroleum, 
describing the PC’s activities and operations in for the previous year, including the 
audited report by the Auditor General. The minister of Energy and Petroleum shall 
submit the annual report to Parliament one month after receiving it (Petroleum 
Commission Act 2011, section 18, part 1–4). The annual report is also made a public 
document. Respondents at the PC confirmed that the annual report for 2012 was 
produced and submitted to both ministry and Parliament, while work on the 2013 
report appears to be in progress still.137 “The Parliamentary Select Committee on 
Mines and Energy“ is the main parliamentary committee to scrutinize the activities of 
the PC. According to a PC higher executive officer, the PC has regular meetings with 
the Parliamentary Select Committee on Mines and Energy to discuss and get approval 
for the PC’s work program and to discuss their performance.138 The board must also 
submit any other reports the Minister may require in writing (Petroleum Commission 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
136 Interviews, PC official 1 (29th January 2014), PC official 2 (31st January 2014), government official 
(3nd February 2014) and PC official 3 (6th February 2014).   
137 Interviews, PC official 1 (29th January 2014) and PC official 3 (6th February 2014).   
138 Interview, PC official 3, (6th February 2014). 
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Act 2011, section 18, part 4). The Petroleum Commission Act does not provide 
sanctions where the PC has violated their duty in any way. The respondent from 
MoEP however explained that “If they come and their reports are not good, they have 
not performed well, then the Parliament squeezes them, they don't give them enough 
money”.139  
When passed, the new Petroleum Exploration and Production Bill will also affect the 
mandate of the PC. After a long drafting process, with significant assistance from 
Norway, this bill is now approved by cabinet, and is awaiting eventual parliamentary 
endorsement. In the draft bill it is stated that “This bill is a further step towards [the 
strengthening of the legal and regulatory framework] and will firmly equip the 
[Petroleum] Commission with comprehensive legislation required to enable it 
effectively implement its constitutional mandate” (The Petroleum Exploration and 
Production Bill, 2013).140 However, several respondents with whom I discussed this 
matter expressed concern that the new Petroleum Exploration and Production Bill will 
dilute the authorities of the Commission and divert more responsibility to the 
ministry. 141  Respondents were worried that the ministry would be given 
responsibilities within petroleum resource management, while its mandate is to 
develop policy. The Petroleum Exploration and Production Bill contain a number of 
clauses where decisions are taken by “the Minister in consultation with the 
Commission”.142 One example is worth noting: In the Exploration and Production Bill 
there is a proposal to establish a local content fund, which should be managed by the 
minister and the local content committee of the PC. With regards to this, the ACEP 
director commented: “Management is an implementation issue. It is not a policy 
formulation issue. So why should the minister be responsible for the management of 
the fund?” 143 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
139 Interview, representative from MoEP (6th February 2014). 
140 The draft bill is not made public, but I attained a physical copy from a PC official while he/she was 
attending a meeting is Oslo during spring 2014.  
141 Interviews, Amin (17th January 2014), government official (3nd February 2014), World Bank official 
1 (3rd February 2014), PC official 3 (6th February 2014).  
142 I have not been able to analyze the bill draft in it’s entirely. If and when the law is passed, an in-
depth analysis of its effects on the PC’s independence would be valuable.  
143 Interview, Amin, (20th January 2014). 
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7 Analysis  
In this chapter I aim to answer the four research questions formulated in chapter 1. 
Accordingly, the chapter is divided into four parts. The first three parts will constitute 
the evaluative analysis, addressing research questions 1-3. Here I will draw on 
empirical information from chapter 6, where the PC’s organizational structure and 
functions were examined. The evaluative analysis is aimed at defining outcomes by 
applying theoretical categories to the empirical material. The assessment follows the 
same order as the numbered dimensions of the operational concepts, referring to 
tables 3.1 (independence), 3.2 and 3.3 (accountability). When labeling outcomes in 
the evaluative analysis I will refer to table 3.4, which made a fourfold differentiation 
between combinations of “formal” and “real” institutional change. That typology gave 
four possible outcomes along each dimension of independence and accountability 
respectively. The fourth and final part of this chapter is an explanatory analysis 
addressing research question 4, where I will draw on empirical information from both 
chapters 5 and 6. 
7.1 Institutional independence  
The first research question asks to what extent of the PC enjoys institutional 
independence. The proceeding assessment focuses on the four types of independence, 
with its combination of nine dimensions, as the concept was made operational in 
chapter 3 (section 3.1). The outcomes are summarized in tables representing each type 
of independence.  
The	  PC certainly fulfils the first dimension of legal independence requiring that it is a 
separate entity by public law: The Petroleum Commission Act. Since the PC is also 
physically established as of late 2011, autonomy is regarded as high in both formal 
and real terms.  
The second dimension of legal independence focuses on whether “relevant laws place 
the decision-making power with the agency head.” According to the Petroleum 
Commission Act, decisional authority resides with the PC’s governing board, and the 
Chief Executive is responsible for implementation of decisions. The minister of 
energy and petroleum may give directions on matters related to policy, but these 
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should not adversely interfere with the work of the PC. As the Ministry of Energy and 
Petroleum is responsible for developing policy, this is reasonable and not a 
considerable impediment towards the PC’s decision-making power. Nevertheless, the 
empirical material raises concerns regarding the PC’s decisional power in advising the 
ministry.144 Even though the Petroleum Commission Act clearly states that GNPC 
should no longer play any advisory role towards the ministry (effective six months 
after passing the act), the corporation is still exercising that function. The fact that the 
government still asks GNPC for advice may be understood in light of the PC’s start-
up challenges and capacity needs. Though not necessarily representative of the 
government’s position, a MoEP representative expressed that advice from GNPC was 
welcome and “the best way to go” since GNPC are partners in production. Although 
legally safeguarded, the PC’s decisional power on providing advice to the Ministry of 
Energy and Petroleum appears to be diluted through this duplication of efforts.  
The third dimension of legal independence concerns the extent to which relevant laws 
allow for ministerial interventions in the agency’s decisions. Several respondents 
directed my attention towards ministerial discretionary powers in laws affecting the 
PC’s mandate, namely the Local Content Law and The Petroleum Exploration and 
Production Bill. As described in section 6.3, the Local Content regulations determine 
that Ghanaian companies shall hold a minimum of 5 % equity in petroleum 
agreements or licenses. The minister of energy and petroleum is however vested with 
discretionary power to determine the persons (i.e. Ghanaian companies) qualified to 
hold such equity, and accordingly change the requirement of 5 % local participation. 
Evidence suggest that the minister has used this power to change the terms in at least 
two oil contracts approved after passing the Local Content Law. This provision for 
ministerial intervention reduces the PC’s legal independence, in both formal and real 
terms (suggesting outcome 3 in table 3.4). As I will return to in the discussion of 
accountability of oil companies, the Local Content Law gives the ministry the 
mandate to overrule the PC’s decisions regarding penalties for rule violation on behalf 
of oil companies. This gives scope for ministerial discretion in the management of 
regulations, which should clearly be under the PC’s responsibility. Empirical 
evidence does not imply that this has been practiced so far. Nevertheless, this factor 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
144 Decision-making power is here interpreted as placing advisory authority with the PC, as mandated 
by the Petroleum Commission act.  
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thus reduces the PC legal independence and weakens the PC’s role as the enforcer of 
accountability from the industry.  
Further, the Petroleum Exploration and Production Bill contain numerous clauses 
where decisions should be taken by the minister in consultation with the PC, in 
relating to management of the sector. This issue came forth in several interviews, and 
appeared important to various stakeholders. This may be exemplified by the proposed 
local content fund which is to be managed by the minister and the PC. This appears to 
dilute the decisional authority of the PC while providing discretionary powers to the 
Ministry of Energy and Petroleum. It is thus an impediment to legal independence 
along dimension 3 (cf. table 3.1). Management or implementation of policy is clearly 
a responsibility mandated to the PC by the Petroleum Commission Act. Since the 
Petroleum Exploration and Production Bill is still awaiting parliamentary approval, 
the analytical outcome remains inconclusive. The executive director of ACEP 
explained that his organization has sent analyses to the government, concerning areas 
in the Petroleum Exploration and Production Bill they believe will undermine the 
work of the PC. He claimed that “If they [the sections in the law] are not addressed 
then the Commission will become an appendix of the Ministry.”145 When the bill is 
passed into law, a thorough analysis of its impact on the PC’s legal independence 
would be timely. As I will return to, the significant degree of ministerial interference 
in the PC’s decisional powers provided by the Local Content Law and the Petroleum 
Exploration and Production Bill, provide the most significant impediment towards the 
PC’s independence.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
145 Interview, Amin, (20th January 2014). 
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Table 7.1 Legal institutional independence 
 
The second type of independence concerns the degree of financial dependence on 
central government. The PC has two primary sources of funding: those provided by 
Parliament, and internally generated funds earned by levying fees on the regulated 
industry (in addition to donations). The PC does not seem to be financially dependent 
on government. This applies both in formal and real terms (suggesting outcome 1 in 
table 3.4).  
Dimensions Outcome 
(1) The agency is a separate legal entity 
by public law and is established by a 
parliamentary act  
High: The PC is established as a 
separate legal entity by the Petroleum 
Commission Act (high formal and high 
real legal independence) 
(2) The relevant laws place the decision-
making power with the agency head  
High: Decisional power regarding the 
PC’s activities are placed with the 
governing board (high formal legal 
independence) 
(3) Relevant laws minimize the scope 
for ministerial interventions 
Low: The MoEP is vested with the 
power to change the requirement of 
local content participation and 
determine local operators qualified to 
enter into a petroleum agreement or 
license by the Local Content Law (low 
formal and low real legal independence) 
Low: The MoEP is vested with the 
power to overrule the PC’s decisions 
regarding penalties toward non-
compliance with Local Content 
Regulations (low formal legal 
independence) 
Low: Clauses in the Petroleum 
Exploration and Production Bill open up 
for decisions to be taken by the MoEP in 
consultation with the PC. For example 
in management of the local content fund 
(low formal legal independence) 
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The next dimension of financial independence focuses on whether the agency can 
earn incomes by other sources that central government. The PC can levy fees on the 
regulated industry, suggesting high financial independence along this dimension. The 
PC has already been able to develop some internally generated funds through 
registration fees etc., from companies operating in the petroleum sector. However, 
fees and charges will be further defined in the subsidiary legislations which have not 
yet been passed. This dimension of financial independence is thus considered high in 
formal terms but low in real terms (suggesting outcome 4 in table 3.4).  
The PC also has the ability to take up loans: dimension 6 of institutional 
independence. This is exemplified by the commercial loan acquired to purchase its 
current office building. Thus, independence along this dimension is high in both 
formal and real terms (suggesting outcome 1 in table 3.4). The PC must also cover its 
own financial deficits (dimension 7). Therefore, the last dimension of financial 
independence may also be considered high in both formal and real terms. In summary, 
the financial independence of the PC is considered high along all four sub-
dimensions.  
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Table 7.2 Financial institutional independence 
The eighth dimension of independence looks to whether the agency head is appointed 
(and evaluated) by central government versus the governing board of the agency. The 
latter implies a high degree of independence. In accordance with the constitution of 
Ghana, the PC’s Chief Executive officer and board members are appointed by the 
president. Gyimah-Boadi and Prempeh claim that “This practice leaves the 
[Petroleum] Commission’s Independence in doubt” (2012, 100). This rings true 
according to the theoretical operationalization applied here. There is a concern that 
presidential appointments will enhance political party patronage, which based on the 
empirical material appears to be a general concern in appointments to other public 
entities in Ghana (see section 6.3). Respondents were under the impression that 
political patronage in board appointments was strong for other public entities, while 
PC’s board, including its chief executive and chairman, were people with relevant 
technical expertise. Recalling the discussion in section 3.1, the appointment of 
respected public figures, non-aligned with politics, may advance agency 
independence where executive appointment of agency head and board is the case 
(Amundsen 2013b, 10). Due to presidential appointment of agency head, 
Dimensions Outcome 
(4) A minor part of funding might stem 
from central government 
High: A minor part of PCs funding 
stems from central government (high 
formal and high real financial 
independence) 
(5) The agency is primarily funded by 
other sources than central government, 
e.g. by levying fees on regulated 
industry 
 
High: The Petroleum Commission Act 
mandates the PC to levy fees on the 
regulated industry. Fees and charges 
regime is however yet underdeveloped 
(high formal and low real financial 
independence) 
(6) The agency can take up loans High: PC can take up commercial loans 
and has done so (high formal and high 
real financial independence) 
(7) The agency must cover most of its 
deficits itself, e.g. by imposing budget 
constraints 
High: PC must cover own deficits (high 
formal and high real financial 
independence) 
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independence along dimension 8 is somewhat reduced in formal terms. Independence 
is however advanced by the fact that the Chief Executive is perceived to be non-
aligned with party politics implying high independence in real terms (suggesting 
outcome 4 in table 3.4).  
Dimension nine focuses on whether members of the governing board are appointed by 
central government and if they are ensured fixed terms. The PC’s independence is 
somewhat reduced by the fact that the president can revoke the appointment of any 
board member (including the Chief Executive officer). As mentioned, the president 
also appoints all board members. However, respondents emphasized that the PC 
seems more insulated from political patronage than comparable agencies, because the 
Petroleum Commission Act ensures that two board members are nominated by the 
Environmental Protection Agency and the Institution of Geo-physicists. Formal 
independence along this dimension is thus ensured to a certain extent. Formal 
independence is still impeded on, since the president is “free” to appoint the five 
remaining board members without regard to institutional representation, though their 
integrity and knowledge should be taken into account. As mentioned, respondents 
within the PC had the impression that the bulk of board members have relevant 
technocratic expertise. The current board chairman and Chief Executive were referred 
to as having long experience within the oil and gas sector. Furthermore, the 
government has appointed a person affiliated with the opposition party and the 
Executive director of the civil society organization Isodec as board members, even 
though these are not legal requirements. Board member independence thus seems well 
ensured in practice.  
In summary, both formal and real independence is rather high regarding appointments 
to PC’s board and agency head. Independence is low in the sense that the president 
appoints members, but advanced since the institutional representation is ensured. Real 
independence is further advanced since the board members in general appear to be 
selected based on technocratic expertise.  
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Table 7.3 Appointment of agency head and governing board 
The final type of institutional independence concerns whether the PC has decisional 
powers in human resources management. In practice, the PC has managed its human 
resources through a HR consultancy. Evidence suggests that this is done according to 
high meritocratic standards. HR management independence thus appears to be high in 
real terms. However, the Petroleum Commission Act gives the president power to 
appoint staff necessary for proper and effective performance of the PC. In addition, 
the ministry determines the allowances for board members and members of 
committees that the board establishes. This suggests some impediment to HR 
management autonomy in formal terms (pointing to outcome 4 in table 3.4).  
Dimensions Outcome 
(8) Agency head is appointed and 
evaluated by the governing board 
High: Agency head is a presidential 
appointee, but perceived to have 
technocratic merit (high real and low 
formal independence) 
(9) The board is appointed by actors 
outside central government and its 
members are secured fixed terms 
High: Board members are presidential 
appointees, but institutional 
representation of two board members 
may counter political patronage. Board 
members are perceived to have 
technocratic merit. A civil society 
representative and a person from the 
opposition party are appointed to the 
board (high real and high formal 
independence) 
Low: Board members can be revoked by 
the president (low formal independence) 
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Table 7.4 Human resources management independence 
 
7.2 Is the Petroleum Commission held accountable? 
The second research question asked to what extent the Petroleum Commission is held 
accountable. In chapter 3 I argued that the analysis should focus on the PC’s 
administrative accountability towards its sector ministry and associated parliamentary 
committee, as well as its financial and administrative accountability towards the 
auditor general. Administrative accountability was argued to be a type of top-down 
vertical accountability (cf. section 3.2). Administrative accountability is high where 
the sector ministry and parliamentary committee oblige “the agency to explain and 
inform about the processes whereby inputs are transformed to outputs.” The outcomes 
identified in the proceeding analysis are summarized in tables 7.5 and 7.6.  
The PC is required to provide a detailed annual rapport on its activities to the Ministry 
of Energy and Petroleum, which is then sent to Parliament for scrutiny. This annual 
report should contain a financial audit by the Auditor General. In addition, the annual 
report becomes a publicly available document, providing citizens and stakeholders 
with insight into the affairs of the PC. The Ministry may also demand written reports 
Dimensions Outcome 
(8) Agency head is appointed and 
evaluated by the governing board 
High: Agency head is a presidential 
appointee, but perceived to have 
technocratic merit (high real and low 
formal independence) 
(9) The board is appointed by actors 
outside central government and its 
members are secured fixed terms 
High: Board members are presidential 
appointees, but institutional 
representation of two board members 
may counter political patronage. Board 
members are perceived to have 
technocratic merit. A civil society 
representative and a person from the 
opposition party are appointed to the 
board (high real and high formal 
independence) 
Low: Board members can be revoked by 
the president (low formal independence) 
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from the PC board at any time. In addition, officials from the PC regularly meet with 
the Parliamentary Committee on Mines and Energy to discuss future prospects and 
past performance. These mechanisms strengthen the answerability aspect of 
accountability towards the ministry and Parliament and thus the PC’s administrative 
accountability (dimensions 1 and 2 of accountability). The annual report for 2012 has 
been submitted, while the report for 2013 is a work in progress. These dimensions of 
accountability thus appear to be functional in both formal and real terms (suggesting 
outcome 1 in table 3.4).  
Dimension 3 of accountability looks at the PC’s administrative and financial 
accountability towards the Auditor General. Since the Ghana Auditing Service does 
not conduct performance audits, it does not enhance administrative accountability. As 
seen, the PC is held financially accountable by the Auditor General. Empirical 
findings suggest that financial auditing has been performed in practice. Financial 
accountability can thus be regarded as high in both formal and real terms (suggesting 
outcome 1 in table 3.4). 
While dimensions 1-3 focus on the answerability aspect of accountability, dimension 
4 concerns the enforcement dimension. Evidence suggests that Parliament can reduce 
the PC’s budgetary allocation if its performance or reporting is unsatisfactory. There 
might be other enforcement mechanisms to punish bad conduct that are not uncovered 
by the empirical material.  
Based on the above, there appears to be sound mechanisms in which to ensure the 
PC’s administrative accountability towards the sector ministry and parliamentary 
committee, and financial accountability towards the Auditor General, in regards to 
answerability. 
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Table 7.5 Is the Petroleum commission held accountable? 
 Dimensions Outcome 
A
ns
w
er
ab
ili
ty
 
(1) The sector ministry obliges the 
agency to explain and inform about 
the processes whereby inputs are 
transformed to outputs (vertical, 
administrative accountability) 
High: The PC is required to provide 
a detailed annual rapport on its 
activities to the MoEP, which is then 
sent to Parliament for scrutiny (high 
formal and high real administrative 
accountability) 
(2) Relevant parliamentary 
committee(s) obliges the agency to 
explain and inform about the 
processes whereby inputs are 
transformed to outputs (horizontal, 
administrative accountability) 
(3) The Auditor General obliges the 
agency to explain and inform about 
their financial conduct (horizontal, 
financial accountability) and their 
performance (horizontal, 
administrative accountability) 
 
High: PC is held financially 
accountable by the Auditor General 
by law and in practice (high formal 
and high real horizontal 
administrative accountability) 
Low: Ghana Auditing Service does 
not conduct performance audit (low 
formal and low real horizontal 
financial accountability) 
E
nf
or
ce
m
en
t (4) The sector ministry/relevant 
parliamentary committee/auditor 
general imposes sanctions on the 
agency when they have violated 
their duties 
Inconclusive  
 
7.3 Does the PC hold oil companies accountable?  
Chapters 1 and 2 argued that an important aim of petroleum regulatory reform is to 
ensure accountability from oil companies. The third research question therefore asked 
to what extent the PC keeps the operators in the petroleum industry accountable. The 
PC plays an important function in keeping the oil companies accountable to the 
government and thus indirectly to the people of Ghana. The Petroleum Commission 
Act states that the PC shall safeguard compliance with laws and regulations, and also 
receive information from contractors as provided for under applicable laws and 
regulations. The first factor concerns the enforcement aspect of accountability, while 
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the second factor deals with the answerability aspect of accountability (dimensions 5 
and 6 in table 3.3). The results from the below analysis are summarized in table 7.3. 
In order for the PC to be fully able to exercise its regulatory functions, subsidiary 
legislations are required. In this context, the only legislative instrument amended so 
far is the Local Content Law. This law strengthens the informational aspect of 
accountability by requiring that oil companies submit a local content plan to the PC 
for approval, before any activities can be undertaken. The PC can thus monitor 
whether regulations are upheld. This bolsters the answerability aspect of 
accountability in regard to local content regulations (dimension 5 of accountability). 
The local content law also enhances the enforcement aspect of accountability by 
providing for fiscal penalties or imprisonment where rules and regulations are 
violated (dimension 6 of accountability). However, there is concern that the PC’s role 
as enforcer is somewhat watered down through the Local Content Law, since the 
minister has the power to change the requirements of local content participation. 
Evidence suggests that this has been done in the case of two oil contracts after the 
passing of the Local Content Law. Therefore, the PC’s role as enforcer may be 
impeded by ministerial discretion in the area of local content, in both formal and real 
terms (outcome 3 in table 3.4). 
The Petroleum Commission Act may also constrain the PC’s role as an enforcer of 
accountability, since a person aggrieved by the decisions of the PC can appeal to the 
Ministry of Energy and Petroleum who has the power to overrule the decision. This 
may create leeway for political interests to become involved in matters of technical 
regulation. The empirical material does not demonstrate that this discretional power 
has been employed.  
The PC has also implemented preliminary monitoring and evaluation systems for their 
areas of regulation. Companies’ operations are monitored through their quarterly self-
reporting to the PC as well as inspections of operating facilities, making them 
answerable to the PC. Based on this information gathering, the PC may uncover 
regulatory violations. According to the PC, two companies had their operations halted 
last year due to non-compliance with safety standards. This illustrates that the 
enforcement aspect has been functional. The answerability aspect is further 
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strengthened by PC’s requirement to establish an annual report on all petroleum 
resources and activities in Ghana. 
Drafting subsidiary legislation is a central aspect of the institution cooperation 
between the PC and the NPD. Thus, it is an important means for OfD to influence and 
possibly advance the PC’s role of holding oil companies accountable. How these 
mechanisms take shape in subsequent legislation remains to be seen.  
Table 7.6 Does the Petroleum Commission hold oil companies accountable? 
 Dimensions Outcome 
A
ns
w
er
ab
ili
ty
 
(5) The agency obliges the oil 
companies to explain and inform 
about their conduct 
High: the Local Content Law 
requires that oil companies submit a 
local content plan to the PC for 
approval (high formal answerability) 
Preliminary monitoring and 
evaluation systems are in place but 
legislation for remaining areas of 
regulation are not yet passed 
E
nf
or
ce
m
en
t 
(6) The agency has the means to 
impose sanctions on the oil 
companies when they have violated 
their duties 
Low: The local content law provide 
for penalties for non-compliance 
with Local Content Regulations. 
However, the MoEP may overrule 
the PC’s decisions regarding 
penalties (impediment towards the 
PC’s role as enforcer of 
accountability) 
Low: The Local Content Law allows 
the MoEP to change the 
requirements of local content 
participation (impediment towards 
the PC’s role as enforcer of 
accountability) 
 
7.4 Explanatory analysis  
Research question 4 asked to what extent the policy transfer framework may explain 
outcomes in the establishment of the Ghanaian Petroleum Commission. In this section 
I will apply the concepts introduced in the policy transfer framework, to identify 
empirical relationships between the influences of relevant actors and contextual 
	   92 
factors on the selected outcomes identified above (cf. sections 7.1-3). Further, I will 
assess the hypotheses formulated in the (extended) policy transfer framework. By 
doing so I will assess the usefulness of the policy transfer framework, thus addressing 
research question 4. Since this study is not a full-fledged evaluation, it does not 
wholly reveal which mechanisms that may have caused the various outcomes. As the 
following analysis will show, the policy transfer framework offers heuristic value in 
identifying empirical relationships in the data.  
Actors involved in reform 
The first part of the explanatory framework focuses on whether the transfer process is 
voluntary or coerced, and which actors are involved in the transfer. It was argued that 
the types of actors involved may affect whether the process is voluntary or coerced. 
The discussion will therefore focus on which actors influenced the certain outcomes 
of the reform, and whether the processes appear to have been voluntary or coerced. In 
this section I will place the main focus on the following empirical outcomes: the 
establishment of an independent regulatory institution (dimension 1 of independence) 
and representation on the board of the commission (dimension 9 of independence) I 
also discuss how the policy transfer process has affected the Petroleum Commission’s 
ability to keep the oil companies accountable (dimensions 5 and 6 of accountability). 
Lastly, I assess whether hypothesis 1 and hypothesis 2 proposed in section 3.4 are 
corroborated by the evidence. 
The empirical review in chapters 5 and 6 identified relevant actors in the policy 
transfer processes to include: Ghanaian government officials and politicians, GNPC 
officials, international petroleum experts, the Norwegian government represented 
through OfD, the World Bank, bilateral donors and civil society groups (eventually 
consolidated as a national Civil Society Platform on Oil and Gas). There will likely be 
other actors involved who have not been included by the empirical material.  
Regulatory reform was put on the agenda since shortly after oil was discovered in 
2007. The issue was raised in a phone call between Kofi Annan and Norwegian 
Minister of International Development, Erik Solheim as early as October 2007. Annan 
expressed that “setting in place the right regulatory mechanisms” would be an 
essential part of the cooperation (see section 5.2). Regulations were also mentioned in 
the Memorandum of Understanding, which was the initial statement of intent for the 
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Ghana-Norway cooperation. This document stated that central aims of the cooperation 
would be a revision of the petroleum law of 1983 (the GNPC law) and development 
of regulations to the law. This may be interpreted as an aim of developing regulations 
for the national oil company GNPC to oversee, i.e. holding on to the model where 
regulations are consolidated within the national oil company. The fact that this 
consolidated model was included in the mutually agreed memorandum of 
understanding indicates that Norway did not attempt to coerce the model of an 
independent regulator on the Ghanaian government. The leader of the Technical 
Committee on Oil and Gas emphasized that the government was given great 
opportunity to influence the content of the initial memorandum of understanding. This 
contributes to the impression of a low degree of coercion in the relationship between 
the Norwegian and Ghanaian government.  
The issue of regulation was also discussed at the National forum in February-March 
2008. According to Gary (2009) there was a near consensus among the international 
petroleum experts that regulatory and commercial functions within the petroleum 
industry should be separated. On the other hand, GNPC had argued for a model where 
commercial and regulatory roles would remain consolidated. 
In his framework, Schedler identifies four sets of agents influencing institutional 
reform. They represent four modes of change that work in conjunction. Schedler sees 
institutional reform as a dichotomous conflict between reformers and their opponents. 
He claims that the trigger for reform may come from one side, as somebody “has to 
kick the status quo from its point of equilibrium” (Schedler 1999a, 346). Change may 
occur when equilibriums are disturbed by critical junctures. 
A critical juncture for Ghana’s regulatory reform was when the government presented 
a new Petroleum Exploration and Production Bill in the summer of 2010, to replace 
the one from 1984. This was part of the process of invigorating the petroleum laws 
established under the Rawlings regime during the 1980s. In the new bill, the Ministry 
of Energy was suggested to be the regulator of Ghana’s petroleum sector. To describe 
Ghana’s reform process in Schedler’s terms, it thus appears that “actors from above”, 
i.e. the cabinet, initially had their preferences tilted towards maintaining the status 
quo. The proposed new Petroleum Exploration and Production Bill revealed 
government’s preference towards consolidating regulatory responsibility within the 
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ministry. Government representatives had also argued for a consolidated model earlier 
(cf. section 6.1). Although various actors had promoted regulatory reform during the 
overall policy transfer process, the reactions to the new Petroleum Exploration and 
Production Bill became the trigger for institutional reform (a critical juncture). The 
bill was refuted by Parliament. Under influence and support from civil society, 
Parliament argued that the bill was inconsistent with article 269 of the constitution, 
which states that natural resources should be regulated by an independent 
commission. An independent commission for the regulation of petroleum resources 
was a constitutional demand.  
After the first Petroleum Exploration and Production Bill was rejected, Norway was 
asked to assist in the drafting of a bill. Civil society was able to give input in the 
legislative process, promoting the model of a separate regulator. A near consensus 
was reached around the proposal for an independent regulatory commission. Already 
in December 2010, government presented a Petroleum Commission Bill before 
Parliament. This was an important first step towards ensuring the first dimension of 
regulatory independence: creating a separate institutional entity. In the first Petroleum 
Commission Bill, GNPC were given representation on the board. According to 
Gyimah-Boadi and Prempeh (2012), Parliament rejected this provision, influenced by 
the Civil Society Platform on Oil and Gas’ advocacy. Parliament approved the second 
Petroleum Commission Bill in June 2011. Based on this, it appears that the decision 
to reform was mainly influenced by actors “from above” (Parliament) and “from 
below” (civil society). 
The empirical material does not explicitly reveal which influence actors from outside, 
i.e. donors, may have had on the decision to reform. In the policy transfer framework, 
“actors from outside” were argued to regularly have a coercive influence when 
involved in a reform process. Dolowitz and Marsh claim that processes of policy 
transfer often will involve both coercive and voluntary elements. The evolution of the 
regulatory reform in Ghana appears to be an example of this. The collaboration 
between Ghanaian civil society and external donors make it hard to differentiate 
between the coercive and voluntary elements in the reform process. Endogenous and 
exogenous influences have been somewhat intertwined. The empirical analysis 
showed that the World Bank collaborated with the Civil Society Platform on Oil and 
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Gas in the period when decisions regarding the PC were being reached. The World 
Bank supported the Civil Society Platform on Oil and Gas by funding their 
stakeholder conferences and by including their viewpoints in conditionalities for 
releasing their annual budget support to the government. A World Bank official said 
that engagement with civil society ensured more legitimacy for the Bank’s demands 
towards to government. Disbursements of funds provided by the World Bank Oil and 
Gas Capacity Building Project (the technical assistance loan) were partly conditioned 
on “satisfactory establishment of a future petroleum regulatory body”. This is an 
example of what in section 2.1 was called conditionality as “paternalism”, where aid 
is conditional on being spent on particular activities (Collier 1997). One of the World 
Bank’s trigger actions for budget support in 2012 was that a proposal for the 
establishment of a petroleum regulatory authority was presented before cabinet during 
2011. This may be seen as conditionality through “inducement”, where donors offer 
support if the recipient authorities agree to introduce a set of policies (cf. section 2.1). 
When the World Bank announced their triggers in 2011, the legislating process of the 
Petroleum Commission Bill was already under way. The demand can thus be 
interpreted to be aimed at influencing the physical establishment of the institution. A 
World Bank official explained that this demand was made to support the general 
opinion on regulatory policy in Ghana. Though domestic pressures appear to most 
influential, the World Bank did have a push effect in the decision to reform, 
introducing a coercive element in the policy transfer process. 
Norway aided the legislative work in drafting the Petroleum Commission Bill. 
However, evidence suggests that OfD did not put pressure on the Ghanaian 
government to establish the institution in the first place. Norway had expressed to 
their Ghanaian counterparts that the tripartite separation of roles was one of the 
reasons why things had worked well in Norway. However, an OfD official 
emphasized that the ideas of a Petroleum Commission was essentially Ghanaian. As 
mentioned, the Memorandum of Understanding signed between Norway and Ghana in 
2008, did not mention anything about an independent regulator, but aimed at 
developing regulations to the GNPC law (i.e. remaining the consolidated model). The 
Memorandum of Understanding also stated that Norway should make inputs into the 
policy making process in Ghana “when specifically asked”. This further strengthens 
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the image of a low degree of coercion regarding the regulatory reform on behalf of 
Norway. 
The policy transfer relationship between the Norwegian and Ghanaian governments 
illustrates the vulnerability of a transfer process. It shows how a transfer process may 
depend heavily on trust relations, and be vulnerable to changes in political leadership. 
Simultaneously with Ghana’s change of government in January 2009, communication 
between Norwegian and Ghanaian government officials faded. Evidence suggests this 
was due to the new governments’ lack of trust in deals negotiated under the previous 
NPP government. The OfD cooperation was however reconfirmed after some months. 
In December 2010 the Norwegian Ministry of Petroleum and Energy and the 
Ghanaian Ministry of Energy eventually signed a 5-year cooperation agreement, 
formally establishing OfD assistance within petroleum resource management. The 
institutional cooperation between the PC and NPD was eventually to be included in 
this agreement. The institutional cooperation between the Norwegian Petroleum 
Directorate and the Ghanaian Petroleum Commission became an important 
component in Ghana’s policy transfer process. This cooperation also testifies to a high 
level of voluntariness in the transfer process between Norway and Ghana. 
Respondents from OfD emphasized that it was important that the program document, 
on which the agreement is based, was developed and owned by the receiver. OfD 
would review the program document and give feedback with suggestions for 
alternations, but in principle it should be developed by Ghana to reflect their 
preferences. This resembles with a “jointly agreed and binding development 
contract”, discussed in chapter 2 as typical for Norad’s development programs from 
the 1990s onwards. The Norwegian government has traditionally emphasized that aid 
should be recipient oriented. Both parties should fully share the aims of the 
cooperation and aid should not be used for interference in the policy of recipient 
countries. However, there is some stringency in the fact that the goals have to be 
mutually agreed. The level of goal attainment during the 5-year cooperation period 
forms the basis for an evaluation of whether the cooperation will be extended to a 
consecutive period. This ensures a level of commitment and reduces the risk of policy 
reversal. This constitutes a weak coercive element since it somewhat limits the 
governments running options in a 5-year period. But the cooperation may be 
considered all over voluntary since the goals are largely developed by the recipient.  
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Essential for the policy transfer process, is the NPDs assistance in developing 
subsidiary laws for their various areas the PC’s of regulation. In this way, OfD 
directly influences the PC’s ability to keep oil companies accountable to the 
government and the populace. Based on my data, this is where OfD has had the most 
explicit influence on the outcomes identified in this analysis.146 The regulations were 
claimed to be formed closely after the Norwegian model of regulation, but by learning 
not by coercion. These regulations allow the PC both to monitor oil companies on 
various areas of regulation, and to provide punishment where non-compliance is 
discovered. In this way, OfD positively contributes to strengthening both the 
informational and enforcement dimensions of accountability between oil companies 
and the government (dimensions 5 and 6 of accountability).  
Leira et. al argue that Norway’s positive image on the international arena presents an 
image of a model that can be copied by other countries. This resonates well with the 
view of respondents who referred to Norway as the best model to draw lessons from. 
Advisors to both the NPP and the NDC government emphasized that Norway was a 
preferred partner due to a lack of concern about double agendas as well as limited 
strings and conditions attached to the assistance. One may speculate that Norway’s 
role model image fuels the demand for the Oil for Development program, which is 
currently is the most in-demand Norwegian aid program internationally.  
The above discussion gives reason to problematize the assumption that donor 
influence necessarily leads to coercive transfer. Hypothesis 1 proposes that “If donors 
are the prime mover of reform (through applying conditionality), high autonomy 
along dimension 1, high accountability along dimension 1, and low independence 
along dimension 2, 3, 8, 9 and 10 will be the result” (cf. table 3.1). The reform 
appears to be less donor-induced than what was assumed in section 3.4, and from the 
onset. This rejects hypothesis 1 which assumed that donors were the prime movers of 
reform. The role of donors does represent a coercive element, but the strongest 
influences on the decision to reform appear to be domestic, represented by actors 
from Parliament and civil society.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
146 A noted in the methodological chapter, other types of data might reveal other empirical relationships. 
For example, I do not know to what extent the Norwegian experience is reflected in the Petroleum 
Commission Act, as a result of the consultancy from Norway. This is a challenge regarding the 
reliability of the study.  
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Hypothesis 2 of the explanatory framework proposed that “If donors and CSOs 
coalesce in promoting regulatory reform, there will be a greater chance of 
independence and accountability along all dimensions of the concepts”. This 
expectation proved to have some validity, suggesting that SCOs and donors could 
form successful coalitions to promote change. The Civil Society Platform on Oil and 
Gas cooperated with the World Bank to develop political conditionalities towards the 
Ghanaian government. As discussed in section 6.1, this had great impact on some 
aspects of the general reform processes in Ghana’s petroleum sector.  
From where are lessons drawn 
The third transfer variable essentially concerns which impact domestic contextual 
factors may have on the outcome of reform. This draws on the insight that policy 
transfer does not necessarily happen only on the international dimension, but also 
within the national context. Domestic structures and traditions will limit the range of 
options available in a transfer process. The empirical analysis revealed that 
commissions are an integral part of Ghanaian public administration. A number of 
commissions are in place, regulating the utilization of natural resources and other 
sectors in Ghana. Placing regulatory responsibility with independent commissions can 
be interpreted as a constitutional demand in Ghana. This factor proved decisive for 
the establishment of an independent regulator for the petroleum sector in Ghana, as 
made clear by the above section.  
The discussion in section 2 of the explanatory framework evolved around which 
outcomes could be expected, taking into account that neo-patrimonial features are 
common in African politics. Based on this assumption I formulated hypothesis 3, 
which proposed that neo-patrimonial norms in Ghana’s politics might limit 
independence with regards to appointment of board members and the agency head, 
HR management and ministerial interventions in agency decisions. Ministerial 
administrative accountability was expected to be strong, to ensure strong executive 
control. To test the theoretical expectations against the empirical evidence, I will 
address the five outcomes mentioned in hypothesis 3.  
From the explanatory framework it was expected that the PC’s independence 
regarding appointments to the board (including the Chief Executive) and HR-
management would be low due to an assumption of prevailing neo-patrimonial norms 
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and practices. In Ghana, the president is constitutionally vested with the power to 
appoint members to boards of all public entities. The Civil Society Platform on Oil 
and Gas and other critics shared concerns that this practice would fuel political 
patronage and place the PC’s independence in doubt. In neo-patrimonial systems, 
executive appointments to public boards may seriously impede on agency 
independence, because direct executive appointment could open up for political 
patronage. In such systems, top-positions in the public sector may easily become 
filled with persons selected based on political connections, while by norm it should be 
technocratic merit. However, as the discussion in 7.1 made evident, the PC’s 
independence along these three dimensions was relatively high. While patrimony 
appeared to play a role in board appointments and HR-management of other public 
agencies, the PC seemed to be spared of this. The assumed influence of neo-
patrimonial norms was not irrelevant for the political context, but it proved less 
pertinent for the PC. Hypothesis 3 is thus weakened with regards to these three 
dimensions of independence. This study does not reveal whether the policy transfer 
processes, i.e. the PC’s cooperation with OfD and the World Bank, have affected 
these dimensions of independence positively vis-à-vis other agencies.  
The analysis in section 7.1 suggested that the most significant impediment towards 
the PC’s independence was the ministerial interference in the PC’s decisional powers 
(cf. dimension 3 of independence). This was expected from hypothesis 3. The new 
Petroleum Exploration and Production Bill contain a number of clauses where 
decisions should be taken by the minister in consultation with the PC. This study does 
not include a thorough analysis of the Petroleum Exploration and Production Bill. 
However, a respondent form Africa Centre for Energy Policy (ACEP) warned that the 
Petroleum Commission would become an appendix of the Ministry if the bill was 
passed in its current form. ACEP had sent analyses to the Ministry of Energy and 
Petroleum advocating that the scope for ministerial discretion on areas under the PC’s 
responsibility be reduced. The analysis in section 7.1 also showed that the Local 
Content Law allows for ministerial intervention in the decisions of the PC, for 
example by giving the minister of energy and petroleum power to overrule decisions 
where the PC has handed penalties to oil companies for rule violation. The fact that 
this fits with hypothesis 3, cannot confirm a causal relationship. The empirical data 
does not confirm that Ghana’s politics can be regarded as neo-patrimonial, even 
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though some authors have claimed so (Dzorgbo 2001). Section 7.2 established that 
the PC’s administrative accountability towards its sector ministry was strong, 
something that also fits with the hypothesis.  
To summarize this section, the theoretically motivated expectations in hypothesis 3 
proved accurate on the two dimensions discussed in the last paragraph: high 
administrative accountability and low independence due to significant scope for 
ministerial interventions in agency decisions. This can hardly confirm a causal effect 
of neo-patrimonial norms on this dimension. It may be a spurious relationship rather 
than a causal one. The expectations did not prove very accurate for the remaining 
dimensions.  
In answer to research question 4, I conclude on basis of the above analysis that the 
policy transfer framework did have heuristic value in explaining outcomes in the 
establishment of the Ghanaian Petroleum Commission. Employing the conceptual 
categories from the framework allowed for a systematic entry to the empirical 
material.  
In the first section we saw that external policy transfer processes were not detrimental 
for the establishment of the Ghanaian Petroleum Commission (dimension 1 of 
institutional independence). A decisive factor in the establishment of the institution 
proved to be Parliament’s enforcement of “constitutional accountability”. In section 
3.2 it was argued that constitutional accountability entails monitoring whether 
legislative acts correspond with constitutional rules. As seen, Parliament argued that 
the first Petroleum Commission Bill was unconstitutional, as the constitution of 
Ghana demands separate institutions for the regulation of natural resources. Further, 
formal institutional independence with regards to appointment of agency board and 
Chief Executive was also determined by the constitution.  
In the policy transfer framework it was argued that “actors from outside” often would 
coerce policies on the recipient. We saw that regulatory policy was discussed between 
the Norwegian and the Ghanaian government at an early stage, but the Norwegian 
government did not at any point enforce the model of an independent regulator. This 
is in line with Norwegian aid policy which historically has been highly recipient-
oriented. The World Bank did however pose a coercive influence by employing aid 
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disbursement conditionalities related to petroleum regulatory reform. Empirically we 
saw that OfD has had a marked positive influence on the Petroleum Commission’s 
ability to keep the oil companies accountable (dimensions 5 and 6 of accountability). 
However, the analysis does not reveal which mechanisms that may have caused the 
various outcomes, and it has been difficult to differentiate between voluntary and 
coercive elements in the reform process.  
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8 Conclusion  
In this thesis I have analyzed a regulatory reform in Ghana’s petroleum sector by 
employing qualitative data collected during a fieldwork. More specifically, I have 
studied the establishment of the Ghanaian Petroleum Commission, which came into 
being in late 2011. The regulatory reform processes have been influenced by a 
multitude of domestic and external actors and structures. Shortly after Ghana’s 
discovery of oil in June 2007, a number of “policy transfer” processes were set in 
motion. To comprehend how various influences have affected regulatory reform 
outcomes, I have utilized “the policy transfer framework” developed by Dolowitz and 
Marsh (2000). The thesis has sought to address four research questions.  
The first research question asked: To what extent does the Ghanaian Petroleum 
Commission enjoy institutional independence? I argued that the Petroleum 
Commissions’ independence from central government was a partial precondition for 
the effective regulation of the petroleum industry. Institutional independence is 
therefore an important quality to avoid the detrimental effects of the so-called 
“resource curse”. Critics have contended that the practice of presidential appointments 
to the Petroleum Commission’s board may leave its independence in doubt (Gyimah-
Boadi and Kwasi Prempeh 2012, 100). However, the analysis in this thesis argued 
that institutional independence is high in regard to appointments to the governing 
board and of the Chief Executive. Interview data and documents studied revealed that 
the Petroleum Commission appears to be more insulated from political patronage in 
board appointments than comparable public agencies in Ghana. The analysis also 
showed that the Commission’s financial independence from central government is 
high. 
I argued that the greatest impediment towards the Petroleum Commission’s 
institutional independence was linked to its legal independence. The Petroleum 
Commission Act, which established the Commission, delegates decision-making 
powers related to management and regulation of the petroleum sector to the 
Commission’s board and Chief Executive. However, the Commission’s independence 
is somewhat constrained by subsequent legislations, namely the Local Content Law 
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and the Petroleum Exploration and Production Bill (if the latter becomes passed by 
Parliament). As the analysis revealed, these legislative documents open up for 
increased ministerial intervention in certain areas under the Commission’s decisional 
authority. According to how institutional independence is operationalized in this 
study, such ministerial discretion in matters of technical regulation reduces the 
Commission’s independence. Policy principals’ ability to intervene in, and overrule, 
decisions that according to law are delegated to an independent regulatory institution 
may pose impediments to effective regulation (Minogue and Cariño 2006, 5). 
Regulatory reforms are commonly pursued precisely with an aim of limiting 
ministerial authority over certain parts of public administration (Christensen 2006, 
114).  
Motivated by the salience of “good governance” in the development discourse, and its 
corresponding emphasis on accountability, research questions 2 and 3 addressed 
issues of accountability. The vast scholarly literature on political regulation focuses 
on the inherent trade-off between institutional independence and accountability. 
Without proper mechanisms of accountability, regulators may become dangerously 
independent from the political process (Levi-Faur 2011, 370). Based on this, the 
second research question asked: To what extent is the Ghanaian Petroleum 
Commission held accountable? The analysis concluded that sound mechanisms are in 
place to ensure the Commission’s vertical, administrative accountability towards its 
sector ministry as well as horizontal accountability towards its associated 
parliamentary committee. In addition, the Petroleum Commission is held financially 
accountable by the Ghana Auditing Service.   
Furthermore, it was argued that regulatory reform should not only ensure mechanisms 
that keep government institutions accountable. Of equal or greater importance are 
mechanisms which hold operators in the petroleum industry accountable to the 
populace. Hence, the third research question asked: To what extent does the 
Ghanaian Petroleum Commission keep operators in the petroleum industry 
accountable? Once subsidiary regulatory legislation is developed and passed into law, 
the Commission should be able to carry out its role as an enforcer of accountability 
towards operators in the petroleum industry. The Norwegian Oil for Development 
program provides a positive influence in the respect, by assisting the Petroleum 
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Commission in drafting its regulations. A few months after Ghana discovered oil in 
commercial quantities, the Ghanaian government contacted the Norwegian 
government, requesting assistance through the Oil for Development program. The 
Ghanaian government expressed a wish to draw lessons from the Norwegian 
experience, in terms of managing its petroleum resources in a sustainable manner. 
The regulations developed for the Petroleum Commission are to a large extent 
influenced by the Norwegian experience in petroleum regulation. This is a clear 
example of how policy transfer processes may contribute positively to the 
strengthening of accountability in a recipient country.   
Acknowledging the role of “policy transfer” in Ghana’s reform process, the fourth 
and final research question asked: To what extent does the policy transfer framework 
explain outcomes in the establishment of the Ghanaian Petroleum Commission? The 
scholarly literature on policy transfer deals with processes whereby knowledge about 
policies, institutions and ideas in one political setting is used to develop policies, 
institutions and ideas in another setting (Dolowitz and Marsh 2000, 5). In answer to 
research question 4, the policy transfer framework did not provide for causal 
explanations of reform outcomes. Nevertheless, the framework offered a helpful 
heuristic to identify empirical relationships in the data material. The conceptual 
categories offered by the framework proved useful for identifying the influence of 
various actors on relevant outcomes, and whether this influences was of a voluntary 
or coerced nature. One example already noted is the Oil for Development program’s 
positive contribution to the development of accountability in the petroleum industry.  
Moreover, the overall regulatory reform process can be viewed as being influenced by 
a set of different policy transfer processes, working alongside each other. An 
empirical analysis showed that policy transfer processes were influential in 
facilitating an informed debate about petroleum regulation, unveiling various 
experiences to draw positive and negative lessons from. The Ghanaian government 
engaged early in “lesson drawing”, defined by Rose (1993) as an activity where actors 
voluntarily search for existing solutions in time and space to develop policy. Evans 
and Davies (1999) claim it is typical for a policy transfer process that the “recipient” 
agent organizes forums where ideas can be exchanged with members of the same 
epistemic community. Such arenas can facilitate the development of consensual 
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knowledge regarding policy development. Shortly after oil was discovered, the 
presidential Technical Committee on Oil and Gas convened a large national forum to 
gain insights from other countries’ positive and negative experiences with petroleum 
governance. A gathering of stakeholders, donors, government officials and 
international petroleum experts shared their views on the development of the sector. 
Civil society organizations (CSOs) also engaged in lesson drawing activities in the 
early developmental phases of petroleum policies, which eventually contributed to the 
consolidation of the Civil Society Platform on Oil and Gas. The platform would direct 
significant advocacy towards the government to influence developments in petroleum 
governance. Both the national forum and the civil society preparatory meeting were 
partly funded by the World Bank and other donors. This shows how external actors 
can facilitate the exchange of ideas and experience in a transfer process.  
In closing, I argue that the policy transfer aspect should not be exaggerated in the case 
of Ghana’s regulatory reform. Despite the significant donor involvement, actors and 
structures domestic to the political system appear to have been more influential than 
external “policy transfer” on relevant outcomes in the reform. For example, policy 
transfer processes were not determinative in establishing the Petroleum Commission 
in the first place. The analysis suggested that civil society organizations, domestic 
political processes and constitutional requirements had the greatest impact on the 
relevant outcomes studies in this thesis. Policy transfer “from abroad” proved most 
influential with respect to the technical assistance and capital support directed towards 
the Petroleum Commission from the Oil for Development program and the World 
Bank respectively.  
Furthermore, as argued in chapter 4 the findings in this thesis cannot readily be 
generalized to a “population” of similar cases. However, these findings may have 
transferability to similar instances of regulatory reforms in developing countries. 
Findings in this case study may contribute to the development of hypotheses about 
similar reform processes. The thesis thus aims to enter into dialogue with similar 
scholarly contributions on institutional change and more specifically regulatory 
reform in developing countries, advanced by among others Minogue and Carino 
(2006). 
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Further research on Ghana’s petroleum regulatory reform is recommended, as the 
reform process is still ongoing. The mechanisms that will allow the Petroleum 
Commission to properly enforce accountability towards operators in the petroleum 
sector are still unfolding. Likewise, outcomes regarding the Commission’s legal 
institutional independence may be affected by subsequent legislation currently being 
developed. Given its potential impact on the Petroleum Commission’s independence, 
I recommend a revisited analysis of the Petroleum Exploration and Production Bill, if 
and when it is passed into law. Concerning future theoretical developments, I support 
Evans and Davies (1999, 3) claim that Dolowtz and Marsh’ policy transfer framework 
should engage in theoretical and methodological pluralism and integration in order to 
make stronger knowledge claims. The frameworks’ conceptual categories have 
proved useful, but its explanatory power is weak. 
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Appendix 1 List of respondents 
No Date Name Place Role  
1 13.01.2014 Arne Olsen The Royal Norwegian Embassy in Accra  OfD secretariat 
2 17.01.2014 Steve Manteaw Integrated Social Development Centre (Isodec), Accra 
Chair of The Civil 
Society Platform on 
Oil and Gas 
3 17.01.2014 Frank Bannor Integrated Social Development Centre (Isodec) , Accra 
Programs officer, 
Publish What You 
Pay, Ghana 
4 17.01.2014 Cisca Sarfo-Addai 
Integrated Social Development 
Centre (Isodec) , Accra 
Programs Officer, 
Civil Society 
Platform on Oil and 
Gas 
5 20.01.2014 Mohammed Amin Adam 
Africa Centre for Energy Policy 
(ACEP) , Accra Director of ACEP 
6 20.01.2014 Fredrick Asiamah 
Centre for Public Interest Law, 
Accra 
President, Ghana 
Network of 
Extractive 
Industries 
Journalism  
7 22.01.2014 Kwaku Appiah-Adu  
Centre for Advanced Strategic 
Analysis (CASA) , Accra 
Professor of 
Business 
Management at 
Central University, 
Accra147 
8 29.01.2014 PC official 1 Ghana Petroleum Commission, Accra  
 Anonymous 
 
9 29.01.2014 Richard Afenu  Ghana Minerals Commission, Accra 
Manager, Sectoral 
Policy and 
Planning 
10 30.01.2014 Petter Stigseth The Royal Norwegian Embassy in Accra  
Director of the OfD 
Secretariat 
11 31.01.2014 PC official 2 Ghana Petroleum Commission, Accra  Anonymous 
12 03.02.2014 Government official 
Ghana Petroleum Commission, 
Accra  Anonymous 
13 03.02.2014 World Bank official 1  The World Bank, Accra Anonymous 
14 04.02.2014 World Bank official 2 The World Bank, Accra Anonymous 
15 04.02.2014 Harriet Solheim  
The Royal Norwegian Embassy 
in Accra  
Counselor, 
Norwegian 
Embassy in Accra 
16 06.02.2014 PC official 3  Ghana Petroleum Commission, Accra Anonymous 
17 06.02.2014 Representative of MoEP 
Ghana’s Ministry of Energy and 
Petroleum, Accra  Anonymous 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
147	  Previously: Head of the Policy Coordination, Monitoring and Evaluation Unit at the Office of the 
President and Chairman of the Oil and Gas Technical Committee	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Appendix 2 Introductory letter to respondents 
 
	  
 
Request for your participation in a research project: 
 
Aid and Petroleum Governance 
 
 
To [whom it may concern] 
 
I hereby invite you to participate as a respondent in my ongoing research project 
about institutional developments within Ghana’s petroleum governance sector. The 
topic is seen within the context of the Norwegian aid program “Oil for development” 
(OfD). An overarching theme of the research is to explore how different institutional 
mechanisms can work against the so-called “resource curse”. To gain insight about 
the topic I aim to interview various actors from the Ghanaian government and civil 
society among others. Due to your capacity as […] it would be very valuable to hear 
your perspectives regarding […]. The questions would be regarding […].  
 
The participation is voluntary. If you agree to participate as an interviewee you can 
still withdraw your participation at any time without any particular reason. The 
interview would be conducted as a semi structured conversation with duration of 
approximately one hour. If you approve so, the conversation will be taped. If you 
choose to withdraw as a respondent the collected materials will be deleted.  
 
The research is part of my masters’ degree and thesis at the institute for Political 
Science at the University of Oslo. The data collected will be treated in confidentiality 
and interviewees referred to anonymously in the final thesis. All data will be deleted 
after the end of the project which is estimated to be 2018. The research is conducted 
independent of the Norwegian government and they will not access the data.  
 
If you have questions or remarks please contact me at else.rafoss@gmail.com or my 
supervisor Jostein Askim at jostein.askim@stv.uio.no. 
 
The project is approved and registered at the Norwegian Social Science Data Services 
(NSD). 
 
Sincerely yours 
 
Else Margrete Rafoss 
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Appendix 3 Interview guides 
	  
Included in all interview guides: 
Opening phrases [Repetition of information provided in the informational letter] 
• Present myself and the project briefly. 
• Ask if the conversation can be taped. Clarify that the data will be treated 
anonymously and deleted after the end of the project. 
• Clarify that the project is independent of the Norwegian government at that they 
will not access the data.  
 
Interview guide 1: Petroleum Commission/Government officials  
General 
• Role/background  
• What is your role/position in the Petroleum Commission? (Education, previous 
workplace?) 
• What is the main role of the Petroleum Commission?  
 
Policy transfer  
Establishment of the Petroleum Commission and experience and knowledge transfer 
• What would you say were the main motivations/justifications to set up a 
Petroleum Commission in Ghana? Probes: To curb political interests? GNPC not 
being a player and a judge? Certain actors promoting it? What has characterized 
the policy discourse? 
• From where have lessons/experiences about the institutional structure and 
functions of the Petroleum Commission been drawn? Probe: 
Locally/internationally/”best practice”? 
• Has the Norwegian experience influenced the structure and functions of the PC? 
(How?) 
• Are there similarities with the Petroleum Commission and the Norwegian 
Petroleum Directorate? (Main differences?) 
• What type of training has been in focus the twinning arrangement? Probes: Has 
there been a focus on the separation of functions between three institutions? 
Roles? Focus on power relations or merely technical issues? 
 
Institutional Independence 
• Which types of work is still being done by the GNPC? Probes: The new chief 
executive is from the GNPC? The Petroleum Commission act states “6 months 
after passing the Act, the GNPC should no longer serve any advisory function” – 
(why) is it still? 
• Can you describe the role the Petroleum Commission has played in the processing 
of (oil) contracts so far? Probe: The GNPC has been doing the work – but has it 
collaborated with the PC? 
	   120 
• The Petroleum Exploration and Production Bill which is being passed. Here I see 
that several decisions of the Petroleum Commission is supposed to be taken in 
consultation with the minister – for example the management of the local content 
fund. Do you see this as an issue when it comes to your regulatory independence? 
• I read about The TEN project; heard that the Petroleum Commission did an 
evaluation of the Field Development plans and objected to some issues. The 
minister approved the plan without taking these into consideration. Can you 
describe this process for me? (What happened?) 
• You’ve changes office buildings three times is that right? Has this been connected 
to lack of funds? Could you describe to me that way the Commission is funded?   
 
• President appoints board members – do these have political background or?  
 
Accountability 
• Enforcement: You should make sure regulations are followed – what means does 
the Petroleum Commission have to make sure of that?  
• Answerability: Have the annual public reports on petroleum resources and 
activities been produced?  
• The Parliamentary Committee on mining and energy is supposed to keep scrutiny 
with the Petroleum Commission. Is that done?  
• Does The Auditor General perform oversight?  
 
Closure 
• Organizational map available? 
• Thank you very much for your time.  
• Do you have knowledge of other persons that would have insights about these 
issues that I should speak to? 
• Would it be okay that I contact you again via phone or e-mail if I have follow-up 
questions or questions of clarification regarding this interview?   
 
Interview guide 2: Civil Society Platform on Oil and Gas & Africa 
Centre for Energy Policy  
• Would you please describe your role/background? 
 
The Civil Society Sector  
• Could you please describe the civil society sector on oil and gas in Ghana? How it 
is structured and how it has emerged? Probe: How is competence built? 
Experiences from the mining sector?  
• What kind of work does your organization do?  
• I know the Norwegian aid agents have a goal of contributing to the strengthening 
of the civil society sector in Ghana. Have you been exposed to any external 
influence in terms of funding or training?   
 
Policy transfer  
• Is the so-called Norwegian oil experience talked about in the civil society 
discourse?  
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• Has the Norwegian experience had any influence in the development of the 
petroleum governance sector/its institutions? How? Certain traits that have been 
influential? Other donors? 
• Have important lessons been drawn from elsewhere? Locally? 
• Is there a tradition for independent regulators in Ghana?  
• Factors influencing the decision to establish the Petroleum Commission in Ghana?  
• Discussions among civil society on the accountability of the Petroleum 
Commission? 
 
Participation  
• (How) Is the Civil Society consulted when it comes to important political 
decisions?  
• Do you perceive that your points of view are taken into consideration? 
Achievements?  
• I was told that there is a seat for civil society persons on the board of the 
Petroleum Commission – is that so? (Doesn’t say so in the Act – says 1 person 
from EPA). How was this decision reached?    
• Do board members have connections to political parties/interests groups?  
 
Transparency  
• How much information is available about the public decisions in oil/gas 
governance?  Awarding of contracts? Appointments to top positions?  
 
Accountability 
• Is accountability a term used in the policy discourse? Important? 
• How is “accountability” understood (or operationalized)?   
• Does civil society strengthen accountability? How?  
• Do you think the Petroleum Commission will become fully independent from 
GNPC? 
• You have produced regular policy briefings – are these available?  
 
Closure 
• Is there anything you would like to add?  
• Thank you very much for your time.  
• Do you have knowledge of other persons that would have insights about these 
issues that I should speak to? Actors in civil Society? Journalists? 
Parliamentarians?  
• Would it be okay that I contact you again via phone or e-mail if I have follow-up 
questions or questions of clarification regarding this interview?   
 
Interview guide 3: OfD officials (in Norwegian)  
• Kan du beskrive din rolle eller stilling i OfU?  
• Kan du beskrive rollen til Ofu sekretariatet/organiseringen av Ofu-programmet?  
 
Ofu og institusjonsbyggng 
• Når man snakker om institusjonsbygging i Ofu; Hva legges i begrepet?  
•   Hvor stor andel av samarbeidet vil du anslå har vært fokusert på tekniske assistanse og 
hvor mye på institusjonsbygging?  
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• Ofu-programmet er etterspørselsbasert: Hvordan gjør det seg gjeldende når det gjelder 
institusjonsbyggingen? Norge som tar initiativ eller motsatt angående dette?  
• Ghana kommer godt ut av Scanteam-evalueringen. Spesielt når det gjelder 
institusjonsbygging og good governance. Har du en formening om hvorfor disse 
aspektene tilsynelatende har lyktes bedre i Ghana enn andre samarbeidsland? 
•   Hvordan har assistansen til GNPC vært gjennomført?  
• Har det vært spesielle utfordringer knyttet til institusjonsbyggingen (spesielt med tanke på 
Petroleumskommisjonen)? 
•   Opplevd noen kontroverser i samarbeidet (korrupsjon)?  
 
Sivilsamfunn/media 
• En av målsettingene er også å satse på styrking av sivilsamfunnsorganisasjoner. Hvordan 
har dette vært gjort i Ghana?  
• Er det visse organisasjoner det ville være interessant for meg å snakke med? 
• Har media vært opptatt av utviklingen av styringen av sektoren? Visse aktører?  
 
Accountability  
• Fokuset på good governance forstås som å styrke accountability og transparency. Hva har 
dette innebåret i Ghana? 
• Et viktig mål for OfU er ”policy makers and regulatory authorities are held accountable” I 
2012-rapporten nevnes ikke Ghana – hva har man oppnådd når det gjelder å styrke 
accountability i Ghana?  
• Hvordan holdes petroleumskommisjonen ansvarlig? Hvor stort innsyn har man i 
beslutningstakingen? 
 
Generelt om Petroleumskommisjonen 
•   Kan du kort beskrive Petroleumkommisjonens rolle (lisenser, konsesjoner)?  
•   Etterspørselsbasert bistand: Reguleringsrammeverket – Ghana som etterspurte eller Norge 
som foreslo?  
• Hvilke erfaringer har Ofu med utskilling av regulatorfunksjonen i andre samarbeidsland?  
• Er det viktige forskjeller mellom det norske Petroleumsdirektoratet og 
Petroleumskommisjonen i Ghana?  
 
Institusjonell uavhengighet  
• Funksjonene som nå ligger hos Petroleumskommisjonen lå jo tidligere under ministeriet, 
men i realiteten hos GNPC. Har dere inntrykk av at funksjonene er reelt overført så vel 
som formelt?  
• Har det vært en overføring av personell fra GNPC til PC?  
• Har dere samarbeidspersoner jeg kunne kontaktet i GNPC? 
 
Interview guide 4: World Bank officials  
• Background of respondent/role in the World Bank  
• Can you describe the relationship between the “local” branches and Washington?  
• What kind of assistance has the World Bank provided to Ghana’s government 
regarding oil and gas (public sector)? 
• Which, if any, conditionalities have accompanied the assistance? “Triggers”?  
• How would you describe you cooperation with the Norwegian government?  
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• How is the assistance from the Norwegian government viewed upon (any 
criticisms)?  
• What involvement has the World Bank had in the implementation of the 
Petroleum Commission Act  
• What involvement has the World Bank had in the development of the Petroleum 
Commission? 
• What is you view on how the Petroleum Commission has function in these initial 
years? Probe: Certain challenges?  
• How does the Parliamentary Committee on Mines and Energy keep scrutiny with 
the Petroleum Commission?  
• What means does the World Bank employ to strengthen accountability and 
transparency in the petroleum sector? 
